{"title":"Measuring the Impact of Welfare Benefits on Welfare Durations: State Stratified Partial Likelihood and Fixed Effect Approaches","authors":"John M. Fitzgerald","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1121","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Previous studies of welfare durations in the U.S. have analyzed the role of welfare benefits on the length of time recipients remain on welfare. Typically these studies use individual data and estimate the benefit effects based on both cross-sectional variation across locations and time variation within locations. Cross sectional results on benefit effects may be biased due to unobserved state specific differences in welfare programs or attitudes. This paper compares two strategies for dealing with the problem when estimating welfare exit hazard models: stratification of baseline hazards by state and the inclusion of state fixed effects in the hazards. Although the results show that high benefit states appear to have unobserved characteristics that lead to longer spells, the results also show that increases in welfare benefits do not directly increase welfare durations once one controls for state specific effects.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1121","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. HigginsRichard, A. JohnsonPaul, T. SullivanJohn
{"title":"Spatial Competition and Merger","authors":"S. HigginsRichard, A. JohnsonPaul, T. SullivanJohn","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1223","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a computational equilibrium model of spatially differentiated Bertrand competition and apply it to merger analysis. Two pricing paradigms are studied: one where firms cannot price discriminate among customers and one where firms can. The model encompasses many details that make it highly realistic. A detailed example illustrates several insights into merger analysis that are not readily apparent through traditional means. The most important of these is that merger of substitute products under Bertrand price competition need not result in a price increase.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"16 1","pages":"1-37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1223","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Global Health Warnings on Tobacco Packaging: Evidence from the Canadian Experiment","authors":"Nikolay Gospodinov, I. Irvine","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1304","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract New health warnings on tobacco packaging in Canada became mandatory in January 2001. As of that time producers were required to print large-font warning text and graphic images describing the health consequences of using tobacco. This study uses micro data from two waves of Health Canada's Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Surveys bordering the legislation to investigate if the introduction of the warnings had any significant impacts on smokers. The recently drafted Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, under the sponsorship of the World Health Assembly, assigns a central role for this type of message. Our findings indicate that the warnings have not had a discernible impact on smoking prevalence. The evidence of their impact on quantity smoked is positive, though only at a relatively low level of confidence.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1304","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Has Curriculum Closed the Test Score Gap in Math?","authors":"Heather Rose","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1245","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the extent to which convergence in mathematics course-taking behavior is responsible for narrowing the Hispanic-white and the black-white test score gaps during the 1980s. Mathematics curriculum is measured in detail using high school transcript data from both High School and Beyond and the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988. After controlling for demographic, family, and school characteristics, changes in curriculum account for about 60 percent of the narrowing Hispanic-white test score gap between 1982 and 1992. However, the black-white test score gap did not drop significantly. ∗I would like to thank Julian Betts for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Heather Rose, Public Policy Institute of California, 500 Washington Street, Ste. 800, San Francisco, CA, 94111.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1245","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yvonne Durham, Matthew R. Roelofs, Stephen S. Standifird
{"title":"eBay's Buy-It-Now Function: Who, When, and How","authors":"Yvonne Durham, Matthew R. Roelofs, Stephen S. Standifird","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1316","url":null,"abstract":"This paper utilizes field experiment methodology and market data to study the “Buy-it-Now” (BIN) function in a series of eBay coin auctions. BIN auctions are typically listed by sellers with higher reputations. The probability an auction will end BIN increases with seller reputation and is not significantly affected by negative comments. Auctions listed by new sellers average lower prices and are less likely to end BIN. Buyer use of the BIN option increases as the BIN price decreases. We find that price is directly related to seller reputation, though not affected by negative comments, and is negatively related to buyer reputation. This result is driven by those auctions that start with a BIN price.