PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Credit Misallocation and Disintermediation in China's Infrastructure Financing","authors":"Shawn Chi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3936941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3936941","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how the institutional arrangement in China's financial market increase the cost of capital for underdeveloped areas. I show that fiscal capacity results in higher leverage but not superior profitability for local government financing vehicles. Infrastructure in fiscally strapped cities is more growth-enhancing, however, they can hardly access the low-interest bond market, and instead largely reckon on expensive bank loans. To raise a given amount of debt, a disadvantaged city would fork over anywhere from zero to five times more interest of what would cost a city with bond instruments. Such credit redlining spawns a vicious circle that results in a salient and persistent interregional inequality.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134013828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Winner's Curse and Entry in Highway Procurement","authors":"Dakshina G. De Silva, Benjamin V. Rosa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3907563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907563","url":null,"abstract":"In procurement auctions, there are situations where a bidder's cost is uncertain at the time of bidding, leading to a \"winner's curse.\" We use bridgework data from the State of Oklahoma and an empirical auction model to explore whether the winner's curse also affects entry, which can have serious implications for procurement costs and efficiency. We find that the winner's curse generally reduces entry in Oklahoma by reducing bidder markups conditional on participating. We then investigate implications for entry taxes and subsidies.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134344064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Infrastructure: How to Define It and Why the Definition Matters","authors":"Tracy Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3900740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3900740","url":null,"abstract":"In past government budget policy discussions, the term “infrastructure” has been used to describe spending that mostly pertains to transportation, particularly roads and highways. It has also been used to refer to spending on water projects, environmental improvements, energy, broadband, public lands, and public housing. Critics are correct in noting that some of the spending proposed as part of the American Job’s Plan, such as spending for home care workers, should not be considered infrastructure. But the plan also includes some things that many people might not consider to be infrastructure that they should, such as communications networks and the electricity grid. After discussing the role and importance of infrastructure, this policy brief explores alternative definitions of infrastructure, noting how they differ and what they share in common. Then it considers how using a nontraditional definition can lead to unnecessary expansion of the federal government’s role. Following that, it summarizes some important principles about infrastructure policy, emphasizing the advantages of private ownership and of relying on user fees to fund infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123673295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dispute of the Contracts: A Case from Sikta Irrigation Project, Banke, Nepal","authors":"Anjay Kumar Mishra, Prakash Yada, P. Aithal","doi":"10.47992/ijcsbe.2581.6942.0108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47992/ijcsbe.2581.6942.0108","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose: Government of Nepal (GoN) is implementing many small, medium and large type of Irrigation Projects. Sikta Irrigation Project (SIP) is the National Pride Project implemented by the GoN. The command area of the project has 42766.00 ha and the beneficiary of the project have 46715 households consisting of 4,49,588 population of Banke district. The overall objective of the study is to assess the consequences of delay and dispute of the selected contracts of Sikta Irrigation Project, Banke, Nepal. \u0000Design/Methodology/Approach: Using secondary data of the contract the mean planned duration is compared with mean actual duration to analyze delay analysis and Disputes of the contract have been interpreted based on standards of contract using content analysis. \u0000Findings/Result: The mean planned duration of the contracts under the study is 17.42 months and mean actual time 32.28 months with a standard deviation of 7.72 months and meantime variance is 13.46 months behind the schedule and meantime overrun is 14.85 months. Dispute resolution of only Papu costal JV has been analyzed. The contracts need to be rectified in terms of time by proper scheduling and resource leveling based local calendar. Hope the new amendments (PPMO 10th) of time extension will be helpful for the timely completion of contracts.\u0000Originality/Value: Action research to enhance the performance of Projects by avoiding Disputes. \u0000Paper Type: Analytical Policy Research.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122304545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Importance of the Activities of the Investigator on Studying the Situation of a Road Crime, as a Factor Promoting the Safety of Road Traffic","authors":"D. Ivanov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853205","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, the author draws attention to specific circumstances that need to be carefully investigated by the investigator upon arrival at the scene of the road traffic crimes. The conclusion is substantiated that only an analysis of all the circumstances of the situation at the scene of the commission of a road traffic crime, especially in the absence of the vehicle involved in it and the person who drove it, can help to understand the mechanism of this event, as well as to take measures to prevent such crimes and, as a result, ensure road safety in general.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123099113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Asymmetric Effect of Internet Access on Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Insight from a Dynamic Panel Threshold Regression","authors":"I. Abdulqadir, S. Asongu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3799040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3799040","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the asymmetric effect of internet access (index of the internet) on economic growth in 42 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 2008-2018. The estimation procedure is obtained following a dynamic panel threshold regression technique via 1000 bootstrap replications and the 400 grids search developed by Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000). The investigation first explores the presence of inflection points in the relationship between internet access and economic growth through the application of Hansen's threshold models. The finding from the nonlinearity threshold model revealed a significant internet threshold-effect of 3.55 percent for growth. The article also examines the linear short-run effect of internet access on economic growth while controlling for the effects of private sector credit, trade openness, government regulation, and tariff regimes. The marginal effect of internet access is evaluated at the minimum, and the maximum levels of government regulation and tariffs regime are positive. On the other hand, the minimum and maximum levels of private sector credit and trade openness are negative via the interaction terms. The article advances the literature by its nonlinear transformation of the relevance of internet access on economic growth by exploring interactive mechanisms of: internet access versus financial resource, internet access versus trade, internet access versus government regulation, and internet access versus the tariff regimes from end-user subscriptions. In policy terms, the statistical significance of the joint impact of government regulations and tariff regimes is relevant in the operation of the telecommunication industry in SSA countries.