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Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy最新文献

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Cosmopolitismo em Habermas: com Kant para além de Kant 哈贝马斯的世界主义:康德超越康德
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-21 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P280
Charles Feldhaus
{"title":"Cosmopolitismo em Habermas: com Kant para além de Kant","authors":"Charles Feldhaus","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P280","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to show how Habermas based on Immanuel Kant's project of a peaceful world order restricted to the right to universal hospitality and a voluntary federative legal structure ends up developing a much more robust conception of international law that includes an almost state structure, although it is emphatic in asserting that it is a world governance regime without a global state. Habermas develops his conception not only in a debate with Kant's outline of a perpetual peace, but also considering the normative innovations that have occurred in the more than two hundred years that have passed since the original formulation in 1795.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123909928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nietzsche e La Rochefoucauld: o moralista como psicólogo
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-21 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P444
J. R. Oliveira
{"title":"Nietzsche e La Rochefoucauld: o moralista como psicólogo","authors":"J. R. Oliveira","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P444","url":null,"abstract":"No presente artigo pretende-se analisar a influencia do duque de La Rochefoucauld sobre Nietzsche, levando em conta especialmente as leituras realizadas no contexto de elaboracao de Humano, demasiado humano , a partir de 1876. Para tanto, objetiva-se demonstrar como o moralista e evocado como psicologo na perspectiva das observacoes psicologicas que servem a Nietzsche de critica aos idealismos metafisicos. Inicia-se analisando a influencia de La Rochefoucauld na experiencia de Sorrento, que esta na genese de Humano, demasiado humano , principalmente pela presenca de Paul Ree e, a seguir, examina-se a linguagem aforistica como forma de expressao da filosofia do espirito livre, para entao analisar como a moral e colocada em questao e apresentar tres eixos de aproximacao possiveis entre a teoria proposta por La Rochefoucauld e aquela utilizada por Nietzsche.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131969036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
David Hume e a diferença como princípio cosmopolita 大卫·休谟和作为世界主义原则的差异
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-21 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P173
M. Limongi
{"title":"David Hume e a diferença como princípio cosmopolita","authors":"M. Limongi","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P173","url":null,"abstract":"Este artigo aborda a tematica do cosmopolitismo tendo Hume por referencia. Para Hume, o cosmopolitismo concerne aos processos historicos e efetivos de integracao de pontos de vista, interesses e perspectivas, que acompanham o advento e o avanco das sociedades comerciais. Num primeiro momento, apresento e justifico o recurso a abordagem humiana do tema. Num segundo passo, reconstruo e destaco a maneira com que Hume pensou tais processos, enquanto aqueles que se fazem a partir do reconhecimento das diferencas, particularidades e parcialidade dos pontos de vista, e nao da identidade, universalidade e imparcialidade dos mesmos. Argumento que a posicao humiana e promissora para lidar com a questao que surge quando o assunto e Cosmopolitismo: qual a extensao do campo cosmopolita? Quem faz parte deste campo, quem nao faz?","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131605610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A natureza do juízo moral em Hume A natureza do juízo道德em休谟
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-05-20 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p89
G. Lunardi
{"title":"A natureza do juízo moral em Hume","authors":"G. Lunardi","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p89","url":null,"abstract":"The standard interpretation of the Humean motivation theory considers that it would subscribe to a conativist model based on desires (passions), while intrinsically motivating, that would commit us to a conception of motivational internalism and, therefore, with a non-cognitive position. Basically, this standard interpretation by Hume, maintains that moral judgments are of a purely conative nature, thus providing the agent with an intrinsic reason or motive to act (motivational internalism), while not expressing any rational cognitive content (non- cognitivism). Given the approximation between truth and knowledge, cognitivists also affirm the thesis that there is authentic moral knowledge. Moral judgments have cognitive content and not only, as non-cognitivists want, expressions of attitudes, preferences, desires or prescriptions. Thus, the contrast between cognitivism and non-cognitivism revolves primarily around the question of the nature of moral judgment. And, in Hume's classical interpretation, the nature of moral judgment would be non-cognitive. With this work I explore an alternative line of argument, in defense of a position that privileges the possibility of moral knowledge, according to Hume's moral philosophy. The foundations of morality in Hume examine the motivational requirement with the aim, to be criticized, not of moral knowledge (cognitivism) but of moral rationalism. However, this alternative line does not represent a pure adherence to cognitivism. The strategy followed by this argument, consists of pointing out the “practical” aspect of moral judgments, that is, their role in guiding and motivating moral actions, and then arguing that, given this primordial function of moral judgments, to repeat, its practical character, guiding actions, does not exclude, also, a moral knowledge. In a way, the argument is that, according to Hume's theory of motivation, the nature of moral judgment would have an objective and practical dimension (what really moves us to action).","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127008015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Em busca do conhecimento moral 追求道德知识
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-05-20 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p05
A. Bonella
{"title":"Em busca do conhecimento moral","authors":"A. Bonella","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p05","url":null,"abstract":"Neste artigo, depois de esclarecer aspectos da pretensao de objetividade dos juizos morais comuns e aspectos gerais da epistemologia moral, apresento e analiso a possibilidade da existencia e obtencao de crencas morais verdadeiras, primeiramente, em posicoes ceticas contrarias a tal, como na perspectiva niilista da teoria do erro e na subjetivista das teorias relativistas (social e individual), depois, em segundo lugar, em duas posicoes favoraveis ao conhecimento moral, a realista naturalista e a realista nao-naturalista ou intuicionista. Uma perspectiva normalmente considerada contraria a existencia e obtencao de crencas morais verdadeiras e a expressivista, mas neste artigo sugiro e esboco como ela, ou ao menos algumas de suas versoes mais sofisticadas, pode ser epistemicamente amistosa na busca por conhecimento moral, num sentido mais fraco do conceito.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133482373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A virtude da solidariedade na hermenêutica enquanto um jogo de fusão de horizontes 诠释学中的团结美德是一场视野融合的游戏
