Bioethics最新文献_第9页

The Euthyphro Dilemma, Assisted Dying, and a Virtue Ethics Approach to Autonomy 尤西弗罗困境，协助死亡，以及自主的美德伦理途径。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-08-11 Epub Date: 2026-03-22 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70104

Thomas Donaldson

{"title":"The Euthyphro Dilemma, Assisted Dying, and a Virtue Ethics Approach to Autonomy","authors":"Thomas Donaldson","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70104","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.70104","url":null,"abstract":"The Euthyphro dilemma highlights that accounts of moral value which are dependent on the decisions of agents either result in arbitrary values arising from agent's decisions, or accept external reasons to morally justify the value, making the agent's decisions unnecessary for explaining the resulting value. This highlights an explanatory problem when the autonomous choices of patients form the basis of a moral justification for assisted dying. Providing any other moral reason in support of a request for assisted dying would undermine any moral justification for the request based solely upon the autonomy of the patient. When assisted dying is justified solely by patient's autonomous requests, patients requesting assisted dying are not treated as moral agents, because moral agents act for reasons. This does not mean that autonomy does not have a vital role in morality, as a safeguard against force, deceit or coercion being used to override the agency of patients. Autonomy is the necessary starting point of the development of virtue and the growth of human agency, but not its goal. In virtue ethics, patient's autonomous decisions, such as when requesting assistance to die, can be either virtuous or vicious, and so moral evaluation of the reasons for their choice is necessary to decide whether or not they can be shared by clinicians.","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"40 7","pages":"767-771"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.70104","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147494891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Commenting on the Gaza War: What, if Anything, Does Bioethics Offer? 评论加沙战争：如果有的话，生命伦理学提供了什么？

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70171

Simon Lucas

{"title":"Commenting on the Gaza War: What, if Anything, Does Bioethics Offer?","authors":"Simon Lucas","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.70171","url":null,"abstract":"The editors of Bioethics chose to publish a special issue on the Gaza war, arguably one of the most contentious contemporary topics. This decision deserves praise for seeking to protect a space for rigorous engagement in a highly polarized debate. At the same time, such an undertaking is inherently risky. Herein, I try to assess whether the issue succeeds on its own terms, particularly its commitment to advancing ethical analysis within areas of established bioethical expertise. I argue that it falls short of these standards. While a few articles offer a robust ethical analysis of bioethical aspects related to the war, several others exhibit the very features the journal sought to avoid: they appear driven by personal conviction, limited in disciplinary rigor, and, in the case of empirical papers, to a certain extend fail to integrate normative analysis, remaining largely descriptive. Moreover, the issue displays a striking trend toward a highly condemnatory tone, raising questions about whether factors beyond the subject matter itself may have shaped the discourse. While the initiative is therefore praiseworthy for its stated goal, its execution is less convincing. Overall, the journal might have been better served by refraining from a dedicated special issue and instead continuing to solicit careful, methodologically rigorous contributions-such as the stronger pieces included here-that more faithfully reflect its stated aspirations and high editorial standards.","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148708561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Agents of Climate Justice in Healthcare 医疗保健中的气候正义代理人。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-08-11 Epub Date: 2026-05-10 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70106

Joshua Parker

{"title":"The Agents of Climate Justice in Healthcare","authors":"Joshua Parker","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70106","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.70106","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the critical issue of decarbonising healthcare systems to help combat climate change. I focus on identifying the ‘agents of justice’ responsible for this transformation. Beginning with the claim that healthcare's greenhouse gas emissions cause injustice, the paper assumes that achieving a net zero healthcare system is essential for climate justice. The discussion centres on two prevailing perspectives: one that primarily assigns responsibility to healthcare organisations and another that holds individual healthcare professionals accountable. The paper advocates for a pluralistic approach to responsibility, contending that the complexity and scale of reducing healthcare emissions necessitate allocating responsibilities based on effectiveness. This leads to the identification of two types of responsibility: first-order responsibilities, which involve direct actions to reduce emissions, and second-order responsibilities, which involve supporting and ensuring the fulfilment of first-order duties. The paper clarifies how mitigation responsibilities should be allocated across organisations and individuals by expanding the scope of responsibility to include a broader range of agents, both within and beyond the healthcare sector. By distinguishing between first-order and second-order responsibilities, the paper offers a clearer framework for understanding the distribution of obligations in achieving climate justice in healthcare. Ultimately, it underscores that focusing solely on direct mitigation efforts by organisations or clinicians is inadequate, and a more comprehensive, multi-agent approach is required to effectively decarbonise healthcare systems.","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"40 7","pages":"697-706"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.70106","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147864784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Pregnancy, Ethics, and the Law in Medical Assistance in Dying. 死亡医疗援助中的怀孕、伦理和法律。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-08-03 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70169

