Philosophic research and analysis最新文献

{"title":"On some generalized Simpson type inequalities for (α,m)-coordinated convex functions in context of q 1 q 2-calculus","authors":"G. Gulshan, M. Ali, R. Hussain, Asad Sadiq, H. Budak","doi":"10.1515/anly-2023-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/anly-2023-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the current investigation, we offer the generalized version of q 1 ⁢ q 2 {q_{1}q_{2}} -Simpson’s type inequalities via ( α , m ) {(alpha,m)} -coordinated convex functions. To validate their generalized behavior, we demonstrate the link between our outcomes and the already derived ones. Moreover, we provide some application to special means of positive real numbers to support our findings. The principal outcomes raised in this investigation are extensions and generalizations of the comparable results in the history on Simpson’s inequalities for coordinated convex functions.","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"298 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79631805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Scattering of an inhomogeneous coupled Schrödinger system in the conformal space","authors":"T. Saanouni, Congming Peng","doi":"10.1515/anly-2023-0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/anly-2023-0027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies the inhomogeneous defocusing coupled Schrödinger system i ⁢ u ˙ j + Δ ⁢ u j = | x | - ρ ⁢ ( ∑ 1 ≤ k ≤ m a j ⁢ k ⁢ | u k | p ) ⁢ | u j | p - 2 ⁢ u j , ρ > 0 , j ∈ [ 1 , m ] . idot{u}_{j}+Delta u_{j}=lvert xrvert^{-rho}bigg{(}sum_{1leq kleq m}a_% {jk}lvert u_{k}rvert^{p}biggr{)}lvert u_{j}rvert^{p-2}u_{j},quadrho>0,% ,jin[1,m]. The goal of this work is to prove the scattering of energy global solutions in the conformal space made up of f ∈ H 1 ⁢ ( ℝ N ) {fin H^{1}(mathbb{R}^{N})} such that x ⁢ f ∈ L 2 ⁢ ( ℝ N ) {xfin L^{2}(mathbb{R}^{N})} . The present paper is a complement of the previous work by the first author and Ghanmi [T. Saanouni and R. Ghanmi, Inhomogeneous coupled non-linear Schrödinger systems, J. Math. Phys. 62 2021, 10, Paper No. 101508]. Indeed, the supplementary assumption x ⁢ u 0 ∈ L 2 {xu_{0}in L^{2}} enables us to get the scattering in the mass-sub-critical regime p 0 < p ≤ 2 - ρ N + 1 {p_{0}<pleqfrac{2-rho}{N}+1} , where p 0 {p_{0}} is the Strauss exponent. The proof is based on the decay of global solutions coupled with some non-linear estimates of the source term in Strichartz norms and some standard conformal transformations. Precisely, one gets | t | α ⁢ ∥ u ⁢ ( t ) ∥ L r ⁢ ( ℝ N ) ≲ 1 lvert trvert^{alpha}lVert u(t)rVert_{L^{r}(mathbb{R}^{N})}lesssim 1 for some α > 0 {alpha>0} and a range of Lebesgue norms. The decay rate in the mass super-critical regime is the same one as of e i ⋅ Δ ⁢ u 0 {e^{icdotDelta}u_{0}} . This rate is different in the mass sub-critical regime, which requires some extra assumptions. The novelty here is the scattering of global solutions in the weighted conformal space for the class of source terms p 0 < p < 2 - ρ N - 2 + 1 {p_{0}<p<frac{2-rho}{N-2}+1} . This helps to better understand the asymptotic behavior of the energy solutions. Indeed, the source term has a negligible effect for large time and the above non-linear Schrödinger problem behaves like the associated linear one. In order to avoid a singular source term, one assumes that p ≥ 2 {pgeq 2} , which restricts the space dimensions to N ≤ 3 {Nleq 3} . In a paper in progress, the authors treat the same problem in the complementary case ρ < 0 {rho<0} .","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75738944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Symmetry’s revenge","authors":"Joseph C. Schmid","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 James Henry Collin recently developed a new symmetry breaker favouring the ontological argument’s possibility premiss over that of the reverse ontological argument. The symmetry breaker amounts to an undercutting defeater for the reverse possibility premiss based on Kripkean cases of a posteriori necessity. I argue, however, that symmetry re-arises in two forms. First, I challenge the purported asymmetry in epistemic entitlements to the original and reverse possibility premisses. Second, relevantly similar Kripkean cases equally undercut the original possibility premiss.","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80430226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why we should not assume that ‘normal’ is ambiguous","authors":"Jon Bebb","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad022","url":null,"abstract":"There is a widespread and largely unchallenged assumption within philosophy that the word ‘normal’ is ambiguous: i.e., that it can mean different things in different contexts. This assumption appears in work within topics as varied as the philosophy of biology, medicine, justification, causation, and more. In this paper I argue that we currently lack any independent reason for adopting such an assumption. The reason that would most likely be offered in its favour requires us to ignore an alternative and equally plausible explanation for the seeming variety of different meanings that ‘normal’ is taken to have. Meanwhile, the well-known conjunction reduction test for ambiguity provides no evidence for the ambiguity of ‘normal’, and in fact suggests that maintaining this ambiguity claim is more difficult than has been initially supposed. Therefore, with the way things stand at present, it should not be assumed without argument that ‘normal’ is an ambiguous term.","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90909130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Explanatory virtues and reasons for belief","authors":"Noah D Mckay","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this essay, I address an objection to inference to the best explanation due to Bas C. van Fraassen, according to which explanatory virtues cannot confirm a theory, since they make the theory more informative and thus less likely to be true given the probability axioms. I try to show that van Fraassen’s