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-05-20 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p135
Luiz Rohden
{"title":"A virtude da solidariedade na hermenêutica enquanto um jogo de fusão de horizontes","authors":"Luiz Rohden","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p135","url":null,"abstract":"O objetivo deste paper e explicitar e fundamentar a virtude da solidariedade subjacente a teoria e a pratica da Hermeneutica Filosofica de Hans-Georg Gadamer, a qual e imprescindivel para alcancarmos nossa felicidade e criarmos um ethos de responsabilidade mutua. Embora Gadamer nao tenha dito ou sustentado essa hipotese, mostrarei sua plausibilidade logica bem como pertinencia teorica e pratica. Para tanto, mostrarei as relacoes intimas entre Hermeneutica e Solidariedade enquanto jogos de fusao de horizontes regidos pelo pressuposto de que somos seres linguisticos que visamos, desde os primordios da humanidade, de uma ou de outra forma, instituir um ethos de parceria, de harmonia e de cooperacao mutua. Justificarei isso explicitando, inicialmente, significados e sentidos do termo Solidariedade em Gadamer, denominando-o um jogo com regras e finalidades proprias de uma virtude etica enquanto contencao de si e instituicao do bem. Aprofundarei, a seguir, elos entre Hermeneutica e Solidariedade a partir dos temas da linguagem e da tradicao enquanto exercicios de fusao de horizontes pautados pela instituicao do acordo consigo mesmo e com os outros. Ao final, apontarei algumas implicacoes para nossa realizacao pessoal e social bem como para protecao da natureza.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125902500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Ignorância moral e o papel das virtudes 道德无知和美德的作用
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-05-20 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p61
D. Coitinho
{"title":"Ignorância moral e o papel das virtudes","authors":"D. Coitinho","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p61","url":null,"abstract":"O objetivo deste artigo e investigar o problema da ignorância moral, especificamente, quero saber em que medida uma acao errada cometida por um agente responsavel pode ser apropriadamente censurada, considerando que a acao errada foi cometida por ignorância. Inicio com uma descricao do fenomeno da ignorância moral e uma definicao. Posteriormente, investigo como a virtude epistemica da autonomia e a virtude moral da justica nos auxiliam a melhor lidar com o problema em questao a partir do escopo da responsabilidade coletiva. Por fim, ressalto os aspectos sociais deste tipo de ignorância, com destaque para os fenomenos do vies cognitivo e progresso moral. Proponho que a ignorância moral de um agente pode ser um alvo apropriado de censura apenas quando ele estiver justificado epistemicamente de forma moderada, mas nao expressar as virtudes cidadas da autonomia e justica.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114816940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pressupostos metaéticos do anarquismo filosófico
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-05-20 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p33
Andrea Faggion
{"title":"Pressupostos metaéticos do anarquismo filosófico","authors":"Andrea Faggion","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p33","url":null,"abstract":"As a positive thesis, philosophical anarchism claims that political authority is always at odds with practical rationality insomuch as authoritative directives are best analysed as content-independent reasons. The aim of this paper is to clarify the metaethical assumptions behind such a claim. Since philosophical anarchists reject as irrational the possibility that an agent can follow content-independent reasons issued by another agent, emphasising agents’ responsibility to assess the content of every directive before acting in conformity with it, it is safe to say that philosophical anarchists must be cognitivist in metaethics. At the very least, were there no right or wrong answers to questions such as “what does one have reason to do in these circumstances?”, answers such as “one should follow authoritative directives” would be as good as any other. However, philosophical anarchism requires much more than metaethical cognitivism; indeed, it requires a very specific (and ambitious) type of cognitivism. I intend to show which one.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123607110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Democracia e direitos humanos no contexto da reformulação da teoria do discurso 话语理论重塑背景下的民主与人权
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-01-29 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p195
Luís Alexandre Dias do Carmo
{"title":"Democracia e direitos humanos no contexto da reformulação da teoria do discurso","authors":"Luís Alexandre Dias do Carmo","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p195","url":null,"abstract":"The paper will deal with the democratic project of society and human rights in the context of the reformulation of Habermas' theory of discourse in Direito e Democracia (DD) and in his essay The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights (DH): the implications of the habermasian interpretation of his own theory of fundamental rights (exposed in DD) by the light of the concept of human dignity in the essay DH. Conclusion: such a reformulation is not hassle-free! In the grounds of the law as such, and specifically of human rights, in DD, this reasoning is not explicitly stated and in the other text, there are a number of difficulties, which reveals the unsatisfactory, from the point of view philosophical view of his theory of law and human rights.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126610502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pressupostos metafísicos para a fundamentação da moral em Schopenhauer 叔本华道德基础的形而上学假设
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-01-29 DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p263
Mônica Saldanha Dalcol, A. Alós
{"title":"Pressupostos metafísicos para a fundamentação da moral em Schopenhauer","authors":"Mônica Saldanha Dalcol, A. Alós","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p263","url":null,"abstract":"The reflection on the nature of the foundation of morality has a long trajectory in philosophy. We ought to hilight the proposal developed by the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who bases morality from compassion. In this work, we will analyze what are the metaphysical assumptions necessary for the formulation of an ethics of compassion.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131177351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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