Timothy F Murphy, Jennifer A Parks

引用次数: 0

Limiting Human Genomic Data Generation and Retention for Environmental Reasons. 由于环境原因限制人类基因组数据的产生和保留。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-07-23 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70166

Wendy Xin, Narcyz Ghinea, Ainsley J Newson

{"title":"Limiting Human Genomic Data Generation and Retention for Environmental Reasons.","authors":"Wendy Xin, Narcyz Ghinea, Ainsley J Newson","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.70166","url":null,"abstract":"The exponential growth of human genomic data presents a largely unexamined environmental challenge. Generating, storing, processing, using and sharing genomic data each contribute to environmental harms through substantial energy demands, resource use, and waste generation. This paper examines how we ought to respond to these environmental harms. We first argue that the environmental harms from genomic data warrant serious ethical consideration, even though the magnitude of such harms is relatively small compared to some other industries (e.g., fossil fuel industries). We then explore potential strategies for mitigation. While it is important to improve how genomic data is handled and to optimise the infrastructure required for handling it, we contend that these measures are not sufficient. We should, at least in some cases, also limit the amount of genomic data we generate and (continue to) store for environmental reasons. Although we recognise the uncertainty around the value of genomic data-what seems irrelevant today could prove valuable tomorrow-we argue that such uncertain benefits cannot justify unlimited data generation and retention. Decisions about when and how to limit genomic data should consider a range of factors, including which social groups are most likely to benefit from genomic research and which are most likely to bear its environmental harms.","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148563730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Death Determination, the Dying Process and the Dead Donor Rule: A Critical Analysis of the Italian 20-Minute No-Touch Period in Controlled Donation After Circulatory Determination of Death. 死亡确定、死亡过程和死亡供体规则：对循环确定死亡后控制捐赠中意大利20分钟无接触期的批判性分析。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-07-17 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70163

Lucia Craxì

{"title":"Death Determination, the Dying Process and the Dead Donor Rule: A Critical Analysis of the Italian 20-Minute No-Touch Period in Controlled Donation After Circulatory Determination of Death.","authors":"Lucia Craxì","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.70163","url":null,"abstract":"In Italy, controlled Donation after Circulatory Determination of Death (cDCDD) requires a 20-min no-touch period documented by continuous electrocardiographic monitoring. Since Italian law adopts a single brain-based definition of death, this procedure serves as an indirect determination of the irreversible cessation of all brain functions. This differs from other countries using 5-min no-touch periods and focusing on permanent cessation of circulation. This paper argues that the Italian 20-min no-touch period lacks a convincing scientific and ethical basis. No evidence shows that 20 min is the minimum period required to establish beyond doubt the irreversible cessation of all brain functions after circulatory arrest. Moreover, the Italian legal definition of death relies on a standard that is not fully verifiable in practice, both regarding the cessation of all brain functions and irreversibility. It further maintains that the dead donor rule is vulnerable insofar as it is closely tied to legal definitions of death that do not fully capture the complexity of dying as a biological process. Donor protection should instead be based on what can be biologically proven, clinically confirmed, and ethically justified. The paper suggests a partial reformulation of the dead donor rule, based on the diagnosis of a permanent dying process that will inevitably lead to complete biological death. On this ground, Italy should reduce its no-touch period to the 5-min standard and revise death-determination protocols to document the permanent cessation of effective systemic circulation rather than the disappearance of cardiac electrical activity.","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148474531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Rethinking the Dead Donor Rule: A Defense of Normothermic Regional Perfusion. 对死亡供体规则的反思：常温局部灌注的辩护。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-07-16 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70147

Jake Greenblum, Timothy Aylsworth

引用次数: 0

The Role of Social Value in Data-Intensive Health Research. 社会价值在数据密集型健康研究中的作用。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-07-16 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70159

