{"title":"Let's go WILD: Increasing Inclusivity in Theories of Developmental Psychology.","authors":"Kim A Bard, Heidi Keller, David A Leavens","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X25000044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25000044","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Most scientists are aware that developmental databases derive primarily from Western, middle-class samples, but fewer are cognizant that developmental theories can be similarly biased. There is urgency in revising developmental theories, both scientifically (embracing diversity is essential to the study of human psychology) and applied (it is damaging to apply WEIRD standards/methods/theories to evaluate development in the multitude of non-WEIRD contexts).We evaluate the extent to which two prominent developmental theories are inclusive. We find that Shared Intentionality Theory is based on a WEIRD bias in the foundational databases: the core constructs lack culturally diverse data, undermining claims that this theory explains human-general social cognition. In Attachment Theory, we illuminate the lack of inclusivity in the core assumptions and resulting claims of the meaning and measure of the attachment system: this theory excludes cultural diversity in social-emotional constructs focused on communal orientations (e.g., interdependence, attachment networks) found in many people of the Global South, and neglects culture-specific adaptive behavior patterns.Acknowledging the lack of inclusivity at the level of theory is necessary. We urge researchers to take a more WILD approach: obtain <b>W</b>orldwide samples, study development <b>I</b>n situ, focus on <b>L</b>ocal cultural practices and ethnotheories, and consider development as <b>D</b>iverse. Being WILD entails attending to inclusivity during the entire research process, from framing the research questions to interpreting the data (e.g., respecting all adaptive behaviors in development). Five Steps for Increasing Inclusivity can be used as a practical guide to decenter psychological theories from their current WEIRD mindset.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":" ","pages":"1-60"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144126458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ecological Affordances across Life Stages: An Affordance Management Framework.","authors":"Ahra Ko, Steven L Neuberg","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X25000056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25000056","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Although the interaction between humans and their environments is central to psychological science, its dynamics throughout the lifespan remain unexplored. We consider how <i>ecological affordances</i>-the opportunities and threats an environment poses for one's goal achievement-can be differently perceived across developmental life stages. Integrating affordance-management and life-history perspectives, we propose that individuals perceive and respond to ecological affordances based on their prioritized goals, which shift systematically as they progress through life stages. The same environment can be perceived as posing an opportunity at one life stage, but as posing a threat or being irrelevant at other stages with different goal priorities. To illustrate the value of this framework, we focus on three environmental dimensions tied to recurring adaptive challenges in human history: genetic relatedness, physical violence, and sex-age ratio. We examine how individuals perceive and navigate ecological affordances across three key life stages-childhood, mating, and parenting-through multiple strategies: (a) recalibrating cognitive and affective attunement to relevant cues, (b) adjusting psychological and behavioral strategies, and (c) reconstructing their environments at various levels. By bridging social, developmental, and cognitive psychology with behavioral ecology and evolutionary biology, this framework advances our understanding of human-environment interactions by (a) challenging the assumption that environmental effects are static, (b) generating precise hypotheses about psychological and behavioral patterns, enabling systematic and holistic investigation, and (c) underscoring the potential for lifelong flexibility in ecological navigation.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":" ","pages":"1-74"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143961532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism.","authors":"Anil K Seth","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X25000032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25000032","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance, it is natural to ask whether AI systems can be not only intelligent, but also conscious. I consider why people might think AI could develop consciousness, identifying some biases that lead us astray. I ask what it would take for conscious AI to be a realistic prospect, challenging the assumption that computation provides a sufficient basis for consciousness. I'll instead make the case that consciousness depends on our nature as living organisms - a form of biological naturalism. I lay out a range of scenarios for conscious AI, concluding that real artificial consciousness is unlikely along current trajectories, but becomes more plausible as AI becomes more brain-like and/or life-like. I finish by exploring ethical considerations arising from AI that either is, or convincingly appears to be, conscious. If we sell our minds too cheaply to our machine creations, we not only overestimate them - we underestimate ourselves.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":" ","pages":"1-42"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143952537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sensory Horizons and the Functions of Conscious Vision.","authors":"Stephen M Fleming, Matthias Michel","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X25000068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25000068","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>It is not obvious why we are conscious. Why can't all of our mental activities take place unconsciously? What is consciousness for? We aim to make progress on this question, focusing on conscious vision. We review evidence on the timescale of visual consciousness, showing that it is surprisingly slow: postdictive effects reveal windows of unconscious integration lasting up to 400 milliseconds. We argue that if consciousness is slow, it cannot be for online action-guidance. Instead, we propose that conscious vision evolved to support offline cognition, in tandem with the larger visual sensory horizons afforded by the water-to-land transition. Smaller visual horizons typical in aquatic environments require fast, reflexive actions of the sort that are guided unconsciously in humans. Conversely, larger terrestrial visual horizons allow benefits to accrue from \"model-based\" planning of the sort that is associated with consciousness in humans. We further propose that the acquisition of these capacities for internal simulation and planning provided pressures for the evolution of reality monitoring-the capacity to distinguish between internally and externally triggered signals, and to solve \"Hamlet's problem\" in perception-the problem of when to stop integrating evidence, and fix a particular model of reality. In line with higher-order theories of consciousness, we associate the emergence of consciousness with the emergence of this reality monitoring function. We discuss novel empirical predictions that arise from this account, and explore its implications for the distribution of conscious (vs. unconscious) vision in aquatic and terrestrial animals.