BioethicsPub Date : 2024-04-11DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13284
Leah Pierson
{"title":"Accounting for future populations in health research","authors":"Leah Pierson","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13284","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13284","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The research we fund today will improve the health of people who will live tomorrow. But future people will not all benefit equally: decisions we make about what research to prioritize will predictably affect when and how much different people benefit from research. Organizations that fund health research should thus fairly account for the health needs of future populations when setting priorities. To this end, some research funders aim to allocate research resources in accordance with disease burden, prioritizing illnesses that cause more morbidity and mortality. In this article, I defend research funders' practice of aligning research funding with disease burden but argue that funders should aim to align research funding with future—rather than present—disease burden. I suggest that research funders should allocate research funding in proportion to aggregated estimates of disease burden over the period when research could plausibly start to yield benefits until indefinitely into the future.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 5","pages":"401-409"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140589403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-03-30DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13281
Robert Vandersluis, Julian Savulescu
{"title":"The selective deployment of AI in healthcare","authors":"Robert Vandersluis, Julian Savulescu","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13281","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13281","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Machine-learning algorithms have the potential to revolutionise diagnostic and prognostic tasks in health care, yet algorithmic performance levels can be materially worse for subgroups that have been underrepresented in algorithmic training data. Given this epistemic deficit, the inclusion of underrepresented groups in algorithmic processes can result in harm. Yet delaying the deployment of algorithmic systems until more equitable results can be achieved would avoidably and foreseeably lead to a significant number of unnecessary deaths in well-represented populations. Faced with this dilemma between equity and utility, we draw on two case studies involving breast cancer and melanoma to argue for the selective deployment of diagnostic and prognostic tools for some well-represented groups, even if this results in the temporary exclusion of underrepresented patients from algorithmic approaches. We argue that this approach is justifiable when the inclusion of underrepresented patients would cause them to be harmed. While the context of historic injustice poses a considerable challenge for the ethical acceptability of selective algorithmic deployment strategies, we argue that, at least for the case studies addressed in this article, the issue of historic injustice is better addressed through nonalgorithmic measures, including being transparent with patients about the nature of the current epistemic deficits, providing additional services to algorithmically excluded populations, and through urgent commitments to gather additional algorithmic training data from excluded populations, paving the way for universal algorithmic deployment that is accurate for all patient groups. These commitments should be supported by regulation and, where necessary, government funding to ensure that any delays for excluded groups are kept to the minimum. We offer an ethical algorithm for algorithms—showing when to ethically delay, expedite, or selectively deploy algorithmic systems in healthcare settings.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 5","pages":"391-400"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.13281","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140330339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-03-25DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13283
Thomas Grote, Philipp Berens
{"title":"A paradigm shift?—On the ethics of medical large language models","authors":"Thomas Grote, Philipp Berens","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13283","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13283","url":null,"abstract":"<p>After a wave of breakthroughs in image-based medical diagnostics and risk prediction models, machine learning (ML) has turned into a normal science. However, prominent researchers are claiming that another paradigm shift in medical ML is imminent—due to most recent staggering successes of large language models—from single-purpose applications toward generalist models, driven by natural language. This article investigates the implications of this paradigm shift for the ethical debate. Focusing on issues like trust, transparency, threats of patient autonomy, responsibility issues in the collaboration of clinicians and ML models, fairness, and privacy, it will be argued that the main problems will be continuous with the current debate. However, due to functioning of large language models, the complexity of all these problems increases. In addition, the article discusses some profound challenges for the clinical evaluation of large language models and threats to the reproducibility and replicability of studies about large language models in medicine due to corporate interests.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 5","pages":"383-390"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.13283","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140208343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-03-22DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13285
Ryan Kulesa, Alberto Giubilini
