IO: Theory eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Selling Signals","authors":"Zhuoran Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3372008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372008","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies a signaling model in which a strategic player can manipulate the signaling cost. A seller chooses a price schedule for a good, and a buyer with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to receivers. When receivers observe the price schedule, the seller charges monopoly prices, and the buyer purchases less than the first-best. In contrast, when receivers do not observe the price schedule, the demand for signals is more elastic. We propose a new refinement, the Quasi-Divinity, to refine the equilibria. In equilibrium, the seller charges lower prices, and the buyer purchases more than when receivers observe the price schedule; the highest buyer types purchase more than the first-best. The model suggests that price transparency benefits the seller but harms the buyer. The model can be applied to schools choosing tuition, retailers selling luxury goods and media companies selling advertisements.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115470904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Effectiveness and Efficiency of State Aid for New Broadband Networks: Evidence from OECD Member States","authors":"Wolfgang Briglauer, M. Grajek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3909746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3909746","url":null,"abstract":"The deployment of new broadband networks (NBNs) based on fiber-optic transmission technologies promises high gains in terms of productivity and economic growth, and has attracted subsidies worth billions from governments around the world in the form of various state aid programs. Yet, the effectiveness and the efficiency of such programs remains largely unstudied. We employ panel data from 32 OECD countries during 2002-2019 to provide robust empirical evidence of both. We find that state aid significantly increases NBNs by facilitating the deployment of new connections to 22% of households in the short term and 39.2% in the long term. By comparing the actual amounts of state aid support to the estimated impact on GDP growth, we also find it to be highly cost efficient, as the programs break even after three years on average.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117094823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Price Squeezes as an Exploitative Abuse","authors":"Zhijun Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3903857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3903857","url":null,"abstract":"Price squeezes have been commonly viewed as an exclusionary abuse under the argument of \"constructive refusal to deal\", however, such an argument has been challenged by the courts and legal scholars. This paper proposes an exploitative rationale for price squeezes. A vertically integrated dominant firm can exploit efficiency gains from a downstream competitor and price squeezing is a necessary condition for such exploitation. Price squeezing forces the competitor to produce at a lower marginal cost than the dominant firm so that the dominant firm can earn more than the monopoly profit by extracting part of efficiency gains from the rival. Exploitation through price squeezing reduces the rival's profit unfairly and distorts the production efficiency without benefiting consumers. Prohibiting price squeezes benefits the competitor and improves production efficiency without harming consumers. This paper lays a solid economic foundation for treating price squeeze cases and contributes to reconciling the diverging approach adopted by the courts in the United States and the European Union in recent price squeeze cases.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125539581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Price Differences Within Retail Gasoline Markets","authors":"Julia González, C. Hurtado","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3901166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3901166","url":null,"abstract":"This paper characterizes fueling stations' pricing strategies to study price variation within retail gasoline markets. We use a unique dataset with stations' locations and daily gasoline prices in the major cities of the continental U.S. to classify cycler and non-cycler stations. We exploit station-level variability in pricing behavior within retail gasoline markets to show that cyclers charge about 4¢ lower gasoline prices than non-cyclers, on average. Additionally, we confirm an almost biweekly duration of the station-level cycling behavior. Finally, we provide evidence of consumer search to explain the intra-market pricing strategy heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134026936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Macroeconomic Model of Federal and Commercial Spectrum Usage","authors":"Carolyn A. Kahn, Daniel Brown, Susan S. M. Hanson, Dr. Zekarias Hussein, J. McQueston, H. Nam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3897861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3897861","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A Macroeconomic Model of Federal and Commercial Spectrum Usage introduces a methodology to assess the macroeconomic impact of electromagnetic spectrum decisions and provides general results on a case study of the economic impact of shifting from fourth generation (4G) to fifth generation (5G) wireless technology. This article provides a summary introduction to this new research tool.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122095453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Obfuscation and Rational Inattention in Digitalized Markets","authors":"Aljoscha Janssen, Johannes Kasinger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3779853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3779853","url":null,"abstract":"We study the behavior of duopolistic firms that can obfuscate their prices before competing on price. Obfuscation affects the rational inattentive consumers’ optimal information strategy, which determines the probabilistic demand. Our model advances related models by allowing consumers to update their unrestricted prior beliefs with an informative signal of any form. We show that the game may result in an obfuscation equilibrium with high prices or a transparency equilibrium with low prices and no obfuscation, providing an argument for market regulation. Obfuscation equilibria cease to exist for low information costs and if one firm seems a priori considerably more attractive.