Wittgenstein and his Philosophy of First-Time Events

Abstract

What might a disciplined inquiry into events occurring always for “another first time” (Garfinkel, 1967) look like? Whilst traditionally, we have always sought a hidden order behind appearances, this may be a misleading aim in human affairs. In this paper I argue that this is to begin our investigations too late in the day. It leads us to think of people as being already self-conscious, self-contained individuals, acting and speaking mostly in a wilful and intellectual manner. Indeed many have interpreted Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and his claim that the meaning of a word is its use in the language, in this light: as if he was concerned with words used as tools or as making moves in a language-game according to pre-existing rules. In this view, words have meaning only if they are systematically connected with states of affairs and/or states of mind. There is, however, another side to Wittgenstein: a concern with the beginnings of language-games in our spontaneous bodily reactions, and with such reactions as being the prototypes for new ways of thinking rather than as the results of ones already in existence. Here, meaning is understood in terms of one’s direct and immediate responsiveness to one’s surroundings. This paper explores this side of Wittgenstein’s thought, and relates it both to his claim that many events in human affairs can be ‘explained’ simply by giving descriptions, and to outlining a set of practical methods for beginning new practices, practices that can begin by noticing the presence within our old practices of previously unnoticed spontaneous bodily reactions.