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Incentives to Invest in Transport Cost Reduction - Conceptual Issues and an Application to Electronic Commerce 降低运输成本的投资诱因-概念问题及在电子商务中的应用
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-24 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1099
Martin Bandulet, Karl Morasch
{"title":"Incentives to Invest in Transport Cost Reduction - Conceptual Issues and an Application to Electronic Commerce","authors":"Martin Bandulet, Karl Morasch","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1099","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Do firms have proper incentives to invest in transport cost reduction? We discuss this question in a duopoly with a local firm and a distant competitor that may invest in a reduction of marginal transportation costs. In a two-stage game with investment in the first and duopoly competition in the second stage, we compare profit-maximizing investment with (constrained) welfare maximization by a social planer. Intuitively, a firm will overinvest if the negative impact on its competitor exceeds the gain in consumer surplus. We analyze how the relative strength of these two effects depends on market demand, firm conduct and investment costs. Applying our results to electronic commerce, we argue that for physical goods either overinvestment or the efficient decision not to invest is the most likely outcome while the specific characteristics of digital products yield either underinvestment or an efficient investment level that reduces transportation costs to zero.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1099","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Mergers and Deterrence 兼并与威慑
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-19 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1122
Daniel Richards
{"title":"Mergers and Deterrence","authors":"Daniel Richards","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1122","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Changes in technology or policy create opportunities for industry restructuring and are frequently accompanied by both numerous mergers and potential entry. In the case of mergers, the combining firms have inside information regarding the strength of the surviving entity. In turn, such strength may be signaled to potential rivals or entrants by means of the acquisition price paid for the target firm. A pooling equilibrium is then possible in which even weak mergers are associated with a high acquisition price meant to deter post-merger rival aggression. The implications of such strategic behavior are consistent with much empirical evidence on mergers.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1122","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Pouring Money Down the Drain? How Sunk Investments and Signing Bonuses can Improve Employee Incentives 把钱倒进下水道?沉没投资和签约奖金如何提高员工激励
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-13 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1138
Anil Arya, Hans Frimor, B. Mittendorf
{"title":"Pouring Money Down the Drain? How Sunk Investments and Signing Bonuses can Improve Employee Incentives","authors":"Anil Arya, Hans Frimor, B. Mittendorf","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1138","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A common explanation for why firms incur sunk costs is that technology considerations make them inescapable. This paper shows that sometimes firms may prefer to make early (less informed) investment decisions even when technology allows such decisions to be delayed. Sunk costs commit and clarify a firm's future course of action to prospective employees, thereby providing them with incentives to acquire firm-specific human capital. This benefit of sunk costs may also provide justification for offering employee signing bonuses.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1138","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Real Options, Conflicting Valuations, and Favoritism 实物期权、估值冲突和偏袒
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1177
Anil Arya, Jonathan C. Glover
{"title":"Real Options, Conflicting Valuations, and Favoritism","authors":"Anil Arya, Jonathan C. Glover","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1177","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, limited managerial capacity gives rise to a timing option: agents can implement projects now-or-later. Because each agent cares only about the project he implements, while the principal cares about the projects undertaken in aggregate, the timing option may be valued differently by the principal and the agents. Under a fair assignment rule (one that treats the agents symmetrically), these conflicting valuations result in agents sometimes not implementing the principal’s desired projects. We identify conditions under which the optimal assignment rule necessarily exhibits favoritism. Favoritism is beneficial because it provides appropriate incentives to the unfavored agent by reducing his option value of waiting.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1177","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Using the Survivor Technique to Estimate Returns to Scale and Optimum Firm Size 利用幸存者技术估计规模收益和最优企业规模
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1081
James N. Giordano
{"title":"Using the Survivor Technique to Estimate Returns to Scale and Optimum Firm Size","authors":"James N. Giordano","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1081","url":null,"abstract":"The survivor technique for estimating returns to scale and optimum firm size has generated a slow but steady literature since its 1958 pilot presentation by George Stigler. This article (1) integrates advances in its application into a complete demonstration of how the technique works, (2) distinguishes a survivor analysis from the related but different analyses of individual firm growth and size distribution as addressed, for example, by Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect, (3) surveys a few exemplary survivor analyses, highlighting their alternative measures of scale and survival, and (4) unifies the scattered discussion of criticisms and qualifications that surround the technique. Accordingly, this essay seeks to reposition the survivor technique as a viable statistical option for research on those industries which meet its criteria.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1081","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Should Unemployment Benefits Respond to the Business Cycle? 失业救济金如何应对经济周期?
