Theoretical medicine and bioethics最新文献

den Hartogh, Govert. What Kind of Death: The Ethics of Determining One's Own Death. New York/London: Routledge, 2023. 402 pp. USD $ 128.00 (hardcover); USD $ 43.99 (paper); USD $ 43.99 (Ebook). ISBN 978-1-032-24796-0. 哈托夫，州长。什么样的死亡：决定自己死亡的伦理？纽约/伦敦：劳特利奇出版社，2023。402页，USD $ 128.00（精装）；43.99美元（纸）；43.99美元（电子书）。ISBN 978-1-032-24796-0。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-12-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09694-y

William G Hoy

引用次数: 0

Biting the bullet on ethical veganism, antinatalism, and the demands of morality. 咬牙坚持伦理素食主义、反生育主义和道德要求。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09687-x

Joona Räsänen

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On instrumentality and second-order effects: revisiting anti-natalism and animal farming. 论工具性和二阶效应：重新审视反出生论和动物养殖。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09690-2

Niñoval F Pacaol, Kielle Vincent J Delima, Jhon Russel B Ventura, Julius Lawrence J Curbilla, Rohn Fredrick P Casas, Bernel G Moquia, Samantha Mae N Mendoza, Mark Francis E Habagat, Ai Mei Niña G Cabillan, Frenz Alrie P Terio

引用次数: 0

Antinatalism and the vegan's dilemma. 反生育主义与素食者的困境。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09683-1

James Schultz

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Reaffirming the irrationality of human confidence that an ageless existence would be better: A reply to García-Barranquero and Llorca Albareda. 重申人类认为不老的存在会更好的非理性自信：答复加西亚-巴兰奎罗和洛尔卡-阿尔巴雷达。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09688-w

Susan B Levin

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Epicureanism and euthanasia. 伊壁鸠鲁主义与安乐死

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09684-0

Jeremy W Skrzypek

{"title":"Epicureanism and euthanasia.","authors":"Jeremy W Skrzypek","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09684-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-024-09684-0","url":null,"abstract":"If Epicurean arguments for the harmlessness of death are successful, then they also successfully undermine a common justification for physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and the termination of hopeless pregnancies that I call the 'Mercy Intuition', according to which, by ending the life of a suffering loved one for whom there is little to no chance of recovery, one is relieving that person of her suffering, and thus providing a great benefit to her. For, if death is not a harm to the person who dies, then it cannot be a benefit to her either, even in cases of intense and prolonged suffering. Along these lines, in this paper, I defend the claim that death cannot provide a benefit to those who are suffering. I begin by highlighting the Epicurean foundations of the argument, focusing on three main Epicurean arguments for the harmlessness of death and their no-benefit analogues. I then move on to explore several important limitations of the argument, which make available a number of strategies for avoiding its conclusion. Along the way, I respond to each of these avoidance strategies. I conclude that even granting several of its limitations, the argument still poses a serious challenge to the Mercy Intuition.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"433-446"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11602868/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142305340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The ethical inadequacy of uninformed surrogate consent: advancing respect for persons in clinical research. 不知情代理同意的伦理缺陷：促进临床研究中对人的尊重。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09693-z

Robert R Harrison

{"title":"The ethical inadequacy of uninformed surrogate consent: advancing respect for persons in clinical research.","authors":"Robert R Harrison","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09693-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-024-09693-z","url":null,"abstract":"In clinical research, decision-making capacity is often equated with unspecified conceptions of autonomy, and autonomy is often equated with personhood. On this view, the loss of decision-making capacity is seen as a loss of autonomy, and the loss of autonomy subsumes a loss of personhood. An ethical concern arises at the intersection of those philosophical considerations with the legal considerations in informed consent. Because persons with inadequate decision-making capacity cannot provide legally effective consent, enrollment in research can occur only if a surrogate gives permission on the person's behalf. Federal regulations and resulting institutional policies allow permission from surrogates empowered under state law to consent to medical treatment procedures, typically in a hierarchy of legislatively prioritized relationships lacking regard for what the surrogate actually knows about the current research-related values and preferences of the potential subject. As a result, the research enterprise often countenances reliance on surrogates who have no relational or informational basis for an enrollment decision that aligns with the values and preferences of the subject. Arguing from the perspective that losing decision-making capacity does not alter the moral status of persons, and that respect for persons rather than respect for autonomy is the central ethical obligation, I assess the ethical implications of allowing persons with no knowledge of the values and preferences of the potential subject to make enrollment decisions, concluding that reliance on uninformed surrogates is not an ethically defensible approach to enrolling subjects in clinical research.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"461-479"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142635644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Contributions of neo-Aristotelian phronesis to ethical medical practice. 新亚里士多德理论对医学伦理实践的贡献。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09695-x

Blaine J Fowers, Lukas F Novak, Marah Selim, Latha Chandran, Kristján Kristjánsson

{"title":"Contributions of neo-Aristotelian phronesis to ethical medical practice.","authors":"Blaine J Fowers, Lukas F Novak, Marah Selim, Latha Chandran, Kristján Kristjánsson","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09695-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-024-09695-x","url":null,"abstract":"Virtue-based ethics prioritizes phronesis (practical wisdom) because, as rules have become less action-guiding, good judgment (phronesis) becomes more necessary as a guiding meta-virtue. The view of phronesis that MacIntyre proposed in After Virtue (hereafter, AV phronesis) has been applied in medical ethics despite his substantial deviations from his source (Aristotle) in After Virtue. In this paper, we clarify the differences between the neo-Aristotelian and AV phronesis views and argue for a neo-Aristotelian phronesis with four functions (constitutive, adjudicative, emotion regulative, and blueprint). In referring to neo-Aristotelians, we refer to the recent scholars that who hark back strongly to Aristotle and have amended some of Aristotle's less palatable views by adding insights from current empirical science to the domains that he left vague. Then we discuss how AV phronesis and neo-Aristotelian phronesis differ, focusing on the distinction between technical (i.e., alterable means toward patient health such as medication choices) and phronetic (i.e., actions that are inseparable from patient health) actions in medicine. This distinction is understated in AV phronesis, but central to neo-Aristotelian phronesis. Accordingly, the neo-Aristotelian approach makes an important and unique contribution to physician ethical development.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142776159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Deckers, Jan. Fundamentals of Critical Thinking in Health Care Ethics and Law. Ghent, Belgium: Owl Press, 2023. 263 pp. $24.54(paperback). ISBN 978-9072201591. Deckers，Jan.医疗保健伦理与法律中的批判性思维基础。比利时根特：Owl Press, 2023.263 pp.24.54 美元（平装本）。ISBN978-9072201591。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09696-w

Monica Consolandi

引用次数: 0

Correction: Flourishing at the end of life. 更正：生命终结时的繁荣。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-10-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09691-1

Xavier Symons, John Rhee, Anthony Tanous, Tracy Balboni, Tyler J VanderWeele

引用次数: 0