Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory最新文献

{"title":"Common value auctions with buy prices","authors":"Quazi Shahriar","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807452","url":null,"abstract":"Risk aversion and impatience of either the bidders or the seller have been utilized to explain the popularity of buy prices in private value auctions. This paper, using a pure common value framework, models auctions with \"temporary\" buy prices. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies in a general setup and then analyze a seller's incentive to post a buy price when there are two bidders. We find that, when bidders are either risk neutral or risk averse, a risk neutral seller has no incentive to post a buy price. But when the seller is risk averse, a suitably chosen buy price can raise his expected payoff when the bidders are either risk neutral or risk averse. Since expected seller revenue is lower, bidders' expected payments are likely to be lower in a common value buy-price auction. This paper thus gives a possible explanation for the popularity of buy-price auctions with both bidders and sellers.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126160424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A two tiered dynamic oligopoly model","authors":"Bar Ifrach, V. Farias, G. Weintraub","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807472","url":null,"abstract":"Dynamic oligopoly models are used in industrial organization and the management sciences to analyze diverse dynamic phenomena such as investments in R&D or capacity, the entry and exit of firms, and dynamic pricing. The applicability of these models has been severely limited, however, by the curse of dimensionality involved in the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) computation. In this work we introduce a new model and equilibrium concept that alleviates the curse of dimensionality. Our model focuses on \"two-tiered\" industries in which few \"dominant\" firms have a significant market share and there are many \"fringe\" firms with a small market share each; this is a prevalent market structure in many industries. In MPE each firm keeps track of all of its competitors' individual states, which for example, represent their quality level. In our approach each firm keeps track of the individual states of dominant firms only and of few aggregate statistics that summarize the state of fringe firms; this dramatically reduces the dimensionality of the equilibrium computation problem. We present an asymptotic result that provides a theoretical justification for our approach. We introduce an efficient algorithm to compute our equilibrium concept and report results from computational case studies that illustrate applications. Our results suggest that our approach greatly increases the applicability of dynamic oligopoly models and opens up the door to studying novel issues in industry dynamics.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124859087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aggregate matchings","authors":"Federique Echenique, SangMok Lee, M. Shum","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807477","url":null,"abstract":"This paper characterizes the testable implications of stability for aggregate matchings. We consider data on matchings where individuals are aggregated, based on their observable characteristics, into types, and we know how many agents of each type match. We derive stability conditions for an aggregate matching, and, based on these, provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition for an observed aggregate matching to be rationalizable (i.e. such that preferences can be found so that the observed aggregate matching is stable). Subsequently, we derive moment inequalities based on the stability conditions, and provide an empirical illustration using the cross-sectional marriage distributions across the US states.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124892948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pricing with markups under horizontal and vertical competition","authors":"J. Correa, R. Lederman, N. Stier-Moses","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807498","url":null,"abstract":"We model a market for a single product that may be composed of sub-products that face horizontal and vertical competition. Each firm, offering all or some portion of the product, adopts a price function proportional to its costs by deciding on the size of a markup. Customers then choose a set of providers that offers the lowest total cost. We characterize equilibria of the two-stage game and study the efficiency resulting from the competitive structure of the market.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129319640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"n-newsvendor biform game of trading capacity futures","authors":"Yick-hin Hung, Leon Y. O. Li, T. Cheng","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807438","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a group of suppliers who have the same facilities and similar capabilities to produce goods with a very short lead-time for n retailers (newsvendors) who sell non-identical products. We treat such short lead-time capacity as a commodity that can be traded as futures to the retailers. In a two-stage inventory model, retailers buy physical goods and capacity futures as inventory portfolios in the first stage to determine their inventory positions in the selling season. After realization of demand is observed in the second stage, retailers make a replenishment decision that is limited to the capacity futures on hand. However, retailers are allowed to form coalitions to transfer the residual capacity futures among themselves. Therefore, retailers have bidirectional adjustments to their inventory positions. We prove that this mechanism is a good tool to induce suppliers to offer their capacities in the season, and the futures market provides a hedge for them. We employ a biform game to analyze the risk and payoff of retailers as players in both non-cooperative and cooperative stages. The Nash equilibrium in the first stage and the core in the second stage have been identified. Our findings suggest retailers can share risk among different supply chains with different products to mitigate inventory risk and improve their payoffs. However, the game discriminates against those retailers that have lower profit margin, lower inventory cost and lower lost sales penalty.