The Modern schoolman最新文献

{"title":"Masks, Abilities, and Opportunities: Why the New Dispositionalism Cannot Succeed","authors":"C. Franklin","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/26","url":null,"abstract":"Conditional analyses of ability have been nearly entirely abandoned by philosophers of action as woefully inadequate attempts of analyzing the concept of ability. Recently, however, Vihvelin (2004) and Fara (2008) have appealed to the similarity between dispositions and abilities, as well as recent advances in the metaphysics of dispositions, in order to construct putatively superior conditional analyses of ability. Vihvelin and Fara claim that their revised conditional analyses of ability enable them to show that Frankfurt-style cases fail to sever the connection between freedom and responsibility, and that compatibilism about free will and determinism is true. I argue, however, that even granting the truth of their dispositional analyses, they cannot achieve these aims. Vihvelin and Fara’s fundamental error lies in their failing to appreciate the complex nature of free will and moral responsibility—specifically that agents’ freedom and responsibility depend not only on their abilities, but also their opportunities.","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"88 1","pages":"89-103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/26","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71277736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Does Agent-­‐Causal Power Work?","authors":"Andrei A. Buckareff","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/27","url":null,"abstract":"Agent-causalism or the agency theory is the thesis that agents qua objects/substances cause at least some of their decisions (or at least their coming to have an intention that is constitutive of a decision). In this paper, I examine the tenability of an attractive agentcausal account of the metaphysics of the springs of free action developed and defended in the recent work of Timothy O’Connor. Against the backdrop of recent work on causal powers in ontology, I argue that, however attractive the account, O’Connor’s agent-causal theory of free agency is ultimately untenable.","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"88 1","pages":"105-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/27","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71277783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Editor’s Farewell","authors":"William Charron","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/21","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"88 1","pages":"3-3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/21","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71278081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tracing and the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility","authors":"K. Timpe","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/22","url":null,"abstract":"In “The Trouble with Tracing,” Manuel Vargas argues that tracing-based approaches to moral responsibility are considerably more problematic than previously acknowledged. Vargas argues that many initially plausible tracing-based cases of moral responsibility turn out to be ones in which the epistemic condition for moral responsibility is not satisfied, thus suggesting that contrary to initial appearances the agent isn’t morally responsible for the action in question. In the present paper, I outline two different strategies for responding to Vargas’s trouble with tracing. I then show how further consideration of the epistemic condition for moral responsibility renders tracing significantly less problematic than Vargas claims.","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"88 1","pages":"5-28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/22","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71278135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Softening Fischer’s Hard Compatibilism","authors":"C. Ragland","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/24","url":null,"abstract":"According to “hard” compatibilists, we can be responsible for our actions not only when they are determined by mindless natural causes, but also when some agent other than ourselves intentionally determines us to act as we do. “Soft” compatibilists consider freedom compatible with merely natural determinism, but not with intentional determinism (e.g., theological determinism). Because he believes there is no relevant difference (NRD) between a naturally determined agent and a relevantly similar intentionally determined agent, John Martin Fischer is a hard compatibilist. However, he argues for “historical” compatibilism by appealing to the intuition that certain manipulated agents are not responsible. By considering a new type of manipulation case, I show that Fischer’s appeal to ordinary intuitions about manipulation conflicts with NRD, so that he must choose between the two. The closing section explains why I think going “soft” is Fischer’s better option. Compatibilism about free will and determinism comes in two varieties: hard and soft.1 To see the difference between these, we must distinguish between ‘intentional’ and ‘natural’ determination. An event is naturally determined just in case it must occur given past history and the laws of nature. An event is intentionally determined just in case it is causally necessitated by some agent’s deliberate choice to bring it about. Hard compatibilists, such as Harry Frankfurt (1986, 113–23) and Gary Watson, say that that moral responsibility is compatible with both natural and intentional determination of the will. On their view, we can be responsible for our actions and choices not only when they are determined by laws of nature, but also when some agent other than ourselves is deliberately causing us to choose and act as we do; we can be “at once a full fledged free agent” and “a creature whose every move, every hope and scheme is a part of another’s plan” (Watson 2000, 69). Soft compatibilists, such as A. J. Ayer (1982) and Daniel Dennett (1984, 57–73), claim that freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with natural determination, but not with intentional determination. In their view, being completely under the control of another person is not compatible with being free and responsible. However, past history and the laws of nature are not agents capable of controlling us, and so in 1 My terms here follow Kane (1998, 67–68), and Watson (2000, 67–69). The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 88, No. 1–2, January and April 2011, pp. 51–71 © C. P. Ragland • © The Modern Schoolman 7-88.1-2 Ragland FNL 5/22/12 11:33 AM Page 51 (Black plate)","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"88 1","pages":"51-71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/24","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71278153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"LIBERTARIANISM, LUCK, AND GIFT","authors":"D. Speak","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/23","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"88 1","pages":"29-49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/23","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71278145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CONCEPT OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY","authors":"A. Finch","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/29","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral responsibility debate ought to adopt a new methodology. In particular, they argue, the results of experimental surveys ought to be introduced into the debate.According to the experimental philosophers, these surveys are philosophically relevant because they provide information about the moral responsibility judgments that ordinary people make. Moreover, they argue, an account of moral responsibility is satisfactory only if it is tightly connected to ordinary judgments. The purpose of this paper is to undermine this argument. I will argue that experimental philosophers have not adequately acknowledged the distinction between metaphysics and conceptual analysis; they have not carefully distinguished what-it-isto-be morally responsible from the concept of moral responsibility. I will draw this distinction, and then argue that metaphysicians qua metaphysicians may both ignore experimental data and offer an account of moral responsibility that satisfies the tight connection desideratum.","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"88 1","pages":"145-160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/29","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71277802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities","authors":"Randolph Clarke","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/210","url":null,"abstract":"Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack isn’t required for them to be responsible for doing what they do. Differences between actions and omissions, and between the requirements for responsibility for these two, are also discussed. Suppose that Connie decides on a certain occasion to vote for the Republican candidate. Suppose that conditions sufficient for an agent to be morally responsible for making a decision are satisfied by Connie with respect to making her decision. (Connie is morally competent, she’s aware of what she’s doing, she isn’t compelled, brainwashed, or surgically manipulated, and so forth. If a decision for which one is responsible must be determined by the agent’s deliberative process, then Connie’s is so determined; if, on the other hand, a decision for which one is responsible must be undetermined, Connie’s is undetermined. Etc.) By supposition, Connie is morally responsible for deciding on this occasion to vote Republican. Now imagine a second case—a variant of the first—in which someone closely monitors Connie’s thought process throughout her deliberation. The monitor wants Connie to decide to vote Republican, but he prefers that she do so on her own. If he sees any sign that she’s about to do otherwise, he’ll intervene and cause her to decide as he wishes; otherwise he’ll do nothing.1 As it happens, Connie shows no such sign, and the monitor does nothing except observe. Except for being in the monitor’s presence (and anything that might be implied by being in that presence), Connie is the same in the second case as in the first case. In the second case, what actually produces Connie’s decision to vote Republican (if anything does) is exactly what produces her decision in the first case. 1 Imagine Connie to be such that, on this occasion, her attending to a reason not to vote Republican is a necessary but not sufficient condition for her not deciding to vote Republican. Her so attending could serve as the sort of sign for which the monitor is on the alert. Pereboom (2001, 18–19) presents a case involving a sign of this sort. The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 88, No. 1–2, January and April 2011, pp. 161–169 © Randolph Clarke • © The Modern Schoolman 13-88.1-2 Clarke FNL 5/22/12 11:45 AM Page 161 (Black plate)","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"88 1","pages":"161-169"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/210","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71278093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Special Editor’s Introduction to Experimental and Theoretical Knowledge","authors":"Kent W. Staley","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2010873/44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2010873/44","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"87 1","pages":"185-189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71278016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Adequacy for Purpose: The Best Deal a Model Can Get","authors":"A. Alexandrova","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2010873/411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2010873/411","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"87 1","pages":"295-301"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71277946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}