A natureza do juízo moral em Hume

The standard interpretation of the Humean motivation theory considers that it would subscribe to a conativist model based on desires (passions), while intrinsically motivating, that would commit us to a conception of motivational internalism and, therefore, with a non-cognitive position. Basically, this standard interpretation by Hume, maintains that moral judgments are of a purely conative nature, thus providing the agent with an intrinsic reason or motive to act (motivational internalism), while not expressing any rational cognitive content (non- cognitivism). Given the approximation between truth and knowledge, cognitivists also affirm the thesis that there is authentic moral knowledge. Moral judgments have cognitive content and not only, as non-cognitivists want, expressions of attitudes, preferences, desires or prescriptions. Thus, the contrast between cognitivism and non-cognitivism revolves primarily around the question of the nature of moral judgment. And, in Hume's classical interpretation, the nature of moral judgment would be non-cognitive. With this work I explore an alternative line of argument, in defense of a position that privileges the possibility of moral knowledge, according to Hume's moral philosophy. The foundations of morality in Hume examine the motivational requirement with the aim, to be criticized, not of moral knowledge (cognitivism) but of moral rationalism. However, this alternative line does not represent a pure adherence to cognitivism. The strategy followed by this argument, consists of pointing out the “practical” aspect of moral judgments, that is, their role in guiding and motivating moral actions, and then arguing that, given this primordial function of moral judgments, to repeat, its practical character, guiding actions, does not exclude, also, a moral knowledge. In a way, the argument is that, according to Hume's theory of motivation, the nature of moral judgment would have an objective and practical dimension (what really moves us to action).