{"title":"Reification as a vice: rethinking bioethics beyond moral status.","authors":"Anna Smajdor","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09768-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-026-09768-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper, I argue for an expansion of moral concern in bioethics beyond sentience-based and status-based frameworks. Drawing on Lukács' and Honneth's work on reification, I show that even where the sentience, species membership, or moral status of an entity is unknown, there are compelling ethical reasons to be concerned about the creation, manipulation, and use of such entities. I reconceive reification not just as a social pathology but as a moral vice: a disordered, objectifying mode of perception. Understood in this way, reification provides a flexible normative framework that applies across a wide range of entities, including humans, non-human animals, plants, ecosystems, and even inanimate objects. This vice-based approach helps explain why certain modes of interaction are ethically flawed regardless of the moral status of the entity in question. This facilitates a more inclusive ethical sensibility suited to emerging biotechnologies and the ecological challenges that pose an increasingly complex challenge for bioethics.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"523-541"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13645852/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148804038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An ethical defense of safer supply.","authors":"Arthur Krieger","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09767-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-026-09767-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Safer supply is a medical form of harm reduction in which a patient is prescribed a drug to which they are addicted. Despite ample high-quality evidence that it is a safe and effective last-line treatment for severe, treatment-refractory substance use disorders, safer supply is not widely used or advocated. This is likely due in part to ethical concerns, but I contend that safer supply is ethical by both general moral standards and the professional ethical standards of healthcare. Recent defenses of various harm reduction interventions argue that they are permissible regardless of the moral quality of the drug use they facilitate. I critique those defenses and argue that safer supply is permissible by general moral standards because the medical drug use it supports is not immoral. Furthermore, safer supply does not run afoul of biomedical ethics because it is not maleficent, unhealthful, or nonconsensual. As an evidence-supported and ethically permissible practice, safer supply merits wider use and advocacy.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"503-521"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13646003/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148451176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Flourishing within vulnerability: on human fragility and the conditions for a habitable environment.","authors":"Irene Quiliconi","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09764-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-026-09764-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In recent philosophical discourse, flourishing has emerged as a concept of growing importance-often linked to the field of well-being studies and explored by various and different disciplines. The article approaches flourishing not as an abstract ideal, but rather as a condition that must be understood as rooted in the lived reality of human vulnerability. More specifically, I argue that any genuine account of human flourishing must regard vulnerability- human inherent fragility and reciprocal dependence-not as an impediment, but as the very foundation from which meaningful flourishing can arise. Building on Alasdair MacIntyre's reflections-who observes that this perspective is insufficiently acknowledged in comparison to the prevailing standard of moral philosophy-I understand vulnerability as a fundamental human characteristic arising from the interconnectedness of dependence, rationality, and animality. The second part of the paper engages with phenomenological perspectives in order to establish a dialogue between this tradition and MacIntyre's framework of virtue ethics. The aim is to anchor the concept of a virtuous moral life-implicit in the notion of flourishing-in the lived, embodied experience of the individual. In this light, three fundamental categories intrinsic to human vulnerability are identified as essential compass points for understanding what must be preserved, pursued, and guaranteed even under conditions of extreme fragility. Only by attending to these dimensions-embodiment, co-existence and lived temporality-can ensure that the human environment remains habitable, and thus adequate for a disposition toward flourishing.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"487-502"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13645888/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148311254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lauris C Kaldjian, Kristján Kristjánsson, Shane McLoughlin
{"title":"Practical wisdom in medicine: defending a multidimensional, integrated view of an indispensable virtue.","authors":"Lauris C Kaldjian, Kristján Kristjánsson, Shane McLoughlin","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09760-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-026-09760-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>By defending practical wisdom (phronesis) as a multidimensional virtue that complements the moral virtues, we offer a critique of \"practical wisdom eliminativism\", with special attention to the context of medicine, arguing that the core dimensions of practical wisdom enjoy broad consensus. As the meta-virtue that demonstrates excellence in ethical decision-making, practical wisdom recognizes and employs the best means to achieve good and worthwhile ends by integrating goals, perception of context, moral virtues, deliberation, reason-guided emotion, and motivation. In medicine, practical wisdom encompasses patient-centered deliberation directed toward ends of health and flourishing that promote the patient's good. To counter the notion that practical wisdom is a redundant concept (the eliminativist view), we provide philosophical arguments, evidence from medical practitioners, and psychometric data from a detailed empirical study of US and UK adults. Practical wisdom has survived for more than 2300 years as a unified and unifying intellectual meta-virtue that guides the moral virtues. We believe the reasons we put forward explain why phronesis should be expected to endure as a meaningful, multidimensional concept reflecting the nature of moral deliberation in response to practical challenges in life and medicine.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"465-486"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13646001/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148007747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Camouflaging in autism as a dual-normative construct: a philosophical critique.","authors":"Marios Adamou, Athanasios Koutsoklenis","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09763-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-026-09763-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Social camouflaging-broadly defined as the suppression or modulation of autistic traits to conform to dominant ableist social norms-has become a dominant construct in autism research. Yet despite its empirical and cultural prominence, the concept has not undergone sustained philosophical scrutiny. This paper develops a fourfold critique. Ontologically, camouflaging lacks stability, as it fails to identify a coherent class of phenomena distinguishable from adjacent behaviours. Epistemologically, it relies on theory-laden and circular methodologies that presuppose what they purport to measure. Logically, it embeds contradictions, particularly in attributing intentional capacities to subjects diagnosed in part on the basis of impaired social reasoning. Ethically, it operates within a dual-normative framework that pathologises deviation while privileging narrow forms of autistic legibility. We argue that deconstructing camouflaging exposes its fragility and raises fundamental questions about the normative commitments underlying psychiatric classification.