IO: Theory eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Performance Effects of Diversification: Theory and Evidence on Importance of Nature of Information","authors":"Oghenovo A. Obrimah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3449225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449225","url":null,"abstract":"By definition, diversified corporations consist of several segments. By definition, venture capital firms consist of several segments, that is, funds, each of which has its own legal identity. Feasibility of coinvestments between funds that are managed by the same firm, but of which some are focused (`focused funds') on the technology sector, and others, either focused (for arrival at a `focused firm'), or `generalist' (for arrival at a `diversified firm') provides a unique opportunity for empirical tests of performance effects of corporate diversification. Study findings show, relative to focused firms, that diversified (hybrid) firms are associated with positive abnormal long-run exit performance. The finding that diversified firms take better advantage of arrival of positive shocks within investment opportunity sets of focused funds - an opportunity set held in common by focused and diversified firms - provides unambiguous evidence for efficiency of internal capital markets of diversified firms. Formal theoretical predictions and empirical findings show that while performance effects of corporate diversification align with performance effects of internal capital markets, the extant finding that diversification premiums align with dominance of the diversification structure (Santalo and Becerra 2008) lacks character of a necessary condition for efficiency of internal capital markets.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121002000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ramsey Pricing: A Simple Example of a Subordinate Commodity","authors":"P. Bertoletti","doi":"10.1007/s10258-023-00238-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10258-023-00238-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114990859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Network Cluster-Robust Inference","authors":"Michael P. Leung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3763257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3763257","url":null,"abstract":"Since network data commonly consists of observations from a single large network, researchers often partition the network into clusters in order to apply cluster‐robust inference methods. Existing such methods require clusters to be asymptotically independent. Under mild conditions, we prove that, for this requirement to hold for network‐dependent data, it is necessary and sufficient that clusters have low conductance, the ratio of edge boundary size to volume. This yields a simple measure of cluster quality. We find in simulations that when clusters have low conductance, cluster‐robust methods control size better than HAC estimators. However, for important classes of networks lacking low‐conductance clusters, the former can exhibit substantial size distortion. To determine the number of low‐conductance clusters and construct them, we draw on results in spectral graph theory that connect conductance to the spectrum of the graph Laplacian. Based on these results, we propose to use the spectrum to determine the number of low‐conductance clusters and spectral clustering to construct them.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116765524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication","authors":"M. Andrés, Lisa V. Bruttel, J. Friedrichsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3769348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3769348","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge the communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134362370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Building Blocks of Software Platforms: Understanding the Past to Forge the Future","authors":"He Li, William J. Kettinger","doi":"10.17705/1JAIS.00706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17705/1JAIS.00706","url":null,"abstract":"This study takes a review and theory development (RTD) approach to synthesizing the software platform literature, offering theoretical perspective and research guidance. In doing so, we conceptualize platform and complementary capabilities for software platform owners and complementors. The review indicates that three dimensions reflect platform capabilities: intermediarity, generativity, and ambidexterity, while complementary capabilities include creativity, interconnectivity, and appropriability dimensions. We derive an integrative framework of software platforms, which explains (1) how software platform owners and complementors improve performance by enhancing their capabilities, and (2) how software platform owners, complementors, and the ecosystem environment coevolve. We then discuss how future research can build on and enrich the research framework","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125336302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When the Soapbox Talks: Platforms as Public Utilities (draft)","authors":"Patrick Ward","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3820239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3820239","url":null,"abstract":"Soapboxes are frequently used to illustrate the utility of modern-day informational platforms. The Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU described chat rooms as allowing “any person with a phone line [to] become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.” 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). However, the legal literature rarely goes further in the comparison than conjuring the idyllic scene of a soapbox orator in the classic town square. Instead, scholars more often focus on the shift from mass media to “many-media” and how to update laws to fit mass media’s regulatory environment to the present day, including First Amendment concerns and extending liability to platforms.