IO: Theory eJournal最新文献

Gainers and Losers from Market Integration 市场一体化的赢家和输家

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3502024

H. Gersbach, H. Haller

引用次数: 5

Price Authority under Competing Organizations 竞争组织下的价格管理机构

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3939736

Enriqueta Andreu, D. Neven, S. Piccolo, Roberto Venturini

{"title":"Price Authority under Competing Organizations","authors":"Enriqueta Andreu, D. Neven, S. Piccolo, Roberto Venturini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3939736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3939736","url":null,"abstract":"This paper characterizes the degree of price discretion that competing organizations (principals) award to their sales managers (agents) and examines how such discretion is affected by principals' competitive conduct, market concentration, product substitutability, and demand volatility. We lay down a model in which firms sell differentiated products and sales managers own private information about demand and incur positive marketing costs to sell products to final consumers. Principals cannot internalize these costs through monetary incentives and need to design `permission sets' from which their representatives choose prices. The objective is to understand the forces shaping this set and the constraints (if any) imposed on equilibrium prices. We find that when principals behave non-cooperatively, sales managers are biased towards excessively high prices owing to their will to pass on marketing costs to consumers. Hence, in equilibrium, the permission set requires a list price that caps agents' pricing choices. Such list price is more likely to bind in less concentrated industries, when products are closer substitutes, in industries where distribution requires sufficiently high costs and demand is not too volatile. Instead, when principals behave cooperatively and maximize industry profit, the optimal delegation scheme is more complex. Because principals want to raise prices to the monopoly level, in this regime, the optimal permission features a price floor rather than a list price when the marketing cost is sufficiently low, it features instead full discretion for moderate values of this cost, and only when it is sufficiently high, a list price is optimal. Interestingly, while competition hinders delegation in the noncooperative regime, the opposite happens when principals maximize industry profit.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121181114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Cash Hedging Motivates Information Sharing in Supply Chains 现金套期保值激励供应链信息共享

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3936170

Puping (Phil) Jiang, Panos Kouvelis

{"title":"Cash Hedging Motivates Information Sharing in Supply Chains","authors":"Puping (Phil) Jiang, Panos Kouvelis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3936170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3936170","url":null,"abstract":"We study the interplay between firms’ information sharing behaviors and cash hedging strategies in supply chains. First, we argue that if an information-sharing channel is built up to guide supplier’s cash hedging strategies, then voluntary market information sharing from retailer to supplier may take place when information rent on cost reduction effect of hedging, i.e., the effect of reduced expected cost attained by a more informed supplier via cash hedging outweighs the summation of information rent on flexibility loss of hedging, i.e., the effect of losing contingent production opportunity by a more informed supplier after cash hedging, and wholesale cost of information sharing, i.e., more exploitative wholesale price by a more informed supplier. Second, we find that for homogeneous Cournot-competing retailers, asymmetric information-sharing outcomes could emerge as equilibrium, and building up an information-sharing channel typically will not hurt, and sometimes it can achieve Pareto improvement of the supply chain and consumer welfare. Third, when a single supplier serves multiple markets, the heterogeneity across market sizes and the correlation among market shocks play big roles in shaping the equilibrium. Especially in a simultaneous information-sharing game, greater market size heterogeneity, and negatively correlated market shocks are more likely to result in the nonexistence of pure Nash equilibrium. When the Stackelberg sequence is introduced, greater market size heterogeneity and positively correlated market shocks are more likely to induce information sharing in the equilibrium. Furthermore, in the multi-market setting, the existence of an information-sharing channel could hurt retailers, the system as a whole, and consumer welfare.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133233025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model 平台竞争和互操作性:净收费模式

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3945134

M. Ekmekci, Alexander White, Ling-Xiao Wu

引用次数: 0

Risks and Global Supply Chains: What We Know and What We Need to Know 风险和全球供应链:我们知道什么和我们需要知道什么

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-09-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3936008

R. Baldwin, R. Freeman

引用次数: 65

Data-Driven Collusion and Competition in a Pricing Duopoly With Multinomial Logit Demand 具有多项Logit需求的定价双寡头的数据驱动合谋与竞争

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-09-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3916076

Thomas Loots, Arnoud V. den Boer

{"title":"Data-Driven Collusion and Competition in a Pricing Duopoly With Multinomial Logit Demand","authors":"Thomas Loots, Arnoud V. den Boer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3916076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3916076","url":null,"abstract":"We consider dynamic pricing and demand learning in a duopoly, both from the perspective where the firms compete against each other and from the perspective where the firms aim to collude to increase their revenues. We adopt the widely studied multinomial logit demand model and construct a sustainable notion of collusion, called fair Pareto optimal pricing, that ensures equal relative revenue improvements for both firms compared to the Nash equilibrium. In contrast to other notions of collusion such as joint-revenue maximization, we show that fair Pareto optimal pricing is always detrimental for consumers and profitable for both firms in the duopoly, regardless of the model parameters. Next, we construct a price algorithm that learns the fair Pareto optimal price from accumulating data if deployed by both firms in the duopoly, and prove theoretical performance bounds. In addition, we propose a mechanism to infer demand observations from the competitor's price path, so that our algorithm can operate in a setting where prices are public but demand is private information. We also construct a price algorithm for the case that the firms compete against each other, and show that it learns to respond optimally against a class of algorithms that includes best-response and fixed-price policies. Our work contributes to the understanding of well-performing price policies in a competitive multi-agent setting, and also shows that collusion by algorithms is in theory possible and deserves the attention of lawmakers and competition policy regulators.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127418606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Marketplace Lending: Matching Small Businesses with Specialized Fintech Lenders 市场借贷:将小企业与专业金融科技贷款机构相匹配

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-09-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3916385

Mark J. Johnson

引用次数: 1

Cross-Market Platform Competition in Mobile App Economy 手机应用经济中的跨平台竞争

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3927540

Yusuke Zennyo

引用次数: 1

Decentralized Payment Clearing using Blockchain and Optimal Bidding 使用区块链和最优竞价的去中心化支付清算

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3915103

H. Amini, Maxim Bichuch, Zachary Feinstein