Topics in economic analysis & policy最新文献_第8页

Cost Optimization in the SIS Model of Infectious Disease with Treatment 传染病治疗SIS模型中的成本优化

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-04-24 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1007

S. Goldman, J. Lightwood

引用次数: 88

The Costs of A Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit 医疗保险处方药福利的成本

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-04-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1028

D. Goldman, G. Joyce, J. Malkin

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引用次数: 11

Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements? 环境检查和对执行政策的承诺:替代还是补充?

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-01-23 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1026

L. Franckx

{"title":"Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements?","authors":"L. Franckx","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider an inspection game between polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency that can inspect ambient pollution before inspecting individual firms. We assume that the enforcement agency's objectives do not perfectly correspond with the objectives of the legislative body who determines the standards for compliance and the fines for non-compliance, and that the enforcement agency can determine its inspection policy independently. However, contrary to Franckx (2002), we assume that the agency can commit to inspection probabilities. We show that this commitment power radically changes the value of ambient inspections. If the legislator imposes an infinite fine, commitment power and ambient inspections are perfect substitutes: both allow the agency to obtain perfect compliance without actually inspecting firms. However, with upper limits to the fine, ambient inspections and commitment power are complements. Indeed, if the agency does not conduct ambient inspections, it can only obtain perfect compliance by announcing high probabilities of firm inspections. With stringent upper limits to the fine, this implies high inspection costs. However, if the agency conducts ambient inspections, it can announce probabilities of firm inspections that are conditional on behavior that will not be observed in equilibrium, and all firms will comply.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68555551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

The Optimal Provision of Services in National Parks 国家公园服务的最优提供

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-01-21 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1041

R. Turner

引用次数: 7

System Components, Network Effects, and Bundling 系统组件、网络效应和捆绑

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1046

M. Clements

引用次数: 1

On Vertical Differentiation Under Bertrand and Cournot: When Input Quality has Upward Sloping Supply 伯特兰和古诺条件下的垂直分异:当投入质量有向上倾斜的供给时

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1002

Mark R. Frascatore

引用次数: 0

The Uncertain Wage - Effort Hypothesis and Wage Secrecy 不确定工资-努力假说与工资保密

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2002-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1040

L. Gan

引用次数: 4

Trade Tax Reform in a Small Open Economy with Distributional Objectives and Distortionary Taxation 具有分配目标和扭曲税收的小型开放经济中的交易税改革

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2001-12-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1022

J. Edwards

引用次数: 2

The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems 交换费在支付系统中的中立性

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2001-07-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1069

J. Gans, Stephen P. King

引用次数: 193

Pension systems in integrated capital markets 一体化资本市场中的养老金制度

Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2001-01-11 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1017

Alessandra Casarico

引用次数: 26