{"title":"The Executive Compensation System is Broken","authors":"John C. Bogle","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.868508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.868508","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is based on the author's comments at the Columbia University Symposium on Bebchuk and Fried's \"Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation.\" The paper offers the author's perspective on the book and the problems of executive compensation it discusses.","PeriodicalId":122698,"journal":{"name":"Micro: Organizational Behavior (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115175680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Real World Critique of Pay Without Performance","authors":"Bevis Longstreth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.869810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869810","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is based on the author's comments at the Columbia University Symposium on Bebchuk and Fried's \"Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation.\" The paper offers a critique of the book's statement of the problems of executive compensation as well as of the book's proposed solutions.","PeriodicalId":122698,"journal":{"name":"Micro: Organizational Behavior (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127221010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Firm as an Entity: Management, Organization, Accounting","authors":"Y. Biondi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.774764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.774764","url":null,"abstract":"Why delve into accounting to understand the economic nature of the firm? A Coase's recent suggestion calls economic organization and accounting system at issue for understanding how the special economics of the firm supersedes price system in creating and allocating resources. But incomplete contracts economics has no clear theorizing of these functional modes of existence constituting the firm as a whole (constituents), surely in reason of its methodological contractualism. Starting from Coase, Shubik and Simon, instead, this paper aims at further developing this issue, exploring the accounting system, its nature and role in the special economics of the firm concerned with real dynamics and complexity. By means of the accounting system dealing with the business incomes to the firm, the economic and monetary process generated by the whole firm acquires autonomous but interdependent existence from external markets (both from factors or products markets). The accounting system constitutes thus the \"veil\" that allows this special process to exist. Not only the real dynamics, but also the separation between ownership, control and management (as early discussed by Berle and Littleton) asks for the entity view on the firm provided by dynamic accounting. Even to protect shareholders, this kind of accountability is required, far away from the irrevocably lost proprietary sovereignty. In this accounting-friendly transactional and institutional perspective, the firm entity functions and exists as a managed dynamic system characterized by different structures of production, institutional, organizational, or epistemic (related to the nature and role of institutions, internal organization, and knowledge in the firm). Accounting system becomes a constituent part of these structures and of the whole firm. This new perspective opens to an interdisciplinary approach linking Economics, Accounting, and Law by the shared, synthetic notion of the firm as an entity, which provides the \"clue\" for understanding the nature of the firm as a whole.","PeriodicalId":122698,"journal":{"name":"Micro: Organizational Behavior (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128393351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asset Liquidity, Debt Covenants, and Managerial Discretion in Financial Distress: The Collapse of L.A. Gear","authors":"H. DeAngelo, L. Deangelo, Karen H. Wruck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.273729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.273729","url":null,"abstract":"A hot growth stock in the 1980s, L.A. Gear's equity fell from $1 billion in market value in 1989 to zero in 1998. For over six years as revenues declined precipitously, management tried a series of radical strategy shifts while subsidizing the firm's large losses through working-capital liquidations. The L.A. Gear case illustrates that asset liquidity (broadly construed, not limited to excess cash) can give managers substantial operating discretion during financial distress. It also shows (i) that debt covenants can be stronger disciplinary mechanisms than requirements to meet cash interest payments, (ii) why debt contracts typically constrain earnings instead of cash flow, (iii) why cash balances are not equivalent to negative debt, and (iv) why debt maturity matters. We find that many firms have highly liquid asset structures, thus their managers have the potential to subsidize losing operations should the need arise.","PeriodicalId":122698,"journal":{"name":"Micro: Organizational Behavior (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115266163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bureaucratic Red Tape and Organizational Performance: Testing the Moderating Role of Culture and Political Support","authors":"Sanjay K. Pandey, D. Moynihan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.867124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.867124","url":null,"abstract":"While most real world efforts to improve the effectiveness of government agencies target bureaucratic red tape, academic work has not attempted to understand and develop the implications of red tape for agency performance. This paper builds upon developments in the performance management and red tape literatures to propose and test a model of performance that explicitly accounts for red tape. First, we seek to confirm the frequently asserted claim that red tape has a negative affect on organizational performance. Our findings show that bureaucratic red tape in human resource systems and information systems impede performance. Second, we seek to make a theoretical contribution by arguing that the nature of the organizational culture impacts how red tape affects performance. Our findings also show that organizations with a developmental culture (characterized by flexibility, readiness, adaptability and growth) are better able to deal with negative effects of red tape than organizations that lack these cultural characteristics.","PeriodicalId":122698,"journal":{"name":"Micro: Organizational Behavior (Topic)","volume":"94 Suppl D 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116919035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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