Xavier Symons, John Rhee, Anthony Tanous, Tracy Balboni, Tyler J VanderWeele
{"title":"Correction: Flourishing at the end of life.","authors":"Xavier Symons, John Rhee, Anthony Tanous, Tracy Balboni, Tyler J VanderWeele","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09691-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-024-09691-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142484791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Niñoval F Pacaol, Kielle Vincent J Delima, Jhon Russel B Ventura, Julius Lawrence J Curbilla, Rohn Fredrick P Casas, Bernel G Moquia, Samantha Mae N Mendoza, Mark Francis E Habagat, Ai Mei Niña G Cabillan, Frenz Alrie P Terio
{"title":"On instrumentality and second-order effects: revisiting anti-natalism and animal farming.","authors":"Niñoval F Pacaol, Kielle Vincent J Delima, Jhon Russel B Ventura, Julius Lawrence J Curbilla, Rohn Fredrick P Casas, Bernel G Moquia, Samantha Mae N Mendoza, Mark Francis E Habagat, Ai Mei Niña G Cabillan, Frenz Alrie P Terio","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09690-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-024-09690-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142484792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defending a choice-based system for the determination of death.","authors":"William Choi","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09689-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-024-09689-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Baruch Brody and the principle of justifiable homicide.","authors":"Timothy Furlan","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09678-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-024-09678-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In a series of papers in the early 1970s and in his important book Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life (1975), Baruch Brody offered what remains to this day one of the most philosophically rigorous contributions to the debate concerning the morality of abortion and the ethics of homicide more generally. In this paper I would like to critically examine Brody's argument that abortion is sometimes justifiable in some cases even when (1) one cannot claim self-defense, or (2) diminished responsibility, and (3) the abortion is a 'killing' rather than a 'not saving.' This justification, I argue, is limited to certain cases in which the life of the mother is at stake. The cautious principle which he finally formulates merits serious attention and consideration. While I find a great deal of value in Brody's discussion, I will argue that there are several difficulties with the principle of justifiable homicide he constructs. Accordingly, I will further amend and supplement his final version by offering my own alternative principle.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141997164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The self-fulfilling prophecy in medicine.","authors":"Mayli Mertens","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09677-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-024-09677-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article first describes the mechanism of any self-fulfilling prophecy through discussion of its four conditions: credibility, employment, employment sensitivity, and realization. Each condition is illustrated with examples specific to the medical context. The descriptive account ends with the definition of self-fulfilling prophecy and an expansion on collective self-fulfilling prophecies. Second, the normative account then discusses the moral relevance of self-fulfilling prophecies in medicine. A self-fulfilling prophecy is typically considered problematic when the prediction itself changes the predicted outcome to match the prediction (transformative self-fulfillment). I argue that also self-fulfilling prophecies that do not change the outcome but change the ways in which the outcome was realized (operative self-fulfillment), have significant ethical and epistemic ramifications. Because it is difficult to distinguish, retrospectively, between a transformative and an operative self-fulfilling prophecy, and thus between a false or true positive, it becomes equally difficult to catch mistakes. Moreover, since the prediction necessarily turns out true, there is never an error signal warning that a mistake might have been made. On the contrary, accuracy is seen as the standard for quality assurance. As such, self-fulfilling prophecies inhibit our ability to learn, inviting repetition and exacerbation of mistakes. With the rise of automated diagnostic and prognostic procedures and the increased use of machine learning and artificial intelligence for the development of predictive algorithms, attention to self-fulfilling feedback loops is especially warranted. This account of self-fulfilling prophecies is practically relevant for medical research and clinical practice. With it, researchers and practitioners can detect and analyze potential self-fulfilling mechanisms in any medical case and take responsibility for their ethical and epistemic implications.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11358258/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141908764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Take five? A coherentist argument why medical AI does not require a new ethical principle.","authors":"Seppe Segers, Michiel De Proost","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09676-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-024-09676-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>With the growing application of machine learning models in medicine, principlist bioethics has been put forward as needing revision. This paper reflects on the dominant trope in AI ethics to include a new 'principle of explicability' alongside the traditional four principles of bioethics that make up the theory of principlism. It specifically suggests that these four principles are sufficient and challenges the relevance of explicability as a separate ethical principle by emphasizing the coherentist affinity of principlism. We argue that, through specification, the properties of explicability are already covered by the four bioethical principles. The paper finishes by anticipating an objection that coherent principles could not facilitate technology induced change and are not well-suited to tackle moral differences.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141294061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xavier Symons, John Rhee, Anthony Tanous, Tracy Balboni, Tyler J VanderWeele
{"title":"Flourishing at the end of life.","authors":"Xavier Symons, John Rhee, Anthony Tanous, Tracy Balboni, Tyler J VanderWeele","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09679-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-024-09679-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Flourishing is an increasingly common construct employed in the study of human wellbeing. But its appropriateness as a framework of wellbeing at certain stages of life is contested. In this paper, we consider to what extent it is possible for someone to flourish at the end of life. People with terminal illness often experience significant and protracted pain and suffering especially when they opt for treatments that prolong life. Certain aspects of human goods, however, that are plausibly constitutive of flourishing-such as meaning and purpose, deep personal relationships, and character and virtue-can be uniquely realised when life is ending. We argue that there is a qualified sense in which one can flourish at the end of life but that one must make important modifications to the criteria implicit in conventional conceptions of flourishing. We close with a discussion of the empirical assessment of wellbeing at the end of life and explore the possibility of introducing a flourishing measure in palliative care practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11358345/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142006255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Response to \"The conceptual Injustice of the brain death standard\".","authors":"Grigory Ostrovskiy","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09686-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-024-09686-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142335626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Biting the bullet on ethical veganism, antinatalism, and the demands of morality.","authors":"Joona Räsänen","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09687-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-024-09687-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142335625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epicureanism and euthanasia.","authors":"Jeremy W Skrzypek","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09684-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-024-09684-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>If Epicurean arguments for the harmlessness of death are successful, then they also successfully undermine a common justification for physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and the termination of hopeless pregnancies that I call the 'Mercy Intuition', according to which, by ending the life of a suffering loved one for whom there is little to no chance of recovery, one is relieving that person of her suffering, and thus providing a great benefit to her. For, if death is not a harm to the person who dies, then it cannot be a benefit to her either, even in cases of intense and prolonged suffering. Along these lines, in this paper, I defend the claim that death cannot provide a benefit to those who are suffering. I begin by highlighting the Epicurean foundations of the argument, focusing on three main Epicurean arguments for the harmlessness of death and their no-benefit analogues. I then move on to explore several important limitations of the argument, which make available a number of strategies for avoiding its conclusion. Along the way, I respond to each of these avoidance strategies. I conclude that even granting several of its limitations, the argument still poses a serious challenge to the Mercy Intuition.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142305340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}