{"title":"Do Long Work Hours Contribute to Divorce?","authors":"John H. Johnson","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1118","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Despite frequent claims in the popular press that Americans are working longer hours to the detriment of their families, little academic research has directly tested this proposition. I provide new descriptive evidence on the link between work hours of married couples and the likelihood that a couple will get divorced. Using samples of working couples from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, I uncover several key facts: First, the incidence of divorce is much greater when both spouses are working than when only one spouse is employed. Second, the work hours of women are more highly correlated with divorce than are the work hours of men. Finally, despite these robust correlations, it is difficult to attribute a causal effect of work hours to divorce propensity.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1118","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Threats Without Binding Commitment","authors":"S. Shavell, K. Spier","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper explores the power of threats in the absence of binding commitment. The threatener cannot commit to carry out the threat if the victim refuses payment, and cannot commit not to carry out the threat if payment is made. An important assumption of the model is that once the threat is carried out it cannot be repeated. If exercising the threat is costly to the threatener, then the threat cannot succeed in extracting money from the victim. If exercising the threat would benefit the threatener, however, then the threat's success depends upon whether the threat may be repeated after a payment is made. In the equilibrium of a finite-period game, the threat is carried out and the victim makes no payments. In an infinite-horizon game, however, it is an equilibrium for the victim to make a stream of payments over time. The expectation of future payments keeps the threatener from exercising the threat.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68555483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment","authors":"R. Crandall, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1136","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An expanding economics literature has examined the theoretical linkages between mandatory unbundling in the telecommunications sector and the incentives to invest in facilities by both incumbent local carriers and competitive carriers. Recent empirical evidence that substantiates the theory has emerged. That literature documents CLECs’ reluctance to make facilities-based investments instead of availing themselves of incumbents’ UNEs at low regulated prices that are based on total element long-run incremental costs (TELRIC). By examining the variation in facilities-based investment in loops across U.S. states and over time, we find that facilities-based line growth relative to UNE growth was faster in states where the cost of UNEs was higher relative to the cost of facilities-based investment.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1136","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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