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National Treatment and the Choice Between Exports and FDI 国民待遇与出口与FDI的选择
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-10-24 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1175
B. Hoekman, Kamal Saggi
{"title":"National Treatment and the Choice Between Exports and FDI","authors":"B. Hoekman, Kamal Saggi","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1175","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract International trade agreements increasingly constrain the ability of governments to use trade policies. Fewer international constraints apply to the use of investment policies, although there is discussion about negotiating such disciplines both regionally and multilaterally. Since firms compete in foreign markets via both exports and foreign direct investment(FDI), the following question arises: can constraints on the use of only one type of policy (trade or FDI) induce firms to adopt inefficient modes of supply when serving foreign markets? We address this question in a model in which a local and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market. In the model, the domestic government's trade and/or FDI policies as well as the foreign firm's choice between exports and FDI are endogenous. We show that even if the domestic government is constrained only in its ability to use trade (FDI) policy, and is free to set its FDI (trade) policy, the foreign firm chooses the efficient mode of supply. The key point is that it is never in the interest of the domestic government to set policies in a manner that leads the foreign firm to adopt an inefficient mode of supply.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1175","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Preventive Health Care and Payment Systems 预防保健和支付系统
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-08-24 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1115
P. Barros, Xavier Martinez-Giralt
{"title":"Preventive Health Care and Payment Systems","authors":"P. Barros, Xavier Martinez-Giralt","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1115","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care. The analysis is performed through a series of examples combining different payment schemes at the primary care center and hospital. When hospitals are reimbursed according to costs, prevention efforts are unlikely to occur. However, under a capitation payment for the primary care center and prospective budget for the hospital, prevention efforts increase when shifting from an independent to an integrated management. Also, from a normative standpoint, optimal payment schemes are simpler under joint management.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1115","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
New Evidence on Eastern Europe's Pollution Progress 关于东欧污染进展的新证据
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-07-22 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1100
Matthew E. Kahn
{"title":"New Evidence on Eastern Europe's Pollution Progress","authors":"Matthew E. Kahn","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1100","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Under communism, Eastern Europe's cities were significantly more polluted than their Western European counterparts. An unintended consequence of communism's decline is to improve urban environmental quality. This paper uses several new data sets to measure these gains. National level data are used to document the extent of convergence across nations in sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions. Based on a panel data set from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, ambient sulfur dioxide levels have fallen both because of composition and technique effects. The incidence of this local public good improvement is analyzed.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1100","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Can economic theory explain piracy behavior? 经济理论能解释盗版行为吗?
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-04-30 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1082
H. Holm
{"title":"Can economic theory explain piracy behavior?","authors":"H. Holm","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1082","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper investigates if economic theory can explain variations in piracy behavior between individuals and between countries. It is demonstrated that economic theory explains a notable part of the individual variation in a survey study. Individuals with a low net valuation of an original when a copy is available are more prone to engage in piracy than individuals with a higher valuation. Individuals with a low cost of obtaining and handling copies are also more engaged in piracy. The country-wise variation can also be explained by economic variables; GNI/capita and judicial efficiency explain a substantial part of this variation.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1082","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 94
What Determines Environmental Performance at Paper Mills? The Roles of Abatement Spending, Regulation, and Efficiency 是什么决定造纸厂的环保表现?减排支出、监管和效率的作用
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-04-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1144
Ronald J. Shadbegian, W. Gray
{"title":"What Determines Environmental Performance at Paper Mills? The Roles of Abatement Spending, Regulation, and Efficiency","authors":"Ronald J. Shadbegian, W. Gray","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1144","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the determinants of environmental performance at paper mills, measured by air pollution emissions per unit of output. We consider differences across plants in air pollution abatement expenditures, local regulatory stringency, and productive efficiency. Emissions are significantly lower in plants with a larger air pollution abatement capital stock: a 10 percent increase in abatement capital stock appears to reduce emissions by 6.9 percent. This translates into a sizable social return: one dollar of abatement capital stock is estimated to provide an annual social return of about 75 cents in pollution reduction benefits. Local regulatory stringency and productive efficiency also matter: plants in non-attainment counties have 43 percent lower emissions and plants with 10 percent higher productivity have 2.5 percent lower emissions. For pollution abatement operating costs we find (puzzlingly) positive, but always insignificant, coefficients.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1144","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 70
Time-Consistent Policy and Politics: Does Voting Matter When Individuals Are Identical? 时间一致性政策与政治:当个人相同时，投票是否重要?