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127350943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Institutional Investors and Infrastructure Investing","authors":"A. Andonov, R. Kräussl, Joshua D. Rauh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3245543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3245543","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Institutional investors expect infrastructure to deliver long-term stable returns but gain exposure to infrastructure predominantly through finite-horizon closed private funds. The cash flows delivered by infrastructure funds display similar volatility and cyclicality as other private equity investments, and their performance similarly depends on quick deal exits. Despite weak risk-adjusted performance and failure to match the supposed characteristics of infrastructure assets, closed funds have received more commitments over time, particularly from public investors. Public institutional investors perform worse than private institutional investors. ESG preferences and regulations explain 25$%$–40$%$ of their increased allocation to infrastructure and 30$%$ of their underperformance.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"235 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127533723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Politics of Redevelopment Planning in Tysons and Outcomes 10 Years Later","authors":"E. Hamilton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3664162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3664162","url":null,"abstract":"Following the allocation of funds for a new line on the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Metrorail system, the Board of Supervisors in Fairfax County, Virginia, undertook redevelopment planning for its Tysons area. The redevelopment plan was the first of its kind. The board adopted a comprehensive plan that established the objective of transforming Tysons from highway-oriented suburban office park development into a walkable, mixed-use area. The redevelopment effort has received extensive attention for its goal to turn a highly car-oriented area into walkable, transit-oriented development. But what is perhaps more notable about the Tysons redevelopment planning effort is its objective to allow extensive multifamily housing construction in a wealthy suburban community. So far, more progress has been made toward the goal of housing construction than walkability.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"640 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133541341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Evolution of Global Instant Payment Infrastructure","authors":"Juan Camilo Giraldo Mora, J. Hedman, M. Avital","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3591972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3591972","url":null,"abstract":"Global instant payment and its underlying infrastructure evolution are commonly referred to as fragmentation, with the proliferation of local instant payment systems, or consolidation, with few global instant payment systems prevailing. Even though these evolution views and related management practices are valuable, they emphasize linear and conflict-oriented evolution perspectives that undermine the possibility of progressive fragmentation and consolidation. Conversely, this paper introduces three mechanisms, transactional, modular, and institutional, as well as three related qualities, service layers, service granularity, and service integration, that characterize the evolution of global instant payment infrastructure. Drawing upon four global payment case studies, the paper illustrates evolution patterns that emerge with the mutual and reinforcing influence between these evolution mechanisms and qualities. We find that the evolution of global instant payment infrastructure is taking place with the creation, and integration, of context-specific payment services, and the reduction of layers in payment services. This perspective revisits the fragmentation vis-a-vis consolidation arguments in favor of evolution patterns, which account for progressive fragmentation and consolidation of global instant payment infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128027238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Partnerships in Urban Mobility: Incentive Mechanisms for Improving Public Transit Adoption","authors":"Auyon Siddiq, Christopher S. Tang, Jingwei Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3540566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540566","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: Because of a prolonged decline in public transit ridership over the last decade, transit agencies across the United States are in financial crisis. To entice commuters to travel by public transit instead of driving personal vehicles, municipal governments must address the “last-mile” problem by providing convenient and affordable transportation between a commuter’s home and a transit station. This challenge raises an important question: Is there a cost-effective mechanism that can improve public transit adoption by solving the last-mile problem? Academic/practical relevance: In this paper, we present and analyze two incentive mechanisms for increasing commuter adoption of public transit. In a direct mechanism, the government provides a subsidy to commuters who adopt a “mixed mode,” which involves combining public transit with hailing rides to/from a transit station. The government funds the subsidy by imposing congestion fees on personal vehicles entering the city center. In an indirect mechanism, instead of levying congestion fees, the government secures funding for the subsidy from the private sector. We examine the implications of both mechanisms on relevant stakeholders. These two mechanisms are especially relevant because several jurisdictions in the United States have begun piloting incentive programs, in which commuters receive subsidies for ride-hailing trips that begin or end at a transit station. Methodology: We present a game-theoretic model to capture the strategic interactions among five self-interested stakeholders (commuters, public transit agency, ride-hailing platform, municipal government, and local private enterprises). Results: By examining equilibrium outcomes, we obtain three key findings. First, we characterize how the optimal interventions associated with the direct or the indirect mechanism depend on: (a) the coverage level of the public transit network; (b) the public transit adoption target; and (c) the relative strength of commuter preferences between driving and taking public transit. Second, we show that the direct mechanism cannot be budget-neutral without undermining commuter welfare. However, when the public transit adoption target is not too aggressive, we find that the indirect mechanism can increase both commuter welfare and sales to the private-sector partner while remaining budget-neutral. Finally, we show that, although the indirect mechanism restricts the scope of government intervention (by eliminating the congestion fee), it can dominate the direct mechanism by leaving all stakeholders better off, especially when the adoption target is modest. Managerial implications: Our findings offer cost-effective prescriptions for improving urban mobility and public transit ridership.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126296828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}