Credit Misallocation and Disintermediation in China's Infrastructure Financing

Shawn Chi
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Abstract

This paper investigates how the institutional arrangement in China's financial market increase the cost of capital for underdeveloped areas. I show that fiscal capacity results in higher leverage but not superior profitability for local government financing vehicles. Infrastructure in fiscally strapped cities is more growth-enhancing, however, they can hardly access the low-interest bond market, and instead largely reckon on expensive bank loans. To raise a given amount of debt, a disadvantaged city would fork over anywhere from zero to five times more interest of what would cost a city with bond instruments. Such credit redlining spawns a vicious circle that results in a salient and persistent interregional inequality.
中国基础设施融资中的信贷错配与脱媒
本文考察了中国金融市场的制度安排如何增加欠发达地区的资金成本。我表明,财政能力导致地方政府融资平台的杠杆率更高,但盈利能力不高。财政紧张的城市的基础设施更能促进经济增长,然而,它们很难进入低息债券市场,而主要依靠昂贵的银行贷款。为了筹集一定数额的债务,处于不利地位的城市所支付的利息将是一个城市使用债券工具所需利息的零到五倍。这种信贷评级会产生恶性循环,导致地区间显著而持久的不平等。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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