Tessa I van Rijssel, Sam H A Muller, Marianne Boenink, Johannes J M van Delden

{"title":"The Role of Social Value in Data-Intensive Health Research.","authors":"Tessa I van Rijssel, Sam H A Muller, Marianne Boenink, Johannes J M van Delden","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.70159","url":null,"abstract":"Data-intensive health research complicates traditional requirements for informed consent, due to the amount of data contributors and data points, the open-ended nature of research questions, and repeated or secondary data use. To still enable data-intensive health research, there is a move towards other-generally lower-standards for consent such as opt-out systems, in current developments such as the European Health Data Space (EHDS). This is premised on the social value that data-intensive health research is assumed to provide through advancing research and innovation. Traditionally, social value functions both as a fundamental requirement for research, as well as a ground to justify individual risk in research ethics. However, ongoing debates surrounding data-intensive health research suggest that social value can also be used to justify lower standards of consent. Here, social value seems to obtain an additional and distinct function. This raises questions on the role of social value in research ethics and evaluations of the acceptability of research. In this paper, we examine three possible roles of social value: (i) to prevent research waste and set research priorities; (ii) to justify exposing research participants to risk; and (iii) to lower standards for consent. We discuss the presuppositions underlying these various roles. When social value is invoked to justify lower consent standards, this specifically impacts data contributors' ability to have control over when and how their data are used. Therefore, we propose that this use of social value requires arranging alternative forms of meaningful involvement and control for data contributors.","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148474527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Surrogacy and the Moral Significance of Gestation: Reassessing Procreative Responsibilities. 代孕与妊娠的道德意义：重新评估生育责任。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-07-06 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70153

Maria-Jose Pietrini-Sanchez

{"title":"Surrogacy and the Moral Significance of Gestation: Reassessing Procreative Responsibilities.","authors":"Maria-Jose Pietrini-Sanchez","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.70153","url":null,"abstract":"Practices involving assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) presuppose the allocation of procreative responsibilities of various types and degrees among clinical embryologists, fertility doctors, and nonmedical individuals such as gamete bank staff and attorneys, while typically exempting them from parental rights and obligations. These individuals are appropriately regarded as third-party participants in assisted reproductive technology (ART) procedures. Surrogates, however, engage in gestational labour which implies a sustained, embodied, and relational form of care fundamentally distinct from the technical or procedural contributions of other third-party participants. This distinction calls into question the adequacy of classifying surrogates as mere third-party contributors. This article rejects that classification and argues that the procreative responsibilities of surrogates are better understood as proto-parental responsibilities grounded on the normative significance of gestation. These responsibilities constitute a prior stage of parenthood, providing the moral basis for subsequent parental rights and obligations. In advancing this view, this article critically engages with the professional model proposed by Ruth Walker and Liezl van Zyl, according to which surrogates' procreative responsibilities should be understood in professional terms. I argue that the professional model undermines the surrogate's reproductive autonomy, trivialises the moral significance of gestation, and obscures the moral importance of the connection between gestation and parenthood. By contrast, the account developed here argues that proto-parental responsibilities arise from gestational proximity and the pregnant woman's capacity to cultivate relationship goods foundational to the parent-child relationship.","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148392554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Transhumanism Without Transindividuation in the Age Without Epochality: Stiegler, Vice, and Radical Human Enhancement. 在没有时代性的时代里，没有超个体化的超人类主义：斯蒂格勒、罪恶与激进的人类提升。

IF 2.3 2区哲学

Bioethics Pub Date : 2026-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.70143

Benjamin N Parks

{"title":"Transhumanism Without Transindividuation in the Age Without Epochality: Stiegler, Vice, and Radical Human Enhancement.","authors":"Benjamin N Parks","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70143","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.70143","url":null,"abstract":"At its core, transhumanism is utopic and apocalyptic: it tells us we will be saved through an imminent radical change of our being wrought by radical human enhancement (RHE) technologies. We are rushing, its supporters claim, towards a technological utopia so long as assorted techno-phobes do not stand in the way. In this paper, I will argue that the speed of contemporary technology conflicts with the utopic aim of transhumanism. Unlike many critics of transhumanism, I am not supposing that there is some inherent conflict between being \"truly\" human and using RHE. The problem with RHE lies with the speed with which contemporary technology operates. This speed has destroyed social and psychic apparatuses that once supported the development of virtue. Technologies developed in this milieu, or \"age\" to use Bernard Stiegler's terminology, will continue or conserve this destruction. In short, RHE developed in our age may allow transhumanists to achieve a bodily utopia in which we have achieved functional immortality, but they will not create a utopia in the moral sense-a society in which virtue flourishes and vice is eradicated. Instead, RHE will likely inscribe our vices into the very being of our trans- and posthuman progeny.","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148363848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0