数字化市场中的混淆与理性忽视

Aljoscha Janssen, Johannes Kasinger
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们研究了双寡头企业在价格竞争之前可以混淆价格的行为。混淆影响了理性不注意消费者的最优信息策略,从而决定了概率需求。我们的模型通过允许消费者用任何形式的信息信号更新他们不受限制的先验信念来推进相关模型。我们表明,该博弈可能导致高价格的混淆均衡或低价格且无混淆的透明度均衡,为市场监管提供了论据。当信息成本较低时,如果一家公司似乎先验地更具吸引力,那么混淆均衡就不复存在了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Obfuscation and Rational Inattention in Digitalized Markets
We study the behavior of duopolistic firms that can obfuscate their prices before competing on price. Obfuscation affects the rational inattentive consumers’ optimal information strategy, which determines the probabilistic demand. Our model advances related models by allowing consumers to update their unrestricted prior beliefs with an informative signal of any form. We show that the game may result in an obfuscation equilibrium with high prices or a transparency equilibrium with low prices and no obfuscation, providing an argument for market regulation. Obfuscation equilibria cease to exist for low information costs and if one firm seems a priori considerably more attractive.
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