Political Economy: National最新文献

{"title":"The Weak State Trap","authors":"L. Fergusson, Carlos A. Molina, James A. Robinson","doi":"10.3386/w26848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26848","url":null,"abstract":"Development outcomes come in ‘clusters’ that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to flourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the micro level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing influences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128248146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"International Evidence on Income Share Agreements: Perceptions and Characteristics of ISAs Recipients","authors":"M. Soler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3452929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3452929","url":null,"abstract":"Income Share Agreements (ISAs) have been proposed as an efficient financing scheme for higher education that could also enhance postsecondary outcomes. Yet, there is not enough knowledge about ISAs in education. This paper combines administrative and survey data on students who were offered an ISA by a Latin American provider and offers several novel findings on (1) the factors that explain student ISA take-up and (2) students’ perceptions of ISAs. First, students’ perceptions of ISAs, age, relationship status, and family income are important determinants of the take-up decision. Second, students who took ISAs expect higher future income, but have a worse academic performance than non-takers, suggesting that adverse selection might be a challenge for the large-scale implementation of ISAs. Third, while ISA takers and non-takers do not significantly differ in terms of their attitude towards risk, students are less likely to take an ISA if they perceive it to be riskier than a loan. Lastly, students perceive that ISAs increased their persistence and allowed them to stay enrolled at their preferred institution and major. These findings are relevant for the design and policy evaluation of ISAs both in the US, where legislation has been introduced and ISA programs are proliferating, and in other countries considering reforms in higher education financing.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130996444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM): Design, Prevention Practices, and Effectiveness As Measured Through Public Evaluation in San Jose Municipal Development Projects","authors":"Melchor Dioso, Hilario M. Fontanilla, Liberty R. Mendaña, DPA, Ma. Angelica B. Sunga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3702077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3702077","url":null,"abstract":"Development projects such as infrastructure developments are carried out by different government agencies down to the lowest level of local government to enhance the quality of basic services delivered to the public. However, such projects do not always engender positive changes in the lives of all the people intended to benefit from them. In order to respond to complaints and disputes due to these circumstances, people should be provided with access to mechanism, especially in addressing their grievances and dissatisfaction. Hence, this study was undertaken to identify the grievance redress mechanism design, grievance prevention practices, and effectiveness of GRM employed by the municipal government of San Jose as far as development projects are concerned. The quantitative method (descriptive-correlation) of research was used in this study using self-constructed questionnaires with a respondent of 65 business establishment owners and people residing in areas with on-going and recently finished municipal development projects. Pearson correlation analysis was used in order to determine the relationship between the grievance redress mechanisms design and prevention practices to its effectiveness through public evaluation.<br><br>The following findings were derived: The GRM design employed by the municipal government of San Jose is “high” as well as in terms of resolution approaches and handling complaints which implies that the GRM design employs various resolution approaches and handles complaints in many ways. The grievance prevention practices are “high” as well as in terms of communication and information to communities and the conduct of community consultations which implies that the GRM employed paved the way to at least prevent some issues and concerns to become disputes and/or complaints. The overall effectiveness of the GRM is “high” which implies that the GRM is highly effective and delivered its purpose to resolve issues and concerns regarding municipal development projects with accessibility, transparency, fairness, and predictability. Lastly, there is a significant relationship between the grievance prevention practices and its effectiveness which means that as grievance prevention practices are employed more during the project implementation, grievance redress mechanisms’ effectiveness increases.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123778145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Authoritarian Populism and Burden-Sharing in the Transatlantic Community","authors":"Jordan Becker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3531703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3531703","url":null,"abstract":"While the causes and consequences of populism have drawn much attention from researchers, transatlantic burden-sharing captivates not only scholars, but populist politicians themselves. A populist President in the United States has called for significant changes in the way the U.S. leads, focusing on burden-sharing as a bone of contention with allies; Turkey is at odds with its Western partners; the UK is on the brink of leaving the EU; and illiberal parties who question the utility of the institutional architecture that has ordered European politics for 70 years have made significant electoral gains. More than just a defense economics question, burden-sharing is at the core of hierarchy and order in the transatlantic community. Yet no research to date has empirically analyzed the relationship between populism in national politics and burden-sharing. I find that the higher the share of seats in a state’s parliament held by populist parties, the less that state spends on agreed priorities for collective defense. In short, populist politics is associated with adverse burden-sharing outcomes in the transatlantic community. This finding suggests that the strategic effects of populism extend beyond probabilities of conflict and cooperation and into alliance burden-sharing politics and grand strategy.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114732701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Risk Sharing and Institutional Quality: Evidence from OECD and Emerging Economies","authors":"Faruk Balli, Pierucci Eleonora","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12212","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the impact of institutional quality on risk sharing across Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) and emerging economies (EMEs). It has been found that the quality of institutions and risk sharing are significantly interrelated among OECD members (mostly through credit market channel), but not for the EMEs. Our results are consistent when we control for pre‐ and post‐GFC periods. The reason why the impact of institutional quality on risk sharing is limited among EMEs might be due to the significant monetary injections from advanced economies in the form of remittances and financial aid which might understate other factors that influence risk sharing.