The Modern schoolman最新文献_第2页

Rodrigo de Arriaga on Relations 罗德里戈·德·阿里加谈关系

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2012-12-06 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2012891/24

S. Penner

引用次数: 3

John Poinsot (1589–1644) on the Universale Materialiter Sumptum: A Dual Viewpoint 约翰·波因索(1589-1644)论普遍唯物主义总论:双重观点

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2012-12-06 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2012891/25

D. Heider

引用次数: 1

Thomas Reid on Reidian Religious Belief Forming Faculties 托马斯·里德论里德的宗教信仰形成能力

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2011-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011883/418

Ryan Nichols, Robert Callergård

引用次数: 5

Thomas More and the Christian ‘Superstition’: A Puzzle for Hume’s Psychology of Religious Belief 托马斯·莫尔与基督教的“迷信”:休谟宗教信仰心理学的一个谜

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2011-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011883/414

Rico Vitz

引用次数: 1

Cleanthes’s Propensity and Intelligent Design 克林塞斯的《倾向与智能设计》

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2011-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011883/417

Liz Goodnick

引用次数: 5

Reductio ad Malum: Bayle’s Early Skepticism about Theodicy 还原论与谬论:贝尔早期对神正论的怀疑

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2011-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011883/413

Michael Hickson

引用次数: 1

Amyraut on Reason and Religious Belief 论理性与宗教信仰

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2011-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011883/412

K. Irwin

引用次数: 0

Leibniz on Concurrence, Spontaneity, and Authorship 莱布尼茨论并发性、自发性和作者性

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2011-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011883/416

Julia von Bodelschwingh

引用次数: 7

What is a Causal Theorist to Do about Omissions 因果理论家如何看待遗漏

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2011-04-01 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/28

Rebekah L. H. Rice

{"title":"What is a Causal Theorist to Do about Omissions","authors":"Rebekah L. H. Rice","doi":"10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/28","url":null,"abstract":"Most philosophers concede that one can properly be held morally responsible for intentionally omitting to do something. If one maintains that omissions are actions (negative actions, perhaps), then assuming the requisite conditions regarding voluntariness are met, one can tell a familiar story about how/why this is. In particular, causal theorists can explain the etiology of an intentionalal omission in causal terms. However, if one denies that omissions are actions of any kind, then the familiar story is no longer available. Some have suggested that this poses a special problem for causal theorists of action. I argue that it does not and, even more interestingly, that it renders a more nuanced understanding of voluntariness (since it no longer applies strictly to actions) and moral responsibility (since you might be to blame, but not for anything you’ve done). It is widely accepted that one can properly be held morally responsible for intentionally omitting to do something. If my children are hungry and I decide to continue to write my paper, rather than feed them dinner, I am culpable for failing to provide them the nourishment they require despite its being well within my means to do so. If one maintains that omissions are actions (negative actions, perhaps), then, assuming the requisite conditions regarding voluntariness (whatever they may be) are met, one can tell a familiar story about how this is so. In particular, causal theorists (whether event-causalist or agent-causalist) can explain the etiology of the intentional omission in causal terms since, being actions, omissions will be capable of entering into causal relations with the requisite items (mental events/states, in the case of causalism, or substances, in the case of agent-causalism). On an event-causalist picture, an omission will be the effect of some mental event (perhaps a belief-desire pair, or an intention of some sort) and on the agent-causal view, it will be an effect brought about by a substance (the agent). As effects of agents, or of events within agents, intentional omissions are the sorts of things for which one can be morally responsible since they will have been brought about by the agent, or by events originating in the agent. In what follows, I will focus on Causalism—or, as I prefer, The Causal Theory of Action (CTA)—rather than on agent-causal theories. According to CTA, an event e is an (intentional) action if and only if e is caused (in the right way) by the appropriate (rationalizing) mental item(s). The first parenthetical The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 88, No. 1–2, January and April 2011, pp. 123–144 © Rebekah L. H. Rice • © The Modern Schoolman 11-88.1-2 Rice FNL 5/22/12 11:42 AM Page 123 (Black plate)","PeriodicalId":83189,"journal":{"name":"The Modern schoolman","volume":"20 1","pages":"123-144"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/28","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71277793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

UNDERSTANDING SOURCE INCOMPATIBILISM 了解源不兼容性

The Modern schoolman Pub Date : 2011-04-01 DOI: 10.5840/SCHOOLMAN2011881/25

N. Tognazzini

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引用次数: 6