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":" ","pages":"1-53"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143969119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Philosophy or science of societies?","authors":"Marion Blute","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X24001262","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0140525X24001262","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>While ambitious, interesting, and generally corresponding to usage in archaeology history, and anthropology, Moffett's paper seems more philosophy of science (conceptual analysis) than science (their use in explanations). It avoids explanations of how \"markers of identity\" and \"their recognition\" are acquired (e.g., by biological evolution, individual learning, social learning, or sociocultural evolution) and what the concept of \"a society\" explains.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":"48 ","pages":"e55"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143771130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The family as the primary social group.","authors":"Jack W Klein","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X24001122","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0140525X24001122","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Moffett contends that societies should be considered the \"primary\" group with respect to their social ramifications. Although intriguing, this claim suffers from insufficient clarity and evidence. Rather, if any group is to be crowned supreme it should surely be the family, with its unique capacity to encourage pro-group behavior, shape other groups, and provide meaning.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":"48 ","pages":"e64"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143771195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is a society in the case of multilevel societies?","authors":"Cyril C Grueter, Larissa Swedell","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X24001250","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0140525X24001250","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We expand on Moffett's discussion of societies in the context of multilevel social systems, for which Moffett proposes the core unit to constitute a society. Moffett's definition of a society, however, suggests that it is more parsimonious to assign this label to the upper (band) level. An understanding of multilevel systems is critical for informing discussions about what a society is.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":"48 ","pages":"e63"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143771205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why societies are important and grow so large: Tribes, nations, and teams.","authors":"Roy F Baumeister, Danny Southwick","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X24001274","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0140525X24001274","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Moffett's definition of societies could be augmented by recognizing society's organizing systems that coordinate diverse individuals' behavior for collective good. Viewing humans as cultural animals indicates three reasons for ever larger societies: More shared information, bigger and better marketplace for exchange, and military superiority in numbers. Sports teams are societies offering a promising venue for empirical work.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":"48 ","pages":"e54"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143771208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gabriel Ramos-Fernandez, Sandra E Smith Aguilar, Edoardo Pietrangeli, Cristina Jasso-Del Toro, José R Nicolás-Carlock, Denis Boyer, Braulio Pinacho-Guendulain, Augusto Montiel Castro, Filippo Aureli
{"title":"Group identity without social interactions?","authors":"Gabriel Ramos-Fernandez, Sandra E Smith Aguilar, Edoardo Pietrangeli, Cristina Jasso-Del Toro, José R Nicolás-Carlock, Denis Boyer, Braulio Pinacho-Guendulain, Augusto Montiel Castro, Filippo Aureli","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X24001146","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0140525X24001146","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We present several arguments for the preeminence of social interactions in determining and giving shape to societies. In our view, a society can emerge from social interaction and relationship patterns without the need for establishing an <i>a priori</i> limit on who actually belongs to it. Markers of group identity are one element among many that allow societies to persist.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":"48 ","pages":"e69"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How an interdisciplinary study of societies can develop a comprehensive understanding of the function of deceptive behavior.","authors":"Panagiotis Mitkidis","doi":"10.1017/S0140525X24001249","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0140525X24001249","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Moffett presents a robust proposal for a comparative study of societies as the basis for studying the human condition and behavior. This theoretical framework has implications for the study of deceptive behavior. I discuss how this framework might describe the adaptation of deceptive behavior within human societies and shed light on the dynamics of collaborative deceptive behavior through interpersonal commitment.</p>","PeriodicalId":8698,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Brain Sciences","volume":"48 ","pages":"e67"},"PeriodicalIF":16.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143771110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}