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122241259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fixing Urban Planning with Ostrom: Strategies for Existing Cities to Adopt Polycentric, Bottom-Up Regulation of Land Use","authors":"J. Myers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561745","url":null,"abstract":"Campaigns to address high housing costs by reforming urban planning to allow more housing have had some notable successes, but they continue to face considerable opposition. Proposals often involve top-down preemption of municipal zoning decisions by higher authorities such as state legislatures.<br><br>In places where reform remains politically difficult, I suggest trying the opposite tactic to overcome opposition: introducing laws to allow ultralocal, bottom-up land use decisions, which would address spillover and other concerns and enable win-win bargaining to permit more housing. This tactic draws upon research in the field of common-pool resources founded by Elinor Ostrom. Under my suggested approach, small communities would be able to demand a share of the profits from development in exchange for allowing it on terms and in a form that they like.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132910681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Assessing the Financial Impact of Natural Disasters on Local Governments","authors":"Gang Chen","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12245","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, the increase in the frequency and the severity of natural disasters has posed growing challenges to governments’ disaster response activities. Disasters can have a considerable financial impact on local governments, but this impact has not been systematically analyzed. This study assesses disaster impact using 17 years of panel data (between 1996 and 2012) from the city and county governments in New York state. The research examines many aspects of local governments’ financial conditions, including liquidity, fund balance, and debt. It tests whether governments’ financial conditions are affected by disasters and whether fiscal institutions moderate disasters’ impacts. The results show that a local government's unreserved fund balance and disaster reserve significantly affect its financial condition, while financial condition indicators are not significantly impacted by natural disasters when the fiscal institution variables are controlled.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115556895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Priorities for the Distribution of Interbudgetary Transfers Under the Conditions of Fiscal Decentralization in Ukraine","authors":"Yana Sarnetska","doi":"10.21303/2504-5571.2020.001140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21303/2504-5571.2020.001140","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the problem of the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in Ukraine, taking into account fiscal decentralization trends. To perform the delegated functions, local governments need to have sufficient funding. However, the revenues of local budgets are insufficient to cover all necessary expenses. Therefore, inter-budget transfers, which in Ukraine are the main instrument of financial equalization, play an important role in ensuring the implementation of delegated powers by local governments. The aim of the article is determination of the priorities for the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in Ukraine in the context of fiscal decentralization. The research methodology combines quantitative and qualitative methods. Using quantitative methods, the principles of fiscal decentralization in Ukraine are observed through the mechanism of distribution of intergovernmental transfers. Using high-quality methods and based on the analysis, the priorities of the distribution of inter-budget transfers in the context of fiscal decentralization are formulated. An analysis of foreign publications on fiscal decentralization has shown that the uncertainty of priorities in this area reduces the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization and inhibits the economic development of regions. Prioritization of the distribution of intergovernmental transfers is preceded by the definition of principles for the distribution of intergovernmental transfers. Based on the results of a quantitative analysis, namely, the identified dynamics of fiscal decentralization indicators and the impact of the distribution of intergovernmental transfers on economic development, the following priorities for the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in fiscal decentralization are identified: supporting the prevalence of targeted transfers over non-targeted transfers, increasing the share of capital transfers, increasing the accountability of local authorities self-government regarding the use of funds received in the form of intergovernmental budget transfers.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130581965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Heterogeneous Effects of the De Jure and De Facto Business Environment: Findings from Multiple Data Sets on the Business Environment","authors":"Christine Zhenwei Qiang, He Wang, L. C. Xu","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-9115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-9115","url":null,"abstract":"Using multiple sources of national- and firm-level data around the world, this paper investigates how the effects of the business environment depend on whether the measure is de jure or de facto, and how business environment effects differ by ownership and size. The paper compares estimates of business environment effects from three data sources, and modifies the priors on the relative importance of various elements of the business environment. Among four aspects of the business environment, at least two sets are robust and a third set does not contradict the other two: access to finance, electricity, internet, and human capital. The effects of de jure business environment indicators on firm performances depend on measures of contract enforcement. Foreign-owned firms benefit more from the maintenance of physical safety and ease in obtaining construction permits, and gain competitive advantage in productivity when domestic infrastructure or access to finance is worse. Relatively small firms benefit more from corruption control, basic and modern infrastructure, human capital, and land access. Relatively large firms benefit more from physical safety. Access to finance is important for the expansion of smaller firms and the productivity of large firms.","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"12 14","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120862716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? Unintended Effects of Payment Reform in a Quantity-Based Transfer Program","authors":"Katherine Meckel","doi":"10.3386/w26725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26725","url":null,"abstract":"Quantity vouchers are used in redistributive programs to shield participants from price variation and alter their consumption patterns. However, because participants are insensitive to prices, vendors of program goods are incentivized to price discriminate between program and non-program customers. I study these trade-offs in the context of a reform to reduce price discrimination in the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), which provides a quantity voucher for nutritious foods to low-income mothers and children. The reform caused vendors to drop out, reducing program take-up. In addition, smaller vendors increased prices charged to non-WIC shoppers by 6.4 percent. (JEL H75, I18, I32, I38, J13, J16)","PeriodicalId":137820,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: National","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114565339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}