{"title":"Foreign Portfolio Investment Improves Performance: Evidence from the Czech Republic","authors":"A. Weiss, G. Nikitin","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1205","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When foreigners became the major shareholders of publicly traded firms in the Czech Republic, those firms experienced improvements in performance and increases in investment. In contrast, controlling for ownership type, ownership concentration had no independent effect on performance or investment. The results are robust to the estimation technique used, the choice of independent variables, and the methods used to control for selection bias.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1205","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Franchise Bidding for Postal Services in Rural Regions","authors":"Jörg Borrmann","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we develop a franchise bidding mechanism for postal services under the Universal Service Obligation (USO) in rural areas. For the collection and delivery of mail on rural routes and for small town counter operations, monopoly franchises are awarded. Deficits caused by the USO are balanced by transfers between the government and the incumbent postal operator, i.e. the franchiser. We analyze the efficiency properties of the mechanism and discuss the drawbacks when extending the mechanism to urban areas.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1178","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Economic Assessment of Parents' Self-Composure: The Case of Physical Child Abuse","authors":"Mark D. Agee, T. Crocker, J. Shogren","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1161","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper uses a maximum likelihood procedure that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in the sample to implement a preference-based model to assess factors that influence parents' likelihood of losing their composure and physically abusing their children. A basic supposition of the model is that parents prefer to deal with parent-child conflict by choosing tactics and behaviors that do not exceed a specified level of violence; however, endogenous parent and child behaviors and exogenous circumstances may arouse parents' emotions that cause this level to be exceeded. Our results suggest policy interventions that influence such circumstances and associated behaviors may strongly influence the incidence of physical child abuse. We estimate the ex ante annual value parents attach to risk reductions of self-composure losses associated with excessive parent-child violence. This value is shown to be greater than currently estimated annual savings in ex post costs associated with a comparable decrease in U.S. physical child abuse incidence.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1161","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Membership Diversity in Club Decisions","authors":"Gary Biglaiser, J. Friedman","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1188","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine a club model in which the club's policies are controlled by a homogeneous group of insiders. Their policy decision is to determine the number they will admit from two outsider groups. Countries have immigration policies, private clubs have membership policies, and professional practices also have membership criteria in which individuals may be screened. In all these organizations new members bring a material benefit to the organization, but do so at the cost of introducing a socially differentiated population of outsiders that the majority typically dislikes. It is the interplay of the material benefit and the social cost on which we focus. We characterize steady state equilibria and examine comparative statics results.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1188","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information Transmission and the Bounds to Growth","authors":"G. Cozzi, L. Spinesi","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1168","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies the long run growth implications of the presence of information acquisition and transmission costs. We assume that vertical innovation requires researchers to be informed on the current version of the product they want to improve upon; and we also assume that quasi-fixed managerial inputs are required for production in the manufacturing sector. Despite the fact the increases in total factor productivity cause R&D and managerial quasi-fixed labor costs to decrease in the same way as variable labor costs, the presence of these costs is sufficient to rule out the strong scale effect at all levels of the intertemporal returns to ideas. More importantly, the upper bound of long run growth rates crucially depends on information transmission costs.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1168","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Empirical Analysis of Gambling Addiction: Results from the Case of Taiwan","authors":"Wen-Chun Chang","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1269","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study analyzes gambling addiction in Taiwan by using lottery data from 1978 to 1984. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence of this study. First, lottery play is strongly addictive in Taiwan, and the results are consistent with the theory of rational addiction. Second, the estimated short-run and long-run price elasticities are -0.136, and -1.463, respectively. Because consumers are very likely rational, the concerns of public policy toward gambling should focus on the negative externalities rather than on its addictive nature.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1269","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"WTO Negotiations on Market Access in Agriculture: a Comparison of Alternative Tariff Cut Proposals for the EU and the US","authors":"J. Bureau, L. Salvatici","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1152","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper provides a summary measure of the possible new commitments in the area of agricultural market access undertaken by the European Union and the United States, using the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) as the tariff aggregator. We take the 2001 bound tariffs as the starting point and attempt to assess how much liberalization in agriculture could be achieved in the European Union and the United States as a result of the present negotiations. We compute the index for 20 agricultural commodity aggregates under the actual commitments assuming a specific functional form for import demand. We compare the present levels of the TRI with three hypothetical cases: a repetition of the same set of tariff cuts commitments of the Uruguay Round according to a EU proposal prior to the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting, a uniform 36% reduction of each tariff, an harmonization ( \"Swiss\" ) formula based on the initial US proposal.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1152","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Note on Weak Double Dividends","authors":"G. Metcalf, M. Babiker, J. Reilly","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1275","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A weak double-dividend is the proposition that the welfare improvement from a green tax reform, where the revenue from an environmental tax is used to reduce other tax rates, must be greater than the welfare improvement from a reform where the environmental taxes are returned in a lump sum fashion. We show in this note that a weak double-dividend need not hold in a world with multiple distortions. In an economy with multiple distortions one must choose carefully which tax rates to reduce, or one can do worse than a lump sum redistribution of the environmental tax revenues.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1275","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68557911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intranational Trade Diversion, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, and the L Curve","authors":"Serge Coulombe","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1260","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper provides an empirical analysis of the comparative evolution of intranational and international trade in the Canadian provinces since 1981. We establish a striking empirical fact, the L curve, that characterizes the comparative evolution of intranational (interprovincial) and international trade shares to GDP between 1981 and 2000. We also use a panel data model to evaluate the impact of changing trade costs induced by the CUSFTA on the intensity of international and interprovincial trade. The analysis casts doubt on the intranational trade diversion hypothesis, common in trade models such as the structural gravity model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) that was used recently to revisit the Canada–U.S. border effect. International trade appears to complement rather than substitute for interprovincial trade.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1260","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Commitment and Discretion in Health Care Policy Making","authors":"R. Rosenman, D. Friesner","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1167","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper analyzes the welfare effect from government sponsored insurance under two policy regimes for reimbursement levels – the first under which policy makers commit to a specific reimbursement schedule, the second which allows discretion in setting reimbursement schedules. We find that prices and quality will differ depending on which policy regimen is followed. We are able to identify a level for the policy maker’s elasticity of utility with respect to its policy tool under which government insured patients are unambiguously better off with policy commitment. The ordering of welfare is reversed if the elasticity of utility is reversed. In either case, privately insured patients may be better or worse off.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"143 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1167","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}