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1316","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Time In Purgatory: Examining the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications","authors":"D. Popp, Ted Juhl, Daniel K. N. Johnson","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1329","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As patent applications increase, and the range of patentable technologies increases, the length of time it takes for an invention to go through the examination process at the U.S. Patent Office has increased. Concerns over the distributional effects of these changes have been expressed during policy debates. We use data on U.S. patent applications and grants to ask who is affected by longer grant lags. We augment this analysis with interviews of patent examiners, leading to a better understanding of the examination process. Our analysis finds that differences across technology are most important. These differences do not erode over time, suggesting that learning effects alone will not reduce grant lags. Inventor characteristics have statistically significant effects, but the magnitudes are small.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1329","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interest Groups and Get Out the Vote Drives","authors":"John Cadigan","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1333","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article analyzes voter mobilization and interest group activity within a citizen-candidate model. Interest groups influence the decisions of 'high cost’ voters by running a 'get out the vote’ campaign. Membership fees paid by citizens joining an interest group finance the vote drives. Because citizens choose whether to join an interest group, size is an endogenous feature of equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to the existing literature, it is shown that smaller groups may have greater influence. Importantly, this result does not depend on the ability of smaller groups to overcome the free rider problem. Intuitively, because smaller groups may have a less diverse membership, they can advocate more extreme policy outcomes. An interest group’s influence is shown to depend on voting costs and the separation between candidate positions. The presence of multiple interest groups mitigates an interest’s influence, resulting in inefficiency.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1333","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Producers and Predators in a Multiple Community Setting","authors":"Shinkyoo Han, J. Ochs","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1249","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes an extension of a model of production and predation due to Grossman (1998) to a multiple community setting. In a multiple community setting, defense expenditures in any one community have the property of a local public good. Such expenditures produce effects on other communities. These effects include changes in the distribution of population among communities, the redistribution of predatory effort over communities, and an induced change in the predator/producer ratio in the economy as a whole. The question we address is whether the level of defense chosen by local governments so as to maximize the per capita consumption of their own producers, given defense levels elsewhere, always produces a second-best outcome. Our analysis shows that if the number of communities is fixed, fully rational local government decision-making leads to the same level of defense activity and equilibrium per capita consumption as would be chosen by a central planner. However, if individual local governments are boundedly rational, in the sense that they do not anticipate the effects of their own defense activity on the equilibrium predator/producer ratio and distribution of producer activity, then competition among local governments never achieves a first-best outcome. Furthermore, the equilibrium associated with competition among boundedly rational local governments can sometimes yield a lower consumption per capita in equilibrium than would be achieved if there were no local governments and each agent who chose to be a producer also chose his/her own level of defense.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1249","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Citizens Should Vote on Secession","authors":"E. Eerola, Niku Määttänen, Panu Poutvaara","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1312","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The draft treaty establishing a constitution for the European Union states that each member state may withdraw from the European Union following its own constitutional requirements. We argue that such a rule could lead into an increased use of threat of withdrawal to extract concessions in intergovernmental negotiations. This problem would be exacerbated by national electorates facing an incentive to elect more confrontational politicians. We also suggest a remedy: EU constitution should require that withdrawal from EU membership must be approved by the voters of the withdrawing member state in a referendum.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1312","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections: Who Blames Whom for What","authors":"D. Eisenberg, Jonathan D. Ketcham","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1285","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In United States presidential elections, the incumbent party’s fortunes depend significantly on recent economic conditions, as numerous studies have shown. Many details of how economic voting takes place, however, are still not well understood. Here we present evidence on four issues. 1) Which is more important for determining people’s votes, national or local economic conditions? 2) What time frame do people consider in economic voting? 3) Which demographic groups are most sensitive to the economy in their voting behavior? 4) How does economic voting depend on the political context—in particular, whether a candidate is running for re-election, and whether the incumbent party also controls Congress? Our study includes the first county-level analysis of economic voting in presidential elections. We find the answers to our four questions are: 1) national conditions, by far; 2) the most recent year; 3) blacks, females, and the non-elderly; and 4) no.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1285","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}