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"449-463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148304573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The ethics of separation: conjoined twins, bodily autonomy, and abortion.","authors":"Christian O'Connell","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09769-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-026-09769-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This essay examines a prominent claim in abortion ethics: that bodily autonomy alone suffices to justify abortion even if the fetus is granted the moral status of a person. Instead of revisiting Thomson's violinist, it introduces a comparator offered less as a direct analogy to pregnancy than as a stress test of-and possible counterexample to-that claim. It imagines conjoined twin sisters, one temporarily dependent on the other's body, though a safe separation allowing both to survive is expected within months. The supporting twin's condition imposes serious but non-catastrophic demands; immediate separation would free her at once but kill her sister. The case combines attached, asymmetric dependence with substantial burden and an impending safe separation. In that setting, the familiar autonomy-based framing of the act as withdrawal of bodily support rather than direct lethal intervention begins to look strained. Engaging Thomson, Boonin, Effron, the English decision In re A, and philosophical and clinical-ethical literature on conjoined-twin separation, the essay argues that where immediate release can be achieved only by advancing a death that need not occur at all, bodily autonomy alone no longer seems sufficient. Resisting that conclusion requires either some further premise (about intention, means, development, or personhood) or willingness to accept the high philosophical cost of claiming that autonomy alone may justify bringing about the death of a dependent person who could survive if one waited.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149140118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The mechanics of epistemic justice: a response to Toding et al. and their application of my epistemic approach to dignity.","authors":"Peter J Katz","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09766-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-026-09766-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"437-440"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148364627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Safeguarding the dead donor rule in the age of normothermic regional perfusion: organismic unity, irreversibility, and epistemic responsibility.","authors":"Ersun Augustinus Kayra","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09752-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-026-09752-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Contemporary controlled donation after circulatory determination of death (cDCD) faces a widening epistemic gap: as resuscitative and perfusion technologies expand the ability to restore regional circulation, the inferential distance between the concept of death and bedside determinations becomes more salient. I defend organismic unity-the permanent loss of the organism's capacity for integrated self-maintenance-as the most defensible biological criterion of death. Yet this criterion is underdeterminate at the bedside: it must be tracked by fallible proxies operating under time pressure and uncertainty. The central claim is modal: if irreversibility is constitutive of death, then protocols must distinguish biological impossibility from practical or policy-based non-intervention. In cDCD contexts, what is often operationally established is not biological irreversibility in the strongest sense but a form of prudential warrant under a normative frame of non-intervention (i.e., permanence). I develop (1) a taxonomy and protocol-facing hierarchy of irreversibility senses, (2) an analysis of what 5-min no-touch intervals can and cannot establish, and (3) a conceptual geography of normothermic regional perfusion (NRP) variants, including the thoracoabdominal hard case. From these epistemic limits I derive second-order safeguards-conservatism, transparency, independence, corrigibility, and public accountability-grounded both in deontic respect for the patient and in the dead donor rule (DDR)'s role as a trust-sustaining commitment device. I conclude that safeguarding the dead donor rule in the age of NRP requires neither metaphysical pretense nor DDR abandonment, but institutional integrity: taxonomic clarity about irreversibility, verifiable cerebral exclusion, and second-order safeguards that make uncertainty governable.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"365-379"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147701389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Clinical reasoning as a hermeneutic arc: teleology, narrative, and practical wisdom in patient care.","authors":"Toshiki Nishimura","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09771-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-026-09771-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Clinical reasoning is often described through partially independent frameworks, including causal explanation, probabilistic inference, ethical deliberation, and narrative understanding. What remains insufficiently clarified is how these dimensions are structurally integrated in the care of a particular patient. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur, this paper argues that clinical reasoning is best understood as a hermeneutic and practical movement structured by three interrelated arcs: an epistemological arc (from naive understanding, through explanation, to informed understanding), an ethical arc (from teleology, through deontology, to practical wisdom), and an anthropological arc (from suffering, through cultural works, to renewed acting). Within the epistemological arc, explanation unfolds through four modes of intelligibility-causal, probabilistic, teleological, and narrative-and is coordinated by the clinical skill of scale shifting. The paper's central claim is that teleology mediates between diagnosis and ethics: first as a mode of intelligibility that discloses what is at stake in the patient's life, and then as a normative orientation guiding deliberation about action. Narrative, in turn, does not replace causal, probabilistic, or ethical reasoning, but configures these heterogeneous elements into a meaningful whole and renders them appropriable within the patient's lived world. Finally, this paper presents a fictional clinical case to show how clinical explanation may support patient self-understanding and renewed agency.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149121369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do not harm: a minimal defense of conscientious objection in the medical profession.","authors":"Darrin W Snyder Belousek","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09759-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-026-09759-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I defend conscientious objection (CO) in the medical profession by refuting the incompatibility thesis (IT). IT maintains that CO is incompatible with fulfilling the objectives and obligations of the medical profession and thus impermissible for medical professionals. To refute IT, I construct a case of conscience-based refusal in parallel with a case of profession-based refusal, such that both cases fulfill the primary objective and core obligation of the medical profession, thereby directly demonstrating the compatibility of CO with fulfilling obligations in the medical profession. I conclude that IT is false and thus that CO is permissible for medical professionals. I then defend my argument against potential objections. My argument strategy is two-fold. First, to avoid begging the question, I follow a neutral definition of CO that is compatible with IT. Second, to make the argument as logically strong as possible, I assume only minimal claims about the primary objective and core obligation of the medical profession that should be acceptable to (at least some) defenders of IT.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"381-403"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13522029/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147978293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}