BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-31DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13396
Stuart McLennan, Marieke Bak, Kathrin Knochel
{"title":"Slow Codes are symptomatic of ethically and legally inappropriate CPR policies.","authors":"Stuart McLennan, Marieke Bak, Kathrin Knochel","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13396","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Although cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was initially used very selectively at the discretion of clinicians, the use of CPR rapidly expanded to the point that it was required to be performed on all patients having in-hospital cardiac arrests, regardless of the underlying condition. This created problems with CPR being clearly inadvisable for many patients. Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders emerged as a means of providing a transparent process for making decisions in advance regarding resuscitation, initially by patients and later also by clinicians. Under hospital policies in many countries, however, CPR remains the default position for all patients having cardiac arrest in the hospital if there is no DNR order in place, regardless of whether CPR is medically indicated or in the patient's best interests. \"Slow Codes\" are the delayed or token efforts to provide CPR when clinicians feel CPR is futile or inappropriate. After giving a historical overview of the development and the changing use of CPR, we argue that more attention needs to be given to the cause of slow codes, namely, policies requiring CPR to be performed as the default action while simultaneously lacking implementing interventions such as advance care planning as a routine policy. This is ethically and legally inappropriate, and hospital policies should be modified to allow clinicians to consider whether CPR is appropriate at the time of arrest. Such a change requires a stronger emphasis on early recognition of patients for whom CPR is not in their best interests and to improve hospital emergency planning.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143069871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-29DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13397
Christopher Bobier, Richard B Gibson, Anthony Merlocco, Daniel Rodger, Daniel J Hurst
{"title":"Xenotransplantation as a business solution to the organ shortage.","authors":"Christopher Bobier, Richard B Gibson, Anthony Merlocco, Daniel Rodger, Daniel J Hurst","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13397","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Xenotransplantation has the potential to alter the U.S. transplant system in profound ways. However, this emerging \"spare parts\" solution spearheaded by biotechnology companies raises concerns about its impact on the organ shortage, healthcare systems, population health, and health inequalities. We contend that xenotransplantation may have limited benefits in improving health, could prove prohibitively expensive for many, and may divert resources away from proven public health measures. Additionally, it carries the risk of perpetuating stigma. Xenotransplantation may thereby exacerbate existing healthcare inequities across racial, ethnic, socio-economic, and geographic lines. To mitigate these risks, we contend that public health expert input is integral for xenotransplant policy development and outreach and that this underscores the importance of federal government investment in transplant infrastructure.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143069873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-27DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13395
James Hart, Sapfo Lignou, Mark Sheehan
{"title":"Environmental sustainability and the limits of healthcare resource allocation.","authors":"James Hart, Sapfo Lignou, Mark Sheehan","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13395","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Recent literature has drawn attention to the complex relationship between health care and the environmental crisis. Healthcare systems are significant contributors to climate change and environmental degradation, and the environmental crisis is making our health worse and thus putting more pressure on healthcare systems; our health and the environment are intricately linked. In light of this relationship, we might think that there are no trade-offs between health and the environment; that healthcare decision-makers have special responsibilities to the environment; and that environmental values should be included in healthcare resource-allocation decisions. However, we argue that these claims are mistaken. The environmental crisis involves a wider range of considerations than just health. There is a plurality of reasons to act on the environment; we might do so to protect the natural world, to prevent catastrophes in other parts of the world, or to avert climate war and displacement. Trading-off between health care and environmental sustainability is thus unavoidable and requires sensitivity to all these reasons. Healthcare decision-makers are not well placed to be sensitive to these reasons, nor do they have the democratic authority to make such value judgements. Therefore, decisions about environmental sustainability interventions should be made at a 'higher level' of resource allocation. Importantly, hospitals have environmental duties but not environmental responsibilities; their job is to provide the best healthcare possible within the constraints given to them, not to choose between health care and other goods.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143048858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-25DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13393
Paolo Corsico
{"title":"Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics?","authors":"Paolo Corsico","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13393","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>If \"no ought from is,\" how can bioethics be empirical? Despite the widespread recognition that we can integrate empirical and normative, Hume's Law is still often claimed to pose logical limitations to empirical bioethics. Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics? I argue that we have reasons to answer no. First, I outline and reject two unverified assumptions: that Hume' s Law, the fact-value distinction, and the naturalistic fallacy are roughly the same thing, and that Hume's Law is an undisputed meta-ethical principle which dictates how to formulate normative statements. I then show how the interpretation of Hume's Law as establishing a logical gulf between facts and morality-rather than as clarifying the logical rules of normative argumentation-is dependent upon a non-cognitivist interpretation of the Is-Ought problem. I argue that the version of Hume's Law that stems from ethical non-cognitivism is what is problematic for empirical bioethics. However, other interpretations are possible. We have two reasons to reject the thesis that Hume's Law is an argument against empirical bioethics. First, conflating meta-ethics and applied ethics is problematic. Second, a non-cognitivist interpretation of Hume's Law is likely to constitute an argument not only against empirical bioethics, but against all bioethics that claims to be situated within ethical cognitivism, be it empirical or philosophical. Lastly, I present two meta-ethical postulates shared by empirical and philosophical bioethics. I call them: (1) the \"bridge\" postulate and (2) the \"ethical cognitivism\" postulate.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143048859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-22DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13382
