{"title":"Bargaining Between Collaborators of a Stochastic Project","authors":"Z. Ning","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3679737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3679737","url":null,"abstract":"Some projects require collaboration between two firms. The expected return from such alliance can change over time due to evolving market conditions or arrival of new information. In such cases, when do firms agree to collaborate, and how do they split the profit? To address these questions, the paper studies a continuous-time model of bargaining with a stochastic surplus. The paper shows that the existence of outside options creates a hold-up problem that leads to inefficiencies. Firms act too impatiently, causing both the probability of collaborating and its timing to be sub- optimal. Increasing the frequency of counteroffers in bargaining, which has the effect of balancing their bargaining power, improves efficiency by reducing the hold-up. More importantly, the paper finds that a more balanced bargaining power can lead to Pareto improvement. The model illustrates the effect of outside options and bargaining power on firms’ decision to collaborate, and shows how potential collaborators should (not) bargain.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124732820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantum Prices","authors":"Diego Aparicio, R. Rigobón","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3644988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3644988","url":null,"abstract":"Online data was collected for 350,000 products from over 65 fashion retailers in the U.S. and the U.K. Many retailers practice an extreme form of stickiness described as quantum prices: a large number of differentiated products are priced using few sparse prices, with price changes occurring rarely and in large magnitudes. Quantum prices exist within categories (similar products) and across product introductions (over time). Most surprisingly, it also occurs across categories (very different products). Normalized measures indicate substantial price clustering beyond the role of popular prices, assortment size, or digit endings. Quantum prices imply frictions in lumpy price adjustments through product mix, inflation measurement, and in the law-of-one-price.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126246481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firm Quasi-Dynamics in the Chinese Manufacturing Industries","authors":"Lixing Li, Qihong Liu, Changyu Ren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3515640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3515640","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the firm quasi-dynamics (entry/exit and growth) in the Chinese manufacturing industries and investigate how these dynamics vary across regions. Our results show that relative to provinces with less developed economies, in provinces with more developed economies: \u0000 \u0000(1) There are higher shares of new firms; \u0000 \u0000(2) New firms are smaller and more labor-intensive; \u0000 \u0000(3) Firms exit at a quicker rate and surviving firms grow faster. \u0000 \u0000These results point toward cross-region differences in market efficiency in terms of how much it costs a firm to enter or exit the market. Our findings shed light on how firms should adapt their strategies across regions and how the government should create sound policies on industrial upgrading and relocation.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132168204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effect of Ease of Use, Service Quality, Price and Brand Image on Purchase Decision in Tokopedia","authors":"Ilyas Pratama Yusran, Osly Usman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3511283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3511283","url":null,"abstract":"This research was conducted to determine the relationship between the effect of the ease of use, quality of service, price, brand image to the purchasing decision on the application Tokopedia. The research was carried out for two months, starting three months from October to December 2019. The research method used was a survey method with the approach of causality. The population in this study is randomized, amounting to 219 respondents. Data collection techniques using literature techniques and questionnaires. Data were analyzed using SmartPLS software version 3. PLS (Partial Least Square) with structural equation analysis (SEM). Results showed that each variable has the same influence. These results can be said purchasing decisions made by consumers on applications Tokopedia influenced and based on ease of use, quality of service, and brand image. According to this study, the price does not influence purchasing decisions by consumers on the Tokopedia application.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130935498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multidimensional Non-Linear Pricing: Evidence from Energy Consumption with a Mixture Pricing Mechanism","authors":"Xintong Han, Zimin Liu, Tong Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3508527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508527","url":null,"abstract":"In current business practice, sellers often combine a variety of pricing strategies to segment the market. These practices often leave consumers with pricing schedules that are highly non-linear and multidimensional. This paper develops a novel structural approach for estimating multidimensional non-linear pricing schemes with more than one decision variable. Using a rich and unique panel data of residents’ electricity consumption, we structurally estimate consumer preferences for electricity consumption in a setting with electricity tariffs, using both an Increasing Block Price (IBP) structure as well as a Time-of-Use (ToU) structure. Our model estimation allows us to identify and evaluate household-level elasticities in price elasticity of demand. Our counterfactual analysis shows that a seemingly welfare-improving policy may trigger the strategic behaviour of consumers and, ultimately, be contrary to the original purpose.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123589318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Á. Cartea, M. Flora, Tiziano Vargiolu, Georgi Slavov
