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The Firm's Cost of Capital, Its Effective Marginal Tax Rate, and the Value of the Government's Tax Claim 企业的资本成本、有效边际税率和政府的税收要求价值
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-02-22 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1465
R. Rao, E. Stevens
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引用次数: 12
The Impact of Delivery Synergies on Bidding in the Georgia School Milk Market 配送协同效应对乔治亚州学校牛奶市场竞价的影响
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-02-15 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1327
R. Marshall, Matthew E. Raiff, J. Richard, Steven P. Schulenberg
{"title":"The Impact of Delivery Synergies on Bidding in the Georgia School Milk Market","authors":"R. Marshall, Matthew E. Raiff, J. Richard, Steven P. Schulenberg","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1327","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Each summer milk processors around the country participate in sealed bid procurements for the right to provide public schools with milk throughout the subsequent academic year. School district contracts are an important part of vehicle routing problems that milk processors solve on an ongoing basis. There are allegedly substantial cost savings for a milk processor from servicing a district that is directly adjacent to one they already service. In this paper, following the work of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996), we construct a procurement model allowing for cost synergies. The equilibrium bid function maps directly into an empirical specification. Using data from a time period when bidders were allegedly acting non-cooperatively, our structural parametric estimation results give significant support for the presence of cost synergies in the bidding.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1327","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
Did the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund Accurately Assess Economic Losses? 9/11受害者赔偿基金是否准确评估经济损失?
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-01-17 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1438
Frank D. Tinari, K. Cahill, E. Grivoyannis
{"title":"Did the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund Accurately Assess Economic Losses?","authors":"Frank D. Tinari, K. Cahill, E. Grivoyannis","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1438","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF), victims' families were provided monetary compensation based on economic and non-economic losses in exchange for giving up their right to sue U.S. entities, such as airlines. Was the Fund successful in calculating economic losses, and should it be repeated in the wake of another such attack? This paper assesses the extent to which forensic economists influenced the Special Master’s decisions. We find that, for the most part, the Special Master's economic awards before collateral offsets were bounded by the presumed award amounts and the forensic economist's calculations, with substantial variation across claimants. This result implies that the Special Master's economic awards appear to have been significantly influenced by other factors offered during the VCF hearings, raising questions about fairness if a similar process is to be repeated in the future.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"221 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1438","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
The Marginal Cost of Funds from Public Sector Borrowing 公共部门借贷资金的边际成本
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-01-13 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1393
Bev Dahlby
{"title":"The Marginal Cost of Funds from Public Sector Borrowing","authors":"Bev Dahlby","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1393","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An expression for the welfare cost of a marginal increase in the public debt is derived using a simple AK endogenous growth model. This measure of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) can be interpreted as the marginal benefit-cost ratio that a debt-financed public project needs in order to generate a net social gain. The model predicts an increase in the public debt ratio will have little effect on the optimal public expenditure ratio and that most of the adjustment will occur on the tax side of the budget.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1393","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Designing Auctions in R&D: Optimal Licensing of an Innovation 研发中的拍卖设计:创新的最优许可
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-01-07 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1533
I. Brocas
{"title":"Designing Auctions in R&D: Optimal Licensing of an Innovation","authors":"I. Brocas","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1533","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study an R&D game in which a research unit undertakes a (non-observable) research effort and, if an innovation is obtained, auctions licenses to a pool of producers. Each producer has a private valuation for the license and suffers a negative externality when a competitor becomes a licensee. We compare the optimal rule for the allocation of licenses and the level of research effort implemented by the innovator in two scenarios: free licensing by the innovator vs. optimal regulation. As long as the cost of public intervention is sufficiently low, free licensing induces two different types of inefficiencies: an excessively high price for licenses and a suboptimal dissemination of knowledge, and an excessively low research effort. This indicates that public intervention should combine the following measures: (i) an antitrust agency which limits the royalties that innovators can ask for a license, and (ii) a direct subsidy to research activity.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1533","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Public Complaints and Alberta's Environmental Regulation 公众投诉和艾伯塔省环境法规
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-01-03 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1494
Heather Eckert