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-03-13 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1101
Dan Anderberg, Carlo Perroni
{"title":"Time-Consistent Policy and Politics: Does Voting Matter When Individuals Are Identical?","authors":"Dan Anderberg, Carlo Perroni","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1101","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider the implications of a lack of policy commitment when policies are chosen through a political process and individuals are ex-ante identical. We show that politics, by allowing ex-post distributional tensions to shape policy, can make it possible to sustain non-trivial equilibria in which the commitment problem is alleviated or fully eliminated. How effective politics can be at countering collective commitment problems in homogeneous groups depends on the nature of the political process and on the extent to which private choices are public information.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1101","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Legal Hold-up in Cotenancy 租赁的法律阻碍
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-30 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1114
M. Baucells, S. Lippman
{"title":"Legal Hold-up in Cotenancy","authors":"M. Baucells, S. Lippman","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1114","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Our analysis (Baucells and Lippman [2001]) of the problem of legal hold-up in co-ownership, in which legal partition is the only remedy to force a sale, proceeded as if a sale of the asset could be effected at any time at a fixed price if the cotenants agree. Here we utilize the more realistic assumption that potential buyers appear intermittently (in accord with a Poisson process and that the price offered is drawn from a specified distribution). In applying the Nash bargaining solution, we select the disagreement point in accord either with Nash's methodology of rational threats or with reservation values. While neither methodology for selecting the disagreement point produces a credible threat when the agents incur legal costs, we argue that the rational threats approach produces more reasonable answers. Our main analysis considers the impact of a Poisson arrival of offers and an exponential time to court upon the optimal bargaining strategies of the cotenants.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"189 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1114","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Horizontal Mergers Without Synergies May Increase Consumer Welfare 无协同效应的横向合并可能增加消费者福利
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-29 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1074
Johan Stennek
{"title":"Horizontal Mergers Without Synergies May Increase Consumer Welfare","authors":"Johan Stennek","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1074","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In imperfectly competitive markets firms with high costs produce positive output. The market's ability to minimize costs is also constrained by the fact that firms' costs are often private information. Mergers in such markets play a dual role. They reduce competition but they also generate an efficiency gain associated with the pooling of information. This paper shows that not only may costs be reduced as a result of merger, the price level may also decline and consumers may thus gain.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1074","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68555535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
Can Price Discrimination be Bad for Firms and Good for All Consumers? A Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Market Price Constraints with Entry and Product Differentiation 价格歧视对企业不利而对所有消费者有利吗?具有进入和产品差异化的跨市场价格约束理论分析
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-26 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1176
Ofer H. Azar
{"title":"Can Price Discrimination be Bad for Firms and Good for All Consumers? A Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Market Price Constraints with Entry and Product Differentiation","authors":"Ofer H. Azar","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1176","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article examines a differentiated-products duopoly model where the firms make entry decisions to two markets and then choose prices. The effects of product differentiation and entry costs are analyzed in two games: with and without price discrimination between the markets. Allowing price discrimination encourages more entry and tends to reduce prices and profits and to increase consumer welfare in both markets. The model suggests that firms might be better off if they agree not to price discriminate between different markets. It also suggests that when the market is not a natural monopoly, regulators should consider the effects of universal service requirements on entry before adopting them, because entry might be discouraged by such requirements, leading to less competitive markets.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1176","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Federal Tax Benefits for Child Care: Progressivity Over Time, EGTRRA, and the Alternative Minimum Tax 儿童保育的联邦税收优惠:随着时间的推移，EGTRRA和替代性最低税
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2003-01-25 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1191
J. Eiler, Warren B. Hrung
{"title":"Federal Tax Benefits for Child Care: Progressivity Over Time, EGTRRA, and the Alternative Minimum Tax","authors":"J. Eiler, Warren B. Hrung","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1191","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the progressivity of tax benefits for child care over time. We find that the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) became more progressive between 1989 and 1998. However, total tax benefits for child care, which include the employer exclusion for child care, were less progressive than the CDCTC alone and became less progressive over time. In simple simulations using 1998 data as the base, we find that the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) increases the progressivity of the CDCTC and total tax benefits for child care.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1191","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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