{"title":"Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision: We can't have both","authors":"Ryan Kulesa, Alberto Giubilini","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13285","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13285","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to <i>conscientiously provide</i> abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to <i>conscientiously refuse</i> to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession—what we will call “pathocentric” and “interest-centric” views—conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclusive. On pathocentric views, refusing to provide a service that takes away from a patient's health is professionally justified because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to refuse to provide that service (e.g., it does not heal, and it is contrary to the goals of medicine). However, providing that same service is not professionally justified when providing that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. Likewise, the thesis turns out false on interest-centric views. Refusing to provide a service is not professionally justified when that service helps the patient fulfill her autonomous preferences because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to provide that service (e.g., it helps her achieve her autonomous preferences, and it would be contrary to the goals of medicine to deny her that service). However, refusing to provide that same service is not professionally justified when refusing to provide that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. As a result, on either of the two most plausible views on the goals of medicine, the symmetry thesis turns out false.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 5","pages":"445-451"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.13285","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140190441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-03-22DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13282
Dorian Accoe, Guido Pennings
{"title":"Navigating conflicts of reproductive rights: Unbundling parenthood and balancing competing interests","authors":"Dorian Accoe, Guido Pennings","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13282","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13282","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Advances in assisted reproductive technologies can give rise to several ethical challenges. One of these challenges occurs when the reproductive desires of two individuals become incompatible and conflict. To address such conflicts, it is important to unbundle different aspects of (non)parenthood and to recognize the corresponding reproductive rights. This article starts on the premise that the six reproductive rights—the right (not) to be a gestational, genetic, and social parent—are negative rights that do not entail a right to assistance. Since terminating or continuing a pregnancy is a form of assistance, the right (not) to be a gestational parent should enjoy primacy in conflicts. However, while refusing assistance may hinder the reproductive project of another person, “prior assistance” does not entitle someone to violate a reproductive right. Therefore, our analysis provides reasons to argue that someone has a right to unilaterally use cryopreserved embryos or continue the development of an entity in an extracorporeal gestative environment (i.e., ectogestation). Although this could lead to a violation of the right not to be a genetic parent, it does not necessarily entail a violation of the right not to be a social parent.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 5","pages":"425-430"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140190442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-03-12DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13280
Catherine Clune-Taylor
{"title":"Arguments for a ban on pediatric intersex surgery: A dis/analogy with Jehovah witness blood transfusion","authors":"Catherine Clune-Taylor","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13280","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13280","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article argues for a ban on the performance of medically unnecessary genital normalizing surgeries as part of assigning a binary sex/gender to infants with intersex conditions on the basis of autonomy, regardless of etiology. It does this via a dis/analogy with the classic case in bioethics of Jehovah Witness (JW) parents' inability to refuse life-saving blood transfusions for their minor children. Both cases address ethical medical practice in situations where parents are making irreversible medical decisions on the basis of values strongly held, identity, and relationship-shaping values—such as religious beliefs or beliefs regarding the inherent value of binary sex/gender—amidst ethical pluralism. Furthermore, it takes seriously—as we must in the intersex case—that the restriction of parents' right to choose will likely result in serious harms to potentially large percentage of patients, their families, and their larger communities. I address the objection that parents' capacity to choose is restricted in the JW case on the basis of the harm principle or a duty to nonmaleficence, given that the result of parent choice would be death. I provide evidence that this is mistaken from how we treat epistemic uncertainty in the JW case and from cases in which clinicians are ethically obligated to restrict the autonomy of nonminor patients. I conclude that we restrict the parents' right to choose in the JW case—and should in the case of pediatric intersex surgery—to secure patient's <i>future autonomy</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 5","pages":"460-468"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.13280","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140102912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-03-11DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13279
Travis Quigley
{"title":"Why restrict medical effective altruism?","authors":"Travis Quigley","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13279","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13279","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a challenge trial, research subjects are purposefully exposed to some pathogen in a controlled setting, in order to test the efficacy of a vaccine or other experimental treatment. This is an example of medical effective altruism (MEA), where individuals volunteer to risk harms for the public good. Many bioethicists rejected challenge trials in the context of Covid-19 vaccine research on ethical grounds. After considering various grounds of this objection, I conclude that the crucial question is how much harm research subjects can permissibly risk. But we lack a satisfying way of making this judgment that does not appeal simply to the intuitions of doctors or bioethicists. I consider one recent and structurally plausible approach to critically evaluating the harm question. Alex London defends a social consistency test for research risks: we should compare the risks undertaken by research subjects to relevantly similar risks which are accepted in other spheres of society. I argue there is no good reason not to consider volunteer military service as a relevant social comparison. This implies there is essentially no cap on acceptable risks on the social consistency rationale. In short, if soldiers can be heroes, why can't research volunteers?</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 5","pages":"452-459"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140095131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-03-08DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13278