{"title":"Public Complaints and Alberta's Environmental Regulation","authors":"Heather Eckert","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1494","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, different levels of government in Canada and the United States have claimed that public complaints are an important source of information for the enforcement of environmental regulations. Public complaints provide monitoring at a lower cost than inspections but are inaccurate because citizens lack the information to assess a potential environmental threat properly. Little existing literature examines the use of public complaints in enforcing environmental regulations. Using a dataset of environmental reports in the province of Alberta between January 1996 and September 2002, this paper details the use of public complaints to enforce Alberta's environmental legislation and examines the effectiveness of public complaints in different industries and for different environmental threats. I find that that the majority of public complaints are simply odour complaints, and that public complaints are investigated less often over time and very rarely lead to enforcement action.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1494","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68559356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Capital Movements and the Political Economy of Trade Policy 资本流动与贸易政策的政治经济学
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1324
Delfim Gomes Neto
{"title":"Capital Movements and the Political Economy of Trade Policy","authors":"Delfim Gomes Neto","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1324","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We develop a political economy model of trade policy using a sector specific factor model with international capital mobility, looking for the relationship between protection and the composition of foreign capital. As foreign direct investment is remunerated at the marginal productivity of capital, an increase of the tariff raises its remuneration, increasing also the transfer of resources abroad. This is an additional cost of the tariff in terms of welfare. As external debt is remunerated at a given international interest rate, the additional cost of protection in terms of welfare does not appear. Then the equilibrium tariff with external debt is higher than with foreign direct investment. We present evidence for a panel of developing countries observed between 1970 and 1998 giving support to the main implication of the model. We find a significant effect of the composition of foreign capital on trade policy, implying that countries which have relatively more foreign direct investment than external debt also have less protection.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1324","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68558822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Digital File Sharing on the Music Industry: An Empirical Analysis 数字文件共享对音乐产业的影响:实证分析
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1549
Norbert J. Michel
{"title":"The Impact of Digital File Sharing on the Music Industry: An Empirical Analysis","authors":"Norbert J. Michel","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1549","url":null,"abstract":"The first file-sharing software, Napster, was shut down in 2001, but the copying technology’s impact on the music industry is still passionately debated. This paper uses micro-level data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to examine the impact of Internet file sharing on music sales. Music industry representatives argue that the practice decreases CD sales, while supporters of file-sharing allege the practice could actually increase sales. Using household-level data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we find support for the claim that file-sharing has decreased sales.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1549","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68559322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Do Plants Overcomply with Water Pollution Regulations? The Role of Discharge Variability 工厂是否过度遵守水污染条例?放电变异性的作用
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1486
Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay, J. Horowitz
{"title":"Do Plants Overcomply with Water Pollution Regulations? The Role of Discharge Variability","authors":"Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay, J. Horowitz","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1486","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses previously unexploited data to examine polluters’ compliance with pointsource water pollution regulations, a line of inquiry motivated by widespread apparent overcompliance. We use a nationwide panel of monthly plant-level effluent concentrations from 1991-1999. These monthly data allow us to observe month-to-month variability in discharges and therefore to test hypotheses not previously examined. We find that plants that have higher discharge variability have lower median discharges. This is strong evidence for the purported “safety margin” effect. This result then implies that average discharges, a common measure of polluter behavior, are not an accurate indicator of polluter behavior. In response, we construct a plant-specific implied probability of a violation that accounts for discharge variability. We show that plants in richer communities have lower violation probabilities. We further argue that plants are indeed overcomplying with the regulations even when accounting for the safety margin effect.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1486","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68559269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Credit Constraints and Contract Enforcement 信用约束和合同执行
Topics in economic analysis & policy Pub Date : 2006-01-01 DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1156
D. Powers
{"title":"Credit Constraints and Contract Enforcement","authors":"D. Powers","doi":"10.2202/1538-0653.1156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1156","url":null,"abstract":"This paper demonstrates that credit constraints can lead to the inability to enforce contracts, thereby creating inefficiency. If time elapses between the contract period and the enforcement period, a credit constrained agent that uses the proceeds of trade to fund consumption faces a greater cost to enforce a contract than an unconstrained agent. This allows the other party to a contract to hold up the credit constrained agent, thereby creating inefficiency. This is demonstrated for two types of enforcement mechanisms; enforcement of a one-time trade via the courts, and enforcement of a long-term trade via a punishment strategy.","PeriodicalId":87841,"journal":{"name":"Topics in economic analysis & policy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2202/1538-0653.1156","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68556547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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