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-09-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1066
Michael T. Kiley
{"title":"How Should Unemployment Benefits Respond to the Business Cycle?","authors":"Michael T. Kiley","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1066","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Unemployment insurance programs balance the benefits of consumption smoothing against the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits. This balance is likely sensitive to the cyclical state of the economy, and hence the generosity of benefits should also respond to the business cycle. The nature of such responses in an optimal unemployment insurance (UI) program is analyzed in a simple model. The results suggest that an optimal UI program would increase the initial level of benefits and probably extend higher benefits over time in response to a recessionary shock. In the simple model, an extension of benefits, such as exists automatically in the system in the United States, provides poorer insurance and poorer incentives than the optimal program, and does so at a higher cost. Moreover, the UI system in the U.S. provides a substantially higher level of welfare to workers who lose jobs during tight labor markets.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1066","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68555504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 43
Relative Performance, Risk and Entry in the Mutual Fund Industry 共同基金行业的相对业绩、风险和进入
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-08-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1540
G. Loranth, Emanuela Sciubba
{"title":"Relative Performance, Risk and Entry in the Mutual Fund Industry","authors":"G. Loranth, Emanuela Sciubba","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1540","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper analyses the impact of the emergence of new funds on the portfolio decisions of mutual fund managers who are evaluated on the basis of relative performance within a dynamic model. Recent theoretical literature has pointed to the inefficiencies in portfolio selection caused by relative performance evaluation of fund managers. We find that the on-going process of creation of new funds, by posing an entry threat to the incumbent fund managers, greatly alleviates these inefficiencies. Hence the transitory market structure that characterises the mutual fund industry could explain why relative performance evaluation is widely in use.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1540","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68559161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Income Redistribution and Risky Occupational Choices 收入再分配与高风险职业选择
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-07-26 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1049
Panu Poutvaara
{"title":"Income Redistribution and Risky Occupational Choices","authors":"Panu Poutvaara","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1049","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I analyze the effect of linear taxation on discrete choices between risky occupations. In the basic model, two occupations differ in the magnitude of income risks, and citizens differ in their expected productivity in one of the occupations. I derive sufficient conditions under which income redistribution encourages a greater part of the population to choose the riskier occupation associated with higher expected income. The results are then generalized to an arbitrary number of groups of citizens facing an arbitrary number of discrete occupational choices belonging to the same linear distribution class.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1049","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68555419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Is More for the Poor Less for the Poor? The Politics of Means-Tested Targeting 穷人得到的更多，穷人得到的更少?经济状况调查的目标政治
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-07-17 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1027
Jonah B. Gelbach, L. Pritchett
{"title":"Is More for the Poor Less for the Poor? The Politics of Means-Tested Targeting","authors":"Jonah B. Gelbach, L. Pritchett","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Standard economic analysis suggests that when the budget for redistribution is fixed, income transfers should be targeted to (i.e. means-tested for) those most in need. However, both political scientists and economists long have recognized the possibility that targeting might undermine political support for redistribution. We formalize this recognition, developing a simple economy in which both non-targeted (universally received) and targeted transfers are available for use by the policymaker. When the budget can be taken as fixed, full use of the targeted transfer is optimal. However, when we allow the budget to be determined through majority voting (with the policymaker choosing the share of the budget to be spent on each type of transfer), the optimal degree of targeting is zero. More strikingly, we show that if the policymaker naively ignores political considerations, the resulting equilibrium actually minimizes not only social welfare, but also the welfare of poor and middle income agents. Thus political considerations cannot generally be regarded as simply another “small\" extension of standard models. As a result, future models and actual policies advocating the use of targeting through means-testing should account explicitly for the role of political considerations.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68555663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 110
The Geography of Intra-Industry Trade: empirics 产业内贸易的地理:经验
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-05-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1105
A. Venables, Patricia G. Rice, Martin Stewart
{"title":"The Geography of Intra-Industry Trade: empirics","authors":"A. Venables, Patricia G. Rice, Martin Stewart","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1105","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper uses bilateral trade data for OECD countries at the 3-digit industry level to investigate the geography of intra-industry trade (IIT). IIT diminishes with distance and much of the existing empirical literature suggests that this is an inherent characteristic of such trade, arguing that trade in sectors intensive in IIT is choked off rapidly by distance. We show that the dependence of IIT on geography arises not because of any inherent feature of the effects of distance on such trade, but because of the spatial structure of countries’ supply and demand characteristics; close countries do a lot of IIT because they have similar economic structures.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1105","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
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