{"title":"Corrigendum to: Attitudes, intentions and procreative responsibility in current and future assisted reproduction","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13278","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13278","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Battisti, D. (2023). Attitudes, intentions and procreative responsibility in current and future assisted reproduction. <i>Bioethics, 37</i>(5), 449–461. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13150.</p><p>The name ‘McDougall’ is incorrectly spelled as ‘McDougal’ on pages 453 and 454.</p><p>The phrase ‘focus-agent focus’ on page 454 is incorrect and should read ‘future-agent focus’.</p><p>The part of the sentence \"implies the prospective parents\" should be replaced with \"commits\", and the word \"have\" in the same sentence should be replaced with \"having\". This sentence should read: \"Considering this, we can recognize that the parent-child relationship argument commits procreators to having attitudes and intentions that are not in contrast with the desires and hopes that their children's lives go well and that they are safe from suffering\" paragraph 4, page 456.</p><p>The word ‘having’ should be replaced with ‘parenting’ in the final paragraph of page 455. This sentence should read: ‘On the one hand, the distinction between creating and parenting a child enables us to justify the fact that the beginning of a parent–child relationship is also morally relevant in the procreative context’.</p><p>The word ‘having’ should be replaced with ‘creating’ on the first line of page 456. This sentence should read: ‘To explain the moral relevance of the distinction between creating and parenting a child let us consider again the example of the couple that, through PGD plus IVF, deliberately select a child with a disability D’.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 4","pages":"377"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.13278","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140066278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-03-05DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13276
Caspar W. Safarlou, Annelien L. Bredenoord, Roel Vermeulen, Karin R. Jongsma
{"title":"Nature-versus-nurture considered harmful: Actionability as an alternative tool for understanding the exposome from an ethical perspective","authors":"Caspar W. Safarlou, Annelien L. Bredenoord, Roel Vermeulen, Karin R. Jongsma","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13276","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13276","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Exposome research is put forward as a major tool for solving the nature-versus-nurture debate because the exposome is said to represent “the nature of nurture.” Against this influential idea, we argue that the adoption of the nature-versus-nurture debate into the exposome research program is a mistake that needs to be undone to allow for a proper bioethical assessment of exposome research. We first argue that this adoption is originally based on an equivocation between the traditional nature-versus-nurture debate and a debate about disease prediction/etiology. Second, due to this mistake, exposome research is pushed to adopt a limited conception of agential control that is harmful to one's thinking about the good that exposome research can do for human health and wellbeing. To fully excise the nature-versus-nurture debate from exposome research, we argue that exposome researchers and bioethicists need to think about the exposome afresh from the perspective of actionability. We define the concept of actionability and related concepts and show how these can be used to analyze the ethical aspects of the exposome. In particular, we focus on refuting the popular “gun analogy” in exposome research, returning results to study participants and risk-taking in the context of a well-lived life.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 4","pages":"356-366"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.13276","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140029633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-02-29DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13277
Daniel Story
{"title":"Cryonics: Traps and transformations","authors":"Daniel Story","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13277","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13277","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cryonics is the practice of cryopreserving the bodies or brains of legally dead individuals with the hope that these individuals will be reanimated in the future. A standard argument for cryonics says that cryonics is prudentially justified despite uncertainty about its success because at worst it will leave you no worse off than you otherwise would have been had you not chosen cryonics, and at best it will leave you much better off than you otherwise would have been. Thus, it is a good, no-risk bet; in game-theoretic terms, cryonics is a weakly dominant strategy relative to refraining from utilizing cryonics. I object to this argument for two reasons. First, I argue that there is a practically relevant chance that cryonics will put you into an inescapable and very bad situation. Hence, cryonics is neither a no-risk bet nor a weakly dominant strategy. Second, I argue that the experience of being reanimated and living in the distant future would likely be transformative, and this likelihood undermines your justification for thinking that reanimation would be beneficial to you. I conclude that the standard argument does not show that cryonics is prudentially justified.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"38 4","pages":"351-355"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139998376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}