{"title":"Credit Misallocation and Disintermediation in China's Infrastructure Financing","authors":"Shawn Chi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3936941","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how the institutional arrangement in China's financial market increase the cost of capital for underdeveloped areas. I show that fiscal capacity results in higher leverage but not superior profitability for local government financing vehicles. Infrastructure in fiscally strapped cities is more growth-enhancing, however, they can hardly access the low-interest bond market, and instead largely reckon on expensive bank loans. To raise a given amount of debt, a disadvantaged city would fork over anywhere from zero to five times more interest of what would cost a city with bond instruments. Such credit redlining spawns a vicious circle that results in a salient and persistent interregional inequality.","PeriodicalId":108610,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Infrastructure (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3936941","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper investigates how the institutional arrangement in China's financial market increase the cost of capital for underdeveloped areas. I show that fiscal capacity results in higher leverage but not superior profitability for local government financing vehicles. Infrastructure in fiscally strapped cities is more growth-enhancing, however, they can hardly access the low-interest bond market, and instead largely reckon on expensive bank loans. To raise a given amount of debt, a disadvantaged city would fork over anywhere from zero to five times more interest of what would cost a city with bond instruments. Such credit redlining spawns a vicious circle that results in a salient and persistent interregional inequality.