Theoretical medicine and bioethics最新文献

A single definition and criterion of death. 死亡的单一定义和标准。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09719-0

David Hershenov

引用次数: 0

Saving the debate: why psychological accounts of personhood ought not accept a univocal biological definition and criterion of death. 挽救辩论：为什么人格的心理学解释不应该接受一个单一的生物学定义和死亡标准。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09718-1

Christopher Buford

引用次数: 0

Clarifying the public misrepresentation of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance. 澄清公众对跨代表观遗传的误解。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09717-2

Tara-Lyn Camilleri

引用次数: 0

The limitations of narrative medicine. 叙事医学的局限性。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09713-6

Rajeev Dutta

{"title":"The limitations of narrative medicine.","authors":"Rajeev Dutta","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09713-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-025-09713-6","url":null,"abstract":"Narrative medicine has emerged over the past few decades as an exciting approach to medical practice, interweaving the practice of medicine with the practices of literary analysis and reflective writing. It is often claimed that narrative medicine enables practitioners to understand and empathize with patient stories, effectively 'joining' patients in illness. However, I argue that there are reasons to be suspicious of narrative medicine's ability to promote patient-centered care. I begin by questioning the distinctiveness of narrative knowledge, suggesting that it is neither able to be propositional knowledge ('knowledge-that') nor phenomenal/experiential knowledge ('knowledge-what-it's-like'). Then, I consider an alternative reading of narrative medicine, by which narratives are simply ways to structure patient information so that a physician can more readily empathize with the patient. I dismiss this alternative as unsatisfactory given that it depends on either all patients building narratives or physicians imposing narrative structure(s) where one does not inherently exist, thus overriding patients. Finally, I provide possible supplements and alternatives to narrative medicine, proposing that active listening and the removal of systemic barriers to physicians' abilities to provide humanistic care (e.g., lower administrative, profit, and documentation burdens) may be a first step to putting empathetic patient care on the forefront. Ultimately, I think that these efforts (while their fruition may present difficulty), rather than sifting through patient information to construct and elevate narratives, present the opportunity to accurately refocus patient-centered care.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":"46 3","pages":"247-264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12037677/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144049187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Intending to avoid the treatment burdens only: the doctrine of double effect and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. 只打算避免治疗负担：双重效果理论以及暂停或撤消维持生命的治疗。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09712-7

Hitoshi Arima

{"title":"Intending to avoid the treatment burdens only: the doctrine of double effect and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.","authors":"Hitoshi Arima","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09712-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-025-09712-7","url":null,"abstract":"It is often believed that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is justifiable only when the patient's death is not intended. Also, in accordance with this belief, many argue that the justification of withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is an application of the doctrine of double effect (hereafter DDE). This paper aims to defend these accounts from some important criticisms. Baruch Brody maintains that most people intend the patient's death when they withhold/withdraw such treatments and that therefore, there are many cases of withholding/withdrawing treatment that are clearly justifiable but rendered unjustifiable by the accounts. Daniel P. Sulmasy asserts that withholding/withdrawing treatment rarely satisfies DDE's fourth condition (that the good effect of the act is proportionately greater than its bad effect) because the goodness of avoiding treatment burden seldom compares to the badness of shortening life. I examine these claims and show that they are mistaken. Central to the discussion in this paper is the idea that those who withhold/withdraw life-sustaining treatment often only intend to avoid the burdens posed by the treatment itself and not to shorten the patient's life. It will be argued that both Brody and Sulmasy are led to an erroneous conclusion because they fail to have an accurate understanding of this idea and its implications.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"209-230"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12037424/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143675120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Take another five. A response to Adams. 再喝五杯。对亚当斯的回应。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09711-8

Michiel De Proost, Seppe Segers

引用次数: 0

The role of the enrolling clinician in emergency research conducted under an exception from informed consent. 在知情同意例外情况下进行的急诊研究中，入组临床医生的作用。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09710-9

Katherine Sahan, Ethan Cowan, Mark Sheehan

引用次数: 0

Can AI principlism without explicability be coherent? A response to Segers and De Proost. 没有可解释性的人工智能原则能连贯吗？这是对西格斯和德普罗斯特的回应。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09709-2

Jonathan Adams

引用次数: 0

GOSSELIN, ABIGAIL. Mental Patient: Psychiatric Ethics from a Patient's Perspective. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2022. 308 pp. USD $45.00 (Paperback). ISBN 9780262544313. GOSSELIN,阿比盖尔。精神病人：从病人的角度看精神病学伦理学。剑桥，马萨诸塞州：麻省理工学院出版社，2022。308页，45美元（平装本）。ISBN 9780262544313。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09716-3

Abdullah Yildiz

引用次数: 0

Wellness versus flourishing in medical education: a critique toward a new synthesis. 健康与繁荣的医学教育：对新综合的批判。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-05-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09714-5

Benjamin W Frush, Daniel T Kim, Jeff Fritz, Kristján Kristjánsson

引用次数: 0