Softening Fischer’s Hard Compatibilism

Abstract

According to “hard” compatibilists, we can be responsible for our actions not only when they are determined by mindless natural causes, but also when some agent other than ourselves intentionally determines us to act as we do. “Soft” compatibilists consider freedom compatible with merely natural determinism, but not with intentional determinism (e.g., theological determinism). Because he believes there is no relevant difference (NRD) between a naturally determined agent and a relevantly similar intentionally determined agent, John Martin Fischer is a hard compatibilist. However, he argues for “historical” compatibilism by appealing to the intuition that certain manipulated agents are not responsible. By considering a new type of manipulation case, I show that Fischer’s appeal to ordinary intuitions about manipulation conflicts with NRD, so that he must choose between the two. The closing section explains why I think going “soft” is Fischer’s better option. Compatibilism about free will and determinism comes in two varieties: hard and soft.1 To see the difference between these, we must distinguish between ‘intentional’ and ‘natural’ determination. An event is naturally determined just in case it must occur given past history and the laws of nature. An event is intentionally determined just in case it is causally necessitated by some agent’s deliberate choice to bring it about. Hard compatibilists, such as Harry Frankfurt (1986, 113–23) and Gary Watson, say that that moral responsibility is compatible with both natural and intentional determination of the will. On their view, we can be responsible for our actions and choices not only when they are determined by laws of nature, but also when some agent other than ourselves is deliberately causing us to choose and act as we do; we can be “at once a full fledged free agent” and “a creature whose every move, every hope and scheme is a part of another’s plan” (Watson 2000, 69). Soft compatibilists, such as A. J. Ayer (1982) and Daniel Dennett (1984, 57–73), claim that freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with natural determination, but not with intentional determination. In their view, being completely under the control of another person is not compatible with being free and responsible. However, past history and the laws of nature are not agents capable of controlling us, and so in 1 My terms here follow Kane (1998, 67–68), and Watson (2000, 67–69). The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 88, No. 1–2, January and April 2011, pp. 51–71 © C. P. Ragland • © The Modern Schoolman 7-88.1-2 Ragland FNL 5/22/12 11:33 AM Page 51 (Black plate)