游戏中的反身性思维理论推理:从经验证据到建模

Jun Zhang
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摘要

心理理论(Theory-of-mind, ToM)是通过递归(“我认为你认为我认为……”)类型推理对心理状态(如信念、欲望、知识、感知)进行建模,以便计划自己的行动或预测他人的行动。这种推理构成了博弈论背景下战略分析的核心。对完全信息博弈中理性行为的传统分析以“常识”公理为中心,根据这一公理,所有参与者都知道某件事是真的,知道所有参与者都知道它是真的,知道所有参与者都知道所有参与者都知道它是真的,等等。这样的公理要求对玩家进行深度的递归建模,这似乎与行为游戏文献所揭示的人类经验行为相矛盾。在这里,我认为这种与规范分析的偏差可能是由于玩家基于经验和情境建立了对其合作伙伴的预测性心理模型,而不必假设先验的完全理性和常识,而不是由于“工具理性”的失误,即玩家(和合作伙伴)将预测从他们的心理模型转化为最佳选择。我通过构建一系列两名玩家、顺序移动矩阵游戏来研究这种心智理论推理的心智模型,所有游戏都以最大三步结束。通过仔细设计收益矩阵,递归推理的深度(即一阶ToM与二阶ToM)可以根据参与者在这些游戏中的选择行为进行对比。实证研究结果支持ToM递归的深度(与换位思考有关)和工具理性(将信念-愿望理性地应用于行动)构成独立的过程。最后,我对重复博弈(如迭代囚徒困境)进行了理论分析,并展示了由于预期未来与对手的互动,相互合作如何成为个体理性的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reflexive theory-of-mind reasoning in games: from empirical evidence to modeling
Theory-of-mind (ToM) is the modeling of mental states (such as belief, desire, knowledge, perception) through recursive ("I think you think I think ...") type reasoning in order to plan one's action or anticipate others' action. Such reasoning forms the core of strategic analysis in the game-theoretic setting. Traditional analysis of rational behavior in games of complete information is centered on the axiom of "common knowledge," according to which all players know something to be true, know that all players know it to be true, know that all players know all players know it to be true, etc. Such axiom requires recursive modeling of players to the full depth, and seems to contradict human empirical behavior revealed by behavioral game literature. Here, I propose that such deviation from normative analysis may be due to players' building predictive mental models of their co-players based on experience and context without necessarily assuming a priori full rationality and common knowledge, rather than due to any lapse in "instrumental rationality" whereby players (and co-players) translate the predictions from their mental models to optimal choice. I investigate this mental model account of theory-of-mind reasoning by constructing a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games all terminating in a maximal of three steps. By carefully designing payoff matrices, the depth of recursive reasoning (i.e., first-order ToM versus second-order ToM) can be contrasted based on participants' choice behavior in those games. Empirical findings support the idea that depth of ToM recursion (related to perspective-taking) and instrumental rationality (rational application of belief-desire to action) constitute separate processes. Finally, I present a theoretical analysis of repeated games, such as the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma, and show how mutual cooperation can arise as individually rational outcome due to expected future interaction with the opponent.
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