{"title":"Rabelais’ Carnival and Madness","authors":"A. Torn","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2012.14.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2012.14.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"Mary Barnes was a resident in R.D. Laing’s therapeutic community, Kingsley Hall, and her book is the only autobiographical account from this seminal time of both counterculture and psychiatry. This article presents part of an analysis of Barnes’ narrative using the Russian critical literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin’s work on ancient literary genres to help develop a deeper understanding of how Barnes embraced her unusual experiences and transformed the self. The author argues that a carnivalistic genre is discernible in Barnes’ more self-consciously stylised psychodynamic text. The exaggerated grotesques, profanities and debasements featured in carnivalistic genres provide Barnes with a moral discourse in which to position the self. By returning to the carnivalistic representation of experience characterised by mediaeval life, Barnes loses her finalised identity, becoming other, enabling her life to take different turns where new possibilities abound. The article concludes by suggesting that there is a fundamental relationship between the experience of and the expression of madness, which reference to Bakhtin helps elucidate.","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"437 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115561007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Existential Synapse: Reductionism, Heidegger and Neurophysiology","authors":"S. King-Spooner","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2006.8.2.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2006.8.2.27","url":null,"abstract":"One interpretation of recent discoveries in the microphysiology of our nervous and hormonal systems is that they give ever stronger and more detailed support for reductionist explanations of psychological functioning - that is, that they have progressively filled out and substantiated the picture that human functioning is rooted in the straightforwardly causal processes of molecular chemistry and physics. But it can be argued that an alternative interpretation fits the facts better - that the functioning of molecules in our nervous and endocrine systems only makes sense when taken in the context of the existential, language-culture-meaning-rooted framework within which we live: as Heidegger put it, that ‘everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fibre and down to the most hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing’. Recent work on the laying down of long-term memory invites a critical comparison of these diametrically (and philosophically) opposed interpretations.","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117073705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Simone Corleo: Psychophysiology Enters the Realm of Philosophy","authors":"Lucia Monads","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2007.9.2.51","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2007.9.2.51","url":null,"abstract":"At the beginning of the twentieth century Simone Corleo was described by G. Gentile as a philosopher who “remained closed within his insular culture” and, in contrast, by F. Orestano and A. Aliotta as a great statesman and man of science.This paper aims to provide a picture of the Sicilian philosopher (1823-1891), who taught moral philosophy at the University of Palermo.Philosophy was for him a science concerned with the study of the constant laws of thinking so as to reach that principle of identity which regulates the stream of knowledge. He wondered how objects are perceived by the senses, which inevitably provide subjective perception, and concluded that it was thanks to the human ability to associate perceptions according to the principles of similarity, time and space, cause and effect. This led him to investigate perception as organic electricity. Disproving Franklin’s theory of imponderable fluids, he affirmed that heat, light and electro-magnetism flowed through bodies. Therefore, philosophy was necessarily connected to physiology and psychology.","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"293 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115432207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Wittgenstein and his Philosophy of First-Time Events","authors":"J. Shotter","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2007.9.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2007.9.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"What might a disciplined inquiry into events occurring always for “another first time” (Garfinkel, 1967) look like? Whilst traditionally, we have always sought a hidden order behind appearances, this may be a misleading aim in human affairs. In this paper I argue that this is to begin our investigations too late in the day. It leads us to think of people as being already self-conscious, self-contained individuals, acting and speaking mostly in a wilful and intellectual manner. Indeed many have interpreted Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and his claim that the meaning of a word is its use in the language, in this light: as if he was concerned with words used as tools or as making moves in a language-game according to pre-existing rules. In this view, words have meaning only if they are systematically connected with states of affairs and/or states of mind. There is, however, another side to Wittgenstein: a concern with the beginnings of language-games in our spontaneous bodily reactions, and with such reactions as being the prototypes for new ways of thinking rather than as the results of ones already in existence. Here, meaning is understood in terms of one’s direct and immediate responsiveness to one’s surroundings. This paper explores this side of Wittgenstein’s thought, and relates it both to his claim that many events in human affairs can be ‘explained’ simply by giving descriptions, and to outlining a set of practical methods for beginning new practices, practices that can begin by noticing the presence within our old practices of previously unnoticed spontaneous bodily reactions.","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"24 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123700833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Whatever Happened to Ethology? The Case for the Fixed Action Pattern in Psychology.","authors":"E. Salzen","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2010.12.2.