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130052453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bounded rationality in games","authors":"W. Kets","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807434","url":null,"abstract":"How do people reason about others in strategic situations and how does that affect their behavior? These questions have been at the forefront of game theory since its inception in the first half of the twentieth century. Traditionally, the focus has been on the question how \"rational\" players behave. As already observed by VonNeumann and Morgenstern (1944), however, the question how rational players should behave cannot be separated from the question how non-rational players behave. Even if one is concerned only with rational behavior, the interactive nature of the problem makes that one has to deal with all possible types of players: What is optimal for a rational player depends on what he expects his opponents to do, and these opponents may be boundedly rational. It is therefore desirable to have a theory of behavior in strategic settings that encompasses both perfect rationality and forms of bounded rationality. In this talk, I describe a general theoretical framework that takes into account that individuals may have limited capacities to reason about others, and sometimes only have access to a very coarse description of the game. I discuss the strategic implications of such a framework.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132495041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Structural estimation of discrete-choice games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria","authors":"Che-Lin Su, K. Judd","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807445","url":null,"abstract":"Estimation of games with multiple equilibria has received much attention in the recent econometrics literature. Unlike other estimation problems such as single-agent dynamic decision models or demand estimation, in which there is a unique solution in the underlying structural models, games usually admit multiple equilibria and the number of equilibria in a game can vary for different structural parameters. This fact makes the estimation of games far more challenging because the likelihood function or other criterion function defined in the space of structural parameters can be discontinuous or non-differentiable. Two-step estimators by Bajari et al. (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Nested Pusedo Likelihood (NPL) estimators by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) are proposed to address this problem. We recast the estimation problem as a constrained optimization problem with the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium condition being the constraints. The advantage of our formulation is that the likelihood function, now defined in the equilibrium probability space, is continuous and smooth. This allows researchers to use state-of-the-art optimization software to solve the estimation problem. In a Monte Carlo study, we compare the performance of a two-step estimator, NLP estimator, and our constrained optimization estimator.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"167 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115564704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cognitive hierarchy modelling of lab, field and neural data","authors":"Colin Camerer","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807440","url":null,"abstract":"Cognitive hierarchy and level-k models assume players use steps of reasoning iteratively. Precision comes from making (and testing) various assumptions about the step distribution, beliefs of players at each step, and responsiveness to expected payoff. I describe several empirical examples of these models applied to lab experiments and two field settings. In addition, eyetracking and some neural evidence are supportive of the concept of limits of iterated thinking and suggest some interesting research directions.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124774426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lottery mechanism design for school choice","authors":"Onur Kesten, M. Utku Ünver","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807504","url":null,"abstract":"A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others, over the mechanisms it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design, strong ex-ante stability and ex-ante stability. This framework generalizes known one-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new mechanisms, the fractional deferred acceptance mechanism, which is ordinally Pareto dominant within the class of strongly ex-ante stable mechanisms, and the fractional deferred acceptance and trading mechanism which is constrained ordinally Pareto efficient within the class of exante stable mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123957758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in the trust game","authors":"G. Attanasi, Pierpaolo Battigalli, R. Nagel","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807457","url":null,"abstract":"We adopt a psychological games perspective to analyze behavior and beliefs in a Trust Game experiment. Subjects are randomly assigned to the role of \"truster\", A player, and \"trustee\", B player. Assuming that B subjects may be affected by guilt aversion and reciprocity, we try to elicit their belief dependent motivations with a set of hypothetical questions. We design the experiment so that subjects have no incentives to manipulate and we check that answers are reliable. We have two main treatments. In the No-Transmission (control) treatment, B's (belief dependent) preferences cannot be common knowledge, hence the game has incomplete information. In the Transmission treatment, B's answers to the hypothetical questions are transmitted and made common knowledge between the two matched subjects. In so far as such answers reveal the \"psychological type\" of B, this treatment approximates a psychological game with complete information. In this case, assuming that players coordinate their expectations on the efficient equilibrium, we should observe trust/cooperation when the revealed type of B is guilt averse (or reciprocal) and no-trust/defection when he is selfish. We also provide qualitative predictions for the incomplete information case, based on a simplified Bayesian psychological game. The main insight is that average behavior is intermediate.\u0000 We analyze the set of answers of each B subject with a grid estimation algorithm. Most B subjects are not selfish and we observe a dominance of guilt aversion over reciprocity. Coherently with our theoretical insights, our experimental results show that in the Transmission treatment inducing a psychological game with (approximately) complete information behavior is more extreme: in the subpopulation of matched pairs where B is highly guilt averse there is more trust and cooperation than in the corresponding incomplete information setting without transmission; whereas in the subpopulation of matched pairs where B has low guilt aversion there is less trust and cooperation than in the corresponding incomplete information setting. In both information settings, we find that the B subjects' cooperation rate is positively related to guilt aversion.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129973652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}