What is a Causal Theorist to Do about Omissions

Abstract

Most philosophers concede that one can properly be held morally responsible for intentionally omitting to do something. If one maintains that omissions are actions (negative actions, perhaps), then assuming the requisite conditions regarding voluntariness are met, one can tell a familiar story about how/why this is. In particular, causal theorists can explain the etiology of an intentionalal omission in causal terms. However, if one denies that omissions are actions of any kind, then the familiar story is no longer available. Some have suggested that this poses a special problem for causal theorists of action. I argue that it does not and, even more interestingly, that it renders a more nuanced understanding of voluntariness (since it no longer applies strictly to actions) and moral responsibility (since you might be to blame, but not for anything you’ve done). It is widely accepted that one can properly be held morally responsible for intentionally omitting to do something. If my children are hungry and I decide to continue to write my paper, rather than feed them dinner, I am culpable for failing to provide them the nourishment they require despite its being well within my means to do so. If one maintains that omissions are actions (negative actions, perhaps), then, assuming the requisite conditions regarding voluntariness (whatever they may be) are met, one can tell a familiar story about how this is so. In particular, causal theorists (whether event-causalist or agent-causalist) can explain the etiology of the intentional omission in causal terms since, being actions, omissions will be capable of entering into causal relations with the requisite items (mental events/states, in the case of causalism, or substances, in the case of agent-causalism). On an event-causalist picture, an omission will be the effect of some mental event (perhaps a belief-desire pair, or an intention of some sort) and on the agent-causal view, it will be an effect brought about by a substance (the agent). As effects of agents, or of events within agents, intentional omissions are the sorts of things for which one can be morally responsible since they will have been brought about by the agent, or by events originating in the agent. In what follows, I will focus on Causalism—or, as I prefer, The Causal Theory of Action (CTA)—rather than on agent-causal theories. According to CTA, an event e is an (intentional) action if and only if e is caused (in the right way) by the appropriate (rationalizing) mental item(s). The first parenthetical The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 88, No. 1–2, January and April 2011, pp. 123–144 © Rebekah L. H. Rice • © The Modern Schoolman 11-88.1-2 Rice FNL 5/22/12 11:42 AM Page 123 (Black plate)