<br><br>These comparisons miss half the story. Comparisons to mass media rightly capture the concentration of corporate power inherent to mass media and present in modern-day platforms. The comparisons miss the amplification, portability, and affordability for the speaker in both the soapbox and social media eras. Overlooking these eras’ shared democratization of speech, the current literature fails to acknowledge the public and democratic aspects of the control of speech in the soapbox era and thus fails to consider the need for the same type of control of informational platforms today. <br><br>The legal literature has engaged with the idea of platforms as public utilities, but without framing the current era as a combination of the soapbox era and the mass media era. This Article addresses this deficiency by making a robust comparison to the soapbox era and exploring the need for public, democratic control of speech on informational platforms.<br><br>This Article has two parts. Part I will first compare the soapbox platform and soapbox oratory to informational platforms. In doing so, Part I will define informational platforms, explain why this comparison is worthwhile, and detail the key similarities and differences between soapbox oratory and informational platforms. In discussing the key similarities and differences, Part I will describe and apply Lawrence Lessig’s modalities of regulation. Part II will argue that informational platforms should be regulated like public utilities. To that end, Part II explains K. Sabeel Rahman’s infrastructural regulation approach and applies the approach to informational platforms, determining that informational platforms do provide infrastructural resources. Part II also offers potential policy responses consistent with the public utility approach, including firewalls, public obligations, and public options.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"273 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122129183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Merger Remedies, Incomplete Information, and Commitment","authors":"B. Johansen, T. Nilssen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3750849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3750849","url":null,"abstract":"Current EU law states that the competition authorities, in dealing with a merger proposal, cannot commit to specific remedies when rejecting proposals and essentially have to resort to accept or reject remedies proposed to it. We show that giving the authorities the power to propose, and commit to, remedies for a merger that they cannot accept in full will lead to a more efficient merger policy. We do this by setting up a theoretic model where government lacks information about the various markets affected by the merger and has resources to collect information on some but not all of them. The benefit of being able to commit is that government, in some cases, is able to obtain remedies rather than full stop of a merger by collecting information on relatively benign markets and, in some other cases, is able to obtain remedies even without spending resources on collecting information.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"142 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132668757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competition and Agency Problems within Banks: Evidence from Insider Lending","authors":"M. Girotti, Federica Salvadè","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3550108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550108","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit. By exploiting interstate branching deregulation, we then show that banks react to greater competition by reducing insider lending, especially when the entry of new competitors may more strongly affect bank profitability. Results are robust to using various identification approaches and alternative indicators of agency conflict. We conclude that competitive pressure reduces managerial self-dealing. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122055419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Can the Concept of Public Value Influence UK Network Utility Regulation?","authors":"M. Cave, Janet Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3746870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3746870","url":null,"abstract":"There is much recent debate about extending the purposes of investor-owned firms to embrace the wider interests of a variety of stakeholders. Network regulatory decisions already involve extensive use of centralised social cost-benefit analysis to capture some aspects of public value. A gap remains which might be filled by a decentralised process, in which firms are supported by their regulator to expand their purposes to include the pursuit of public value, identified by regulated firms in collaboration with consumers and citizens, and delivered in innovative and entrepreneurial ways. We conclude in general, in application to a case study, that the approach has a role, but its success depends critically upon investor-owned utilities taking the change in purposes seriously; collecting and acting on information about consumer and citizen preferences systematically; and upon regulators avoiding incentive structures which guide companies down dysfunctional paths.<br><br>","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131295461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disclosure of Investment Information in a Vertically Related Industry","authors":"Dongjoon Lee, Joonghwa Oh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3746173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3746173","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the strategic disclosure of a downstream firm’s information regarding cost-reducing investment in a vertically related industry. Disclosing information affects an (common) upstream firm’s input price (i.e., vertical strategic effects) and a rival downstream firm’s output level (i.e., horizontal strategic effects). We show that the downstream firm is willing to withhold its information as the products become more differentiated because the horizontal strategic effects decrease with the products differentiation degree. This implies that non-disclosure, rather than disclosure, can convey an aggressive investment (i.e., lower marginal costs) to a rival downstream firm when the products are sufficiently differentiated. Moreover, we show that the downstream firm may disclose its information and pursue its investment at a minimum level when the products are extremely differentiated. In this case, they desire to reveal high marginal costs (i.e., a low investment level) to the upstream firm to reduce the input price, regardless of horizontal market competition.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132799739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}