{"title":"法国双重医疗服务市场的均衡搜索模型","authors":"Damien Besancenot, R. Vranceanu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3019903","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Equilibrium Search Model of the French Dual Market for Medical Services\",\"authors\":\"Damien Besancenot, R. Vranceanu\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3019903\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.\",\"PeriodicalId\":153208,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Search\",\"volume\":\"55 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-06-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Search\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3019903\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Search","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3019903","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
An Equilibrium Search Model of the French Dual Market for Medical Services
The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.
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