The Modern schoolman最新文献

KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION, AND THE NORMATIVITY OF EPISTEMOLOGY 知识，证明，以及认识论的规范性

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2013-05-01 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.2013.90.2.2

R. Audi

{"title":"KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION, AND THE NORMATIVITY OF EPISTEMOLOGY","authors":"R. Audi","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.2013.90.2.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.2013.90.2.2","url":null,"abstract":"Epistemology is sometimes said to be a nor- mative discipline, but what this characterization means is often left unclear. This paper distinguishes two kinds of normativity and thereby provides a new way of un- derstanding attributions of normativity. Associated with this distinction are two kinds of epistemological reflection. These are shown to be parallel to two kinds of ethical reflection. In the light of what emerges in showing these points, the paper clarifies the requirements for naturaliz- ing epistemology, the place normativity might have, given certain kinds of naturalization, and the sense in which knowledge and justification may be viewed as normative. An important question about epistemology is whether the notions of knowl- edge and justification are normative. A related question is whether, if they are, their normativity is epistemic. The terms 'normativity' and 'epistemic' are relative newcomers to philosophy; and, unlike many that figure im- portantly in the field, they have no everyday uses. Lacking such uses does not automatically indicate that they have no clear meaning, but it tends to indicate that intuitions about the concepts expressed by the terms are less clear, and more subject to differences in judgment, than intuitions evoked by terms in common use such as—to take philosophically impor- tant cases—'believe', 'know', 'good', 'property', and even 'cause'. One might think that we can gain clarity by considering the long-standing use of 'norm' and related terms in social-scientific parlance. This is doubtful. As commonly understood, especially in the social sciences, a norm is simply a prevailing pattern and represents what is usual. What pertains to norms in this statistical sense need not be normative in the sense—if there is just one sense—important in philosophy. The term 'normative' has a longer history in philosophical parlance than does 'normativity', and in clarifying the associated concept we can be guided by the usage of the former as well as by discussions explicitly focusing on normativity as the intended referent of the abstract noun, which I take to express (in most of its uses) the property of being normative. My aim here is, first, to clarify the terms 'normativity' and 'epistemic' and, second, in that light, to pursue the question in what sense epistemology","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"90 1","pages":"127-145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.11612/RESPHIL.2013.90.2.2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64516493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}