Theoretical medicine and bioethics最新文献

Defending a choice-based system for the determination of death. 为基于选择的死亡判定系统辩护。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-10-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09689-9

William Choi

引用次数: 0

The role of the enrolling clinician in emergency research conducted under an exception from informed consent.

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09710-9

Katherine Sahan, Ethan Cowan, Mark Sheehan

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Response to "The conceptual Injustice of the brain death standard". 回应 "脑死亡标准在概念上的不公正"。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09686-y

Grigory Ostrovskiy

引用次数: 0

Benjamin's translation as dialectical abduction: a novel epistemic framework for diagnostic hypothesizing.

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09698-2

Shalom Schlagman

引用次数: 0

Contributions of neo-Aristotelian phronesis to ethical medical practice. 新亚里士多德理论对医学伦理实践的贡献。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09695-x

Blaine J Fowers, Lukas F Novak, Marah Selim, Latha Chandran, Kristján Kristjánsson

{"title":"Contributions of neo-Aristotelian phronesis to ethical medical practice.","authors":"Blaine J Fowers, Lukas F Novak, Marah Selim, Latha Chandran, Kristján Kristjánsson","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09695-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-024-09695-x","url":null,"abstract":"Virtue-based ethics prioritizes phronesis (practical wisdom) because, as rules have become less action-guiding, good judgment (phronesis) becomes more necessary as a guiding meta-virtue. The view of phronesis that MacIntyre proposed in After Virtue (hereafter, AV phronesis) has been applied in medical ethics despite his substantial deviations from his source (Aristotle) in After Virtue. In this paper, we clarify the differences between the neo-Aristotelian and AV phronesis views and argue for a neo-Aristotelian phronesis with four functions (constitutive, adjudicative, emotion regulative, and blueprint). In referring to neo-Aristotelians, we refer to the recent scholars that who hark back strongly to Aristotle and have amended some of Aristotle's less palatable views by adding insights from current empirical science to the domains that he left vague. Then we discuss how AV phronesis and neo-Aristotelian phronesis differ, focusing on the distinction between technical (i.e., alterable means toward patient health such as medication choices) and phronetic (i.e., actions that are inseparable from patient health) actions in medicine. This distinction is understated in AV phronesis, but central to neo-Aristotelian phronesis. Accordingly, the neo-Aristotelian approach makes an important and unique contribution to physician ethical development.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"121-136"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142776159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Defining 'Abortion': a call for clarity.

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09706-5

Nicholas Colgrove

{"title":"Defining 'Abortion': a call for clarity.","authors":"Nicholas Colgrove","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09706-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-025-09706-5","url":null,"abstract":"In Dobbs v. Jackson, the Supreme Court found that 'the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion.' Rather, individual states must determine whether a right to abortion exists. Following Dobbs, state abortion laws have diverged significantly. This has generated confusion over what the law permits. Consequently, some pregnant women reportedly have not received timely treatment for life-threatening conditions. Clear guidance on abortion policy is essential, therefore, since continued confusion risks lives. Sweeping calls to improve patient access to abortion will not provide clear guidance, however, since 'abortion' is defined differently across jurisdictions. In fact, there are six variables to consider when defining 'abortion': (1) the definition of 'pregnancy,' (2) whether prescribing abortifacients counts as an abortion, (3) whether abortion successfully terminates pregnancy, (4) whether abortion has some characteristic intention, (5) whether providers must know that they likely will harm fetuses, and (6) whether providers must know that their patients are pregnant. States address each variable differently, so 'abortion' means different things across jurisdictions. One may respond that legislators are solely to blame for confusion here, since medical experts, by contrast, possesses a clear definition of 'abortion.' Not so. 'Abortion' is defined inconsistently throughout the medical literature too. As such, both legal and medical domains would benefit from careful discussions of 'abortion.' Attending to the six variables identified here is a good starting place. In this essay, I suggest how best to think about each and propose a definition of 'abortion' well-suited for developing clear abortion policy in a polarized society.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"137-175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11953220/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143694974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Take another five. A response to Adams.

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09711-8

Michiel De Proost, Seppe Segers

引用次数: 0

Paul Scherz: The Ethics of Precision Medicine: The Problems of Prevention in Healthcare. University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 2024, 194 pp., $40.00 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-02682-0905-6.

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-03-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09708-3

Benjamin Frush

引用次数: 0

Can AI principlism without explicability be coherent? A response to Segers and De Proost.

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-03-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09709-2

Jonathan Adams

引用次数: 0

Intending to avoid the treatment burdens only: the doctrine of double effect and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. 只打算避免治疗负担：双重效果理论以及暂停或撤消维持生命的治疗。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09712-7

Hitoshi Arima

{"title":"Intending to avoid the treatment burdens only: the doctrine of double effect and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.","authors":"Hitoshi Arima","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09712-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-025-09712-7","url":null,"abstract":"It is often believed that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is justifiable only when the patient's death is not intended. Also, in accordance with this belief, many argue that the justification of withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is an application of the doctrine of double effect (hereafter DDE). This paper aims to defend these accounts from some important criticisms. Baruch Brody maintains that most people intend the patient's death when they withhold/withdraw such treatments and that therefore, there are many cases of withholding/withdrawing treatment that are clearly justifiable but rendered unjustifiable by the accounts. Daniel P. Sulmasy asserts that withholding/withdrawing treatment rarely satisfies DDE's fourth condition (that the good effect of the act is proportionately greater than its bad effect) because the goodness of avoiding treatment burden seldom compares to the badness of shortening life. I examine these claims and show that they are mistaken. Central to the discussion in this paper is the idea that those who withhold/withdraw life-sustaining treatment often only intend to avoid the burdens posed by the treatment itself and not to shorten the patient's life. It will be argued that both Brody and Sulmasy are led to an erroneous conclusion because they fail to have an accurate understanding of this idea and its implications.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143675120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0