argument, once made precise, is deductively invalid, and that even an ampliative version of the argument (i) implies, absurdly, that no theory is confirmed by its fit with empirical data; (ii) fails to account for confirmatory closure under deduction; and (iii) falsely presupposes that a theory and its sub-theories can be competing explanations.","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85232248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Recent work in the theory of conceptual engineering","authors":"Steffen Koch, G. Löhr, Mark Pinder","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad032","url":null,"abstract":"A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about which concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering.1 Herman Cappelen’s book Fixing Language (2018) played a central role in setting the terms of current debates, bringing fundamental questions to the fore and developing strategies for tackling them. The theory of conceptual engineering he develops in that book, which he calls the Austerity Framework, has proven to be highly controversial – and, as a locus of debate, very influential. Indeed, the Austerity Framework, along with Cappelen’s discussion more generally, is the starting point for much subsequent work in the field. Cappelen’s work is the foil against which new theories have been developed and defended. Cappelen sets the scene by pointing to a range of projects, inside and outside of philosophy, that he thinks of as conceptual engineering projects. These include projects such as Haslangerian ameliorative projects (Haslanger 2012), Carnapian explication (Carnap 1950) , revisionary views about moral language (Railton 1989), inconsistency theories of truth (Scharp 2013), the astronomical redefinition of ‘planet’ (I.A.U. 2006), public controversies over, for example, the meaning of ‘marriage’ (Ludlow 2014), and so on. According to Cappelen, a theory of conceptual engineering aims (in part) to draw out what is common to such examples: what the ‘conceptual engineers’ are doing and why and how they are doing it. But a theory of conceptual engineering","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"107 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80777996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The ideal in nonideal social ontology","authors":"Miguel Garcia-Godinez","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad059","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80668767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Arzelà’s bounded convergence theorem","authors":"Amar Sarić","doi":"10.1515/anly-2023-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/anly-2023-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article presents a proof of the bounded convergence theorem for Riemann integrals. An effort has been made to keep the exposition concise and self-contained.","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"165 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75704098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On Attention and Norms: An Opinionated Review of Recent Work","authors":"Wayne Wu","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad056","url":null,"abstract":"How might attention intersect with normative issues and the psychology surrounding them? This survey connects three phenomena discussed in ethics and epistemology: salience, vigilance (attunement) and attentional character. I connect these phenomena drawing on an empirical understanding of attention and bias in the biology of human agents that enriches the relevant psychology. Section 1 establishes a common ground conception of attention that is no more controversial than the established empirical paradigms for attention. This allows for an explication of bias needed to explain action and attention, an explication that is both biological and philosophical. With this in place, I emphasize historical biases associated with learning and experience. Section 2 presents an analysis of automaticity and control, concepts needed for an adequate characterization of skill. Historical biases are revealed as automatic, so not controlled through intention. The automatization of attention is central to acquiring skills and excellence in light of normative standards. Section 3 argues that salience involves the deployment of attention, while section 4 characterizes vigilance not merely as a disposition but as an active orientation to attend. Vigilance is one type of attunement, and the set of attunements constitute the agent’s varied orientations to deploy attention. This informs the idea of attentional character as the goal of a normatively sensitive upbringing where appropriate attention is automatized through learning. Section 6 draws on these lessons to assess one common form of epistemic bias in academia and attempts to debias to establish virtuous attentional character.","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81947349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Jeffrey imaging revisited","authors":"Melissa Fusco","doi":"10.1093/analys/anac036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In ‘The logic of partial supposition’ (Analysis vol. 81), Benjamin Eva and Stephan Hartmann investigate partial imaging , a credence-revision method which combines the partiality familiar from Jeffrey Conditioning(The Logic of Decision , 1983 ) with the formal notion of imaging familiar from Lewis’s ‘Causal decision theory’ (1981 ). They argue that because partial imaging is non-monotonic, it ‘fail[s] to provide a plausible account of the norms of partial subjunctive suppositions’.\u0000 In this note, I present a notion of partial imaging that does satisfy monotonicity, and discuss some of the applications and ramifications. The account frames conditioning as a form of imaging, and rejects Gärdenfors’s principle of linearity in ‘Imaging and conditionalization’ (1982 ).","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"22 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72594032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}