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2010.12.2.63","url":null,"abstract":"In the 1950s ethology entered British psychology as an antidote to learning theory, as a re-incarnation of instinct theory, and as a paradigm for human attachment processes. In the 1970s it became simply the study of “natural” behaviour in an evolutionary framework and was replaced by socio-biology and evolutionary psychology, in which species comparisons and evolutionary relationships enable adaptational (i.e. functional) explanations of human behaviours. Ethological theory had been abandoned. Yet the concept of the fixed action pattern (FAP) is the behavioural equivalent of the species in biology. Both identify constancies in variety. Together with the concepts sign stimulus, innate releaser, specific action potential (SAP), displacement activity, appetitive and consummatory behaviour, complex behaviour can be understood as interacting elements for which there should be neuro-hormonal and genetic systems (i.e. mechanisms). An analysis of the nature of emotion using ethological theory is presented as an example. Neuro-ethological work began in the 1960s with brain lesions and stimulation, and continues with modern technologies. For example, syllables in bird song (FAPs?) are correlated with activity in a striatal brain region (HVc) and a gene (FoxP2) – a gene that affects speech. An outline of the ethology and neuro-ethology of speech is presented.","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128012337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Evolution of Intellect: A Brief Account","authors":"N. Wetherick","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2005.7.1.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2005.7.1.45","url":null,"abstract":"Organisms depend for their survival on luck and on their capacity to extract predictive rules from their own personal environment to supplement whatever innate response tendencies they were endowed with. This capacity I call “intellect” which is here a technical term applicable to all organisms. To complete the evolutionary project it will be as necessary to show how human intellect evolved from that of lower animal species as to account for human bodily structure in the same terms. The first task of intellect is to extract predictive rules from the environment – this is possible, in principle, because the external world is law-governed. The organism does this first on the basis of its successful predictions and, in mammals, on the basis of unsuccessful predictions as well. The mammal has evolved the capacity to have in mind a goal object, enabling it to perceive when the object is not present in its perceptual field as well as when it is. Possession of a mental goal object vastly increases the mammal’s predictive power and provides a foundation from which the human conscious mind can evolve. Only the human organism has evolved a capacity to form second order (internal) links between patterns of activity in the central nervous system, as well as first order links between such patterns and states of the external world (possessed by all organisms). Second order links permit language, self-awareness, hypothetical reasoning and many other specifically human capacities but they all appear to require no more than quantitative increases in the complexity of interconnections in the central nervous system.","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131235726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Use and Misuse of the Experimental Method in Social Psychology: A Critical Examination of Classical Research","authors":"Daniel Sullivan","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2021.22.1.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2021.22.1.47","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127273847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Elizabeth Valentine’s ‘Philosophy and History of Psychology’","authors":"H. Wiseman","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2017.18.1.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2017.18.1.36","url":null,"abstract":"Elizabeth Valentine’s work is a testament to an open-minded and inclusive psychologist seeking to find meaningful insights into human nature wherever she can. For Valentine, psychology is a hybrid science, it must make reference to human subjectivity, whilst still maintaining objectivity in its findings. Precisely this is the challenge that psychology as a science faces: how to do justice to human subjectivity in a reliably objective way. Yet, it is precisely because of this subjective element to human reality that psychology is so apt for conversation with insights from other domains – particularly philosophy. The relationship here is mutually beneficial. Philosophy requires psychology to keep it empirically grounded in reality; but psychology needs philosophy to broaden and enrich its conceptual landscape. By way of example, this paper will critically reflect on Valentine’s views of consciousness, and how psychologists should deal with the metaphysical problems surrounding the mind-brain relationship.","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122424729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Psychology and Religion: What are they?","authors":"J. Radford","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2006.8.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2006.8.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"Psychology and religion would appear to be related in principle. But religion does not feature largely in mainstream psychology. Richards (1988) and Buchanan (2003) draw attention to the historical importance of the relationship. A prior question, it is suggested, is what we do or should mean by the two terms. Different types of definition are discussed: stipulative, reportive, essentialist and operational. A special case of the last can be considered to be ‘family resemblances’, characteristics shared in unequal measure by members of a class. This seems most appropriate to religion, but the lists of most writers appear too short. A longer set of characteristics is suggested. But for psychology a lexical approach seems more helpful, an example being the author’s distinction between discipline, subject and profession. These points suggest two entities which do have something in common, but which are in fact essentially different in significant ways affecting assumptions, content, methodology and modes of thought. Nevertheless psychology should engage with religion. Some reasons why it has not done so more completely are discussed. There are currently signs of a more comprehensive approach.","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126908682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Improving the security of the Section: A note from the Section’s Chair","authors":"D. Pilgrim","doi":"10.53841/bpshpp.2016.17.1.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53841/bpshpp.2016.17.1.37","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":123600,"journal":{"name":"History & Philosophy of Psychology","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127307564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
