Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory最新文献_第3页

Reflexive theory-of-mind reasoning in games: from empirical evidence to modeling 游戏中的反身性思维理论推理:从经验证据到建模

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807435

Jun Zhang

{"title":"Reflexive theory-of-mind reasoning in games: from empirical evidence to modeling","authors":"Jun Zhang","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807435","url":null,"abstract":"Theory-of-mind (ToM) is the modeling of mental states (such as belief, desire, knowledge, perception) through recursive (\"I think you think I think ...\") type reasoning in order to plan one's action or anticipate others' action. Such reasoning forms the core of strategic analysis in the game-theoretic setting. Traditional analysis of rational behavior in games of complete information is centered on the axiom of \"common knowledge,\" according to which all players know something to be true, know that all players know it to be true, know that all players know all players know it to be true, etc. Such axiom requires recursive modeling of players to the full depth, and seems to contradict human empirical behavior revealed by behavioral game literature. Here, I propose that such deviation from normative analysis may be due to players' building predictive mental models of their co-players based on experience and context without necessarily assuming a priori full rationality and common knowledge, rather than due to any lapse in \"instrumental rationality\" whereby players (and co-players) translate the predictions from their mental models to optimal choice. I investigate this mental model account of theory-of-mind reasoning by constructing a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games all terminating in a maximal of three steps. By carefully designing payoff matrices, the depth of recursive reasoning (i.e., first-order ToM versus second-order ToM) can be contrasted based on participants' choice behavior in those games. Empirical findings support the idea that depth of ToM recursion (related to perspective-taking) and instrumental rationality (rational application of belief-desire to action) constitute separate processes. Finally, I present a theoretical analysis of repeated games, such as the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma, and show how mutual cooperation can arise as individually rational outcome due to expected future interaction with the opponent.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128010390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Altruistic kidney exchange 无私换肾

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807479

Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver

引用次数: 9

Coalitions and dynamics in network routing games 网络路由博弈中的联盟与动态

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807410

M. Hoefer

引用次数: 0

Communication dynamics in endogenous social networks 内生性社会网络中的交流动态

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807499

K. Bimpikis, D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar

{"title":"Communication dynamics in endogenous social networks","authors":"K. Bimpikis, D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807499","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information aggregation in large societies. An underlying state (of the world) determines which action has higher payoff. Agents decide which agents to form a communication link with incurring the associated cost and receive a private signal correlated with the underlying state. They then exchange information over the induced communication network until taking an (irreversible) action. We define asymptotic learning as the fraction of agents taking the correct action converging to one in probability as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under some additional conditions, also only if) in the induced communication network most agents are a short distance away from \"information hubs\", which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information to be aggregated in the hands of a few agents. We then provide a systematic investigation of what types of cost structures and associated social cliques (consisting of groups of individuals linked to each other at zero cost, such as friendship networks) ensure the emergence of communication networks that lead to asymptotic learning. Finally, we show how these results can be applied to several commonly studied random graph models, such as preferential attachment and Erdos-Renyi graphs.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121506124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

How flow can you go?: a logistic management game and profit sharing 你能达到怎样的心流状态?:一个物流管理游戏和利润分享

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807414

R. Heesen, H. Hamers, K. Huisman

引用次数: 0

Transshipment prices and pair-wise stability in coordinating the decentralized transshipment problem 分散转运协调中的转运价格与成对稳定性问题

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807439

Behzad Hezarkhani, W. Kubiak

{"title":"Transshipment prices and pair-wise stability in coordinating the decentralized transshipment problem","authors":"Behzad Hezarkhani, W. Kubiak","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807439","url":null,"abstract":"The decentralized transshipment problem is a two-stage decision making problem where the companies first choose their individual production levels in anticipation of random demands and after demand realizations they pool residuals via transshipment. The coordination will be achieved if at optimality all the decision variables, i.e. production levels and transshipment patterns, in the decentralized system are the same as those of centralized system. In this paper, we study the coordination via transshipment prices. We propose a procedure for deriving the transshipment prices based on the coordinating allocation rule introduced by Anupindi et al. [1]. With the transshipment prices being set, the companies are free to match their residuals based on their individual preferences. We draw upon the concept of pair-wise stability to capture the dynamics of corresponding matching process. As the main result of this paper, we show that with the derived transshipment prices, the optimum transshipment patterns are always pair-wise stable, i.e. there are no pairs of companies that can be jointly better off by unilaterally deviating from the optimum transshipment patterns.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131035358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Competitive equilibrium computation at advertising marketplaces 广告市场的竞争均衡计算

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807470

Xiaotie Deng

引用次数: 0

Effective communication in cheap-talk games 廉价谈话游戏中的有效沟通

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807466

Navin Kartik, J. Sobel

引用次数: 10

Endogenous group formation and efficiency: an experimental study 内生群体形成与效率:一项实验研究

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807463

G. Charness, Chun-Lei Yang

引用次数: 5

Genetic drift resolves Selten's Chain Store Paradox 遗传漂变解决了塞尔滕的连锁店悖论

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI: 10.1145/1807406.1807421

W. M. Tracy

引用次数: 0