{"title":"Optimal Cross-Border Electricity Trading","authors":"Á. Cartea, M. Flora, Tiziano Vargiolu, Georgi Slavov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3506915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3506915","url":null,"abstract":"We show there exists a profitable cross-border trading strategy for an agent who trades electricity in the European electricity network. Data of the European markets are employed to show how electricity prices in all locations of the network are affected by the flow of power between any two locations that trade power between them. The optimal cross-border trading strategy is derived via the explicit solution of a non-trivial stochastic control problem in which prices at different locations are co-integrated and trading affects prices in all locations of the network.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121570609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Selective Distribution Networks for the Marketing of Luxury Branded Products versus the Amazon Marketplace: The Sisley v Amazon Case before the Court of Milan","authors":"M. Giannino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3506834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3506834","url":null,"abstract":"By an interlocutory order the District Court of Milan found that putting on sale on an electronic marketplace branded luxury products according to selling modalities that differ from the qualitative standards that the supplier has imposed on the resellers admitted to the selective distribution network created for the marketing of those products amounts to a trademark infringement. The Court of Milan confirms that the existence of a lawful competition-compliant selective distribution system constitutes a legitimate reason for not applying the principle of exhaustion. And more importantly, for the first time in Italy, the Court of Milan expressly found that the online sale of branded luxury products in defiance of the selling conditions imposed by the head of a selective distribution network infringes the trademark rights of the latter on such products. This paper reviews the decision of the Court of Milan and gives an insight into its practical implications.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115671854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Siting and Operating Incentives in Electrical Networks: A Study of Mispricing in Australia’s Zonal Market","authors":"M. Katzen, Gordon W. Leslie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3501336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501336","url":null,"abstract":"The incentives electricity generators face in investment and output decisions hinge on market design. Under zonal market designs, where profit-maximizing participants face a uniform regional price, achieving lowest-cost system-wide production can be impossible. Further, zonal designs can incentivize siting in inefficient locations behind network constraints. We develop measures of mispricing that compare the zonal prices generators receive to locational marginal prices that value congestion externalities from generator output. We apply these measures to show wind and solar generators are increasingly siting in constrained areas of the Australian network, and highlight sources of potential efficiency gains from adopting locational marginal pricing.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114947935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B. Bollinger, U. Doraszelski, K. Judd, R. McDevitt
{"title":"The Timing and Location of Entry in Growing Markets: Subgame Perfection at Work","authors":"B. Bollinger, U. Doraszelski, K. Judd, R. McDevitt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3500963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3500963","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a dynamic model in which firms decide when and where to enter a growing market. We do not pre-specify the order of entry, allowing instead for the roles of leader and follower to be determined endogenously. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game and show that the times and locations of entry are governed by the threat of preemption. Because each rm has the opportunity to preempt its rival, both firms tend to enter too early. This in turn leads to rent dissipation. We show that rent dissipation may be far greater than when it is assumed that firms enter the market in a pre-specified order, the assumption made in the existing literature on spatial competition. In an empirical application, we study the entry of restaurants, gas stations, and hotels at highway intersections, finding results largely consistent with our model's predictions.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125145494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quality Selection in Two-Sided Markets: A Constrained Price Discrimination Approach","authors":"Ramesh Johari, Bar Light, G. Weintraub","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3759241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3759241","url":null,"abstract":"Online platforms collect rich information about participants and then share some of this information with their participants to improve market outcomes. In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue. To study this information disclosure problem, we introduce two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce). Our main results provide conditions under which simple information structures commonly observed in practice, such as banning certain sellers from the platform while not distinguishing between participating sellers, maximize the platform's revenue. An important innovation in our analysis that we leverage to obtain our structural results is to transform the study of the two-sided market platform's optimal information disclosure policy into a constrained price discrimination problem.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124796019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}