IO: Theory eJournal最新文献_第3页

Pricing, Quality, and Stocking Decisions in a Manufacturer-Centric Dual-Channel 以制造商为中心的双通道中的定价、质量和库存决策

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-04-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3471948

Xiaomeng Guo, P. Kouvelis, Danko Turcic

{"title":"Pricing, Quality, and Stocking Decisions in a Manufacturer-Centric Dual-Channel","authors":"Xiaomeng Guo, P. Kouvelis, Danko Turcic","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3471948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3471948","url":null,"abstract":"Problem description. We consider a dual channel in which a focal manufacturer (he) sells his output through his online store and an independent brick-and-mortar retailer (she). In this manufacturer-centric dual channel, we study product line, stocking, and pricing decisions in the presence of stochastic demand and inventory constraints. The pricing decisions include choosing whether to give price match guarantees (PMGs), standard in the U.S. retail practice. Methodology/Results. We analyze a game-theoretic model in which a focal manufacturer designs a product line, sets wholesale prices, and decides what products to sell in the dual channel. An independent brick-and-mortar retailer responds to the product line design and the wholesale prices by making stocking decisions in her store. Then, both stores observe demand and independently set retail prices subject to any PMGs that the stores gave to consumers. The brick-and-mortar store (online store) fulfills demand in a make-to-stock (make-to-order) fashion. We find that whenever one of the stores holds a competitive advantage, the manufacturer sells the same product line in both stores. If the brick-and-mortar store holds an advantage, it matches the online store’s retail price to obtain favorable wholesale pricing from the manufacturer. We find no equilibria where the online store price matches the brick-and-mortar store or the stores’ prices match each other. Finally, when neither store has a clear advantage, the manufacturer mitigates price competition by designing a different product for each store. Managerial implications. Our model helps identify optimal stocking and pricing strategies that depend on e-fulfillment cost and demand uncertainty and offers a novel reason for offering PMGs in a supply chain.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130486005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Bargaining Competition and Vertical Mergers 议价竞争与垂直并购

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3760634

W. Boshoff, Luke M. Froeb, Roan Minnie, S. Tschantz

引用次数: 1

Inequality's Economic and Social Roots: The Role of Social Networks and Homophily 不平等的经济和社会根源:社会网络和同质性的作用

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-03-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3795626

M. Jackson

引用次数: 24

Market concentration and the dynamics of prices and mark-ups 市场集中度以及价格和加价的动态

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3801886

Curtis J. Kephart, David R. Munro

引用次数: 0

Geographic Networks and Spillovers between Banks 地理网络和银行间的溢出效应

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3561591

S. Shakya

引用次数: 2

Manufacturer’s "1-Up" from Used Games: Insights from the Secondhand Market for Video Games 制造商如何从二手游戏中“胜出”:二手电子游戏市场的见解

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3487397

Antino Kim, Rajib L. Saha, Warut Khern-am-nuai

{"title":"Manufacturer’s \"1-Up\" from Used Games: Insights from the Secondhand Market for Video Games","authors":"Antino Kim, Rajib L. Saha, Warut Khern-am-nuai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3487397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3487397","url":null,"abstract":"In contrast to industries of other types of information goods, the video game industry still has a sizable secondhand market for games. This is particularly notable because some of the major gaming-console companies (e.g., Sony and Microsoft) actually possess the ability to annihilate the secondhand market altogether; it appears that those companies have given tacit approval to buying and selling used games. Naturally, the question is, what is the special ingredient in the gaming industry that gives a manufacturer incentive to keep a healthy secondhand market even when it has the technological means to shut it down? In this study, leveraging a game-theoretic model, we investigate the effect of gaming console on a manufacturer’s strategy in the presence of a secondhand market for games. We find that when the manufacturer offers a valuable console that provides utilities in addition to playing games, the secondhand market increases the manufacturer’s profit, and that is not at the cost of consumers; the consumers—as well as the society as a whole—also benefit from the secondhand market. This is in stark contrast with settings where there are no consoles involved or the consoles do not offer any intrinsic value; in such settings, the manufacturer would opt to shut down the secondhand market. In the case with a valuable console, however, the increasing appeal of the secondhand market to consumers may improve the manufacturer’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare, all at the same time. We discuss our findings along with managerial and welfare implications.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122862193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Personalised Pricing: The Demise of the Fixed Price? 个性化定价:固定价格的消亡?

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3792842

J. Poort, Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius

引用次数: 2

Carpool Services for Ride-sharing Platforms: Price and Welfare Implications 拼车平台的拼车服务:价格和福利影响

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3709645

Xuan Wang, Renyu (Philip) Zhang

{"title":"Carpool Services for Ride-sharing Platforms: Price and Welfare Implications","authors":"Xuan Wang, Renyu (Philip) Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3709645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709645","url":null,"abstract":"There has been rapid growth in on-demand ride-hailing platforms that serve as an intermediary to match individual service providers (drivers) with consumer demand (riders). Several major players of this market have introduced carpool services that allow passengers heading towards the same direction to share a ride at a discounted fare. In this paper, we develop an analytical model to study the pricing issues of ride-sharing platforms in the presence of carpool services, and their economical and social implications. We show that the carpool service should be provided when its quality and/or the pooling efficiency is high. Adopting carpool services enables the platform to achieve a larger market coverage and allows the customers to enjoy more affordable rides without any sacrifice in service quality. Our analysis reveals that the provision of carpool services benefits the platform and the riders in general, but may hurt the drivers. Our extensive numerical studies suggest that the carpool service and surge pricing, which are two operational levers to match supply with demand, are strategic complements when the demand-supply imbalance is severe, and they become strategic substitutes with balanced demand and supply.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124736806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Relative Prices, Comparative Advantage, and Trade Patterns with Three or More Countries and Goods 相对价格，比较优势，与三个或更多国家和商品的贸易模式

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3786753

H. Thompson

引用次数: 0

Disclosure Policy for Relative Performance Indicators under Product Market Competition 产品市场竞争下的相对绩效指标披露政策

IO: Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3779116

Jumpei Hamamura

引用次数: 2