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134430442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Deregulation and the Lawyers' Cartel","authors":"Nuno Garoupa, M. Marković","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3872974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3872974","url":null,"abstract":"At one time, the legal profession largely regulated itself. However, based on the economic notion that increased competition would benefit consumers, jurisdictions have deregulated their legal markets by easing rules relating to attorney advertising, fees, and, most recently, nonlawyer ownership of law firms. Yet, despite reformers’ high expectations, legal markets today resemble those of previous decades, and most legal services continue to be delivered by traditional law firms. How to account for this seeming inertia? We argue that the competition paradigm is theoretically flawed because it fails to fully account for market failures relating to asymmetric information, imperfect information, and negative externalities. In addition, the regulatory costs imposed on sophisticated consumers such as corporate purchasers of legal services differ radically from those imposed on ordinary consumers who use legal services infrequently. Merely increasing the number and types of legal services providers cannot make legal markets more efficient. We illustrate our theoretical account with evidence from the United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia. For legal markets to better serve the public, regulators must tailor solutions by segment. Regulators should seek to minimize negative externalities associated with the delivery of legal services to the corporate segment and confront information asymmetries that lead to the maldistribution of legal services in the consumer segment. Deregulation alone is insufficient and may in fact exacerbate existing market failures.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116297967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"To Split or to Merge?: How Partitioning Affects Consumption and Engagement with Digital Content","authors":"Heeseung Andrew Lee, A. Choi, Tianshu Sun, Wonseok Oh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3859780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3859780","url":null,"abstract":"Although serialized digital content is becoming increasingly popular in online platforms, authors and publishers have a limited understanding of the economic effects arising from content partitioning. This research investigated how partitioning serialized e-books affects the consumption patterns and engagement behaviors of consumers. Identical e-book titles were partitioned into two formats: small partitioning (SP), in which overlong stories are split into numerous short episodes per installment, and large partitioning (LP), in which narratives are divided into a few episodes, each delivered through longer storytelling. Drawing on the literature on resource partitioning and cognitive processing, we formulated hypotheses revolving around how these partitioning structures affect consumption quantity (i.e., the total number of words read) and progression rate (i.e., how far a consumer progresses into an entire serialized book). We then assessed the extent to which book length moderates the relationship between partitioning structures and consumption behaviors. Finally, attention was directed toward how partitioning structures influence engagement behaviors, such as consumption intensity (i.e., the use of textual annotations and highlights) and review propensity (i.e., the submission of book reviews). For empirical validations, we collaborated with a partner company in developing a consumption-tracing scheme, which keeps track of individual users’ consumption of and engagement with serialized content. The findings revealed that SP structures more effectively increase consumption quantity measured by the number of words read than do LP formats but that LP outcompetes SP in terms of elevating progression rate. As book length increases, the positive effects of SP and LP on consumption quantity and progression rate considerably diminish, respectively. Finally, LP is more effective than SP in inducing higher degrees of engagement measured on the basis of textual annotation and highlighting as well as the predisposition to submit book reviews. We provide scholarly and practical implications for how the partitioning of serialized content influences consumption and engagement patterns, which serve as essential resources in efforts to ensure the growth and sustainability of digital content platforms.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121453832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Trade in Vertically Differentiated Goods under Duopoly","authors":"Agnimitra Chatterjee, Surajit Bhattacharyya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3857453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3857453","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the possibility of free trade between two countries, differentiated in terms of the market size and where each of them has a monopoly firm that produces a vertically differentiated good. The two monopoly firms are involved in intra-industry trade. At autarky, in any one country, only one quality of the good is available. However, strict convexity of the monopolist’s cost function yields the possibility of two different qualities being produced by each of the two firms. In the free trade equilibrium, the foreign firm, as the Stackelberg leader, can devise a predatory strategy and sweeps out the higher-quality product of the domestic firm from the open market. On the contrary, the home firm as price leader can drive the lower quality product out of the market.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133438703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Beneficial Product Returns in Supply Chains","authors":"Meng Li, Yunchuan Liu","doi":"10.1111/poms.13519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13519","url":null,"abstract":"Many retailers and manufacturers accept product returns from consumers (via money-back guarantees) and retailers (via full-credit return policies) respectively. While the extant literature focuses on either manufacturer or retailer return policies, this paper investigates both return policies and finds that a manufacturer's return policy can induce the retailer to adopt a return policy. Although accepting consumer returns hurts the manufacturer when the manufacturer sells through non-competing retailers, we find that the manufacturer is not destined to be hurt by accepting returns when selling to competing retailers that are differentiated in their returns rates.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124678418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}