Xavier Symons
{"title":"The virtues of limits and environmental sustainability in healthcare.","authors":"Xavier Symons","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13382","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The spectre of human-induced climate change has drawn attention to the need to discover new, environmentally sustainable approaches to healthcare. This article draws upon David McPherson's The Virtues of Limits (2021) to develop a virtue ethics for sustainability in healthcare. I explore how a virtuous appreciation of the value of healthcare resources can lead us to exercise stewardship in our use of those resources, whereas a failure to appreciate the value of resources can lead to irresponsible and unsustainable patterns of use. I close with some recommendations of how health systems might go about facilitating the cultivation of the virtues of sustainable health practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143016939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-17DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13385
Andrew McGee, Sinead Prince
{"title":"Is germline genome-editing person-affecting or identity-affecting, and does it matter?","authors":"Andrew McGee, Sinead Prince","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13385","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Writers have debated whether germline genome-editing is person-affecting or identity-affecting. The difference is thought to be ethically relevant to whether we should choose genome-editing or choose preimplantation genetic diagnosis and embryo selection, when seeking to prevent or produce bad conditions (e.g., cystic fibrosis, or deafness) in the individuals who will grow from the embryo edited or selected. We consider the very recent views of three prominent bioethicists and philosophers who have grappled with this issue. We claim that both sides are right, but that the sense in which genome-editing is person-affecting is less important, morally, when the aim is to have healthy children. Since this is the predominant objective of engaging in embryo selection and genome-editing, and since there are certain risks, at least for now, with genome-editing, it remains better, morally, to engage in embryo selection than genome-editing.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143016938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-13DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13392
Suzаnа Ignjаtоvić
{"title":"Arguments against a \"general and permanent\" ban on pediatric intersex surgery: A response to Clune-Taylor.","authors":"Suzаnа Ignjаtоvić","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13392","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The paper offers a critical response to the proposed \"dis/analogy\" between the restriction of Jehovah's Witness parental right to refuse life-saving blood transfusions for their minor children and a \"general\" and \"permanent\" ban on \"unnecessary\" pediatric intersex surgery. The main argument of the analogy is \"securing the patient's future autonomy.\" Feinberg's theory of rights is used to demonstrate that the proposed analogy is untenable. A new category of developmental rights-in-trust is introduced to address specific needs of gender development in DSD situations. Both premises are disputed. First, it is shown that the case of overriding Jehovah's Witness parental rights is not based on securing the patient's future autonomy, but a simple dependency right in Feinberg's theory. Second, it is demonstrated that pediatric intersex surgery is not in the same situation in all morally relevant respects as the Jehovah's Witness case because it represents a special type of developmental right-in-trust. In conclusion, the arguments based on the proposed analogy do not justify a \"general and permanent\" on pediatric intersex surgery.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142973409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-10DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13394
Braylen Samuel
{"title":"The Impairment Argument's Coup de Grâce.","authors":"Braylen Samuel","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13394","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to Hendricks Impairment Argument (IA), abortion is immoral because it impairs the fetus. Here, I argue it is not sufficient to show merely that abortion impairs, Hendricks must show that it harms the fetus. If the fetus is not numerically identical to the person it will become, then it isn't harmed by an abortion. But if the fetus is numerically identical to the person it will become, it is harmed by the deprivation of a future of value. However, taking this route ultimately undermines the novelty of the impairment argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142959283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2025-01-01Epub Date: 2024-05-17DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13304
Łukasz Wiktor, Maria Damps, Grace Kansayisa, Szymon Pietrzak, Bartłomiej Osadnik
{"title":"Bioethical challenges in postwar development aid: The Rwandan case study.","authors":"Łukasz Wiktor, Maria Damps, Grace Kansayisa, Szymon Pietrzak, Bartłomiej Osadnik","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13304","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.13304","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article considers aspects of a development aid that provides medical support to strengthen pediatric orthopedics in Rwanda. We present part of the Afriquia foundation work, a nonprofit foundation from Poland involved in supporting the medical sector in Rwanda as a sign of global solidarity and the human right to health. The main foundation's activity is the treatment of orthopedic problems among Rwandan citizens. We present a case study of two children under the care of the Afiquia foundation. 11-year-old Seraphine treated due to the consequences of right tibia osteomyelitis and 11-year-old Lavi suffering from osteogenesis imperfecta. Both children were treated surgically in Poland due to Rwanda's lack of treatment possibilities. After the applied treatment, Seraphine walks correctly without crutches and can attend school and thrive among her peers. Lavi has not sustained any fragility fracture since the surgery in Poland. He is healthy and constantly ongoing his rehabilitation including gait training. The described cases initiated development aid in Rwanda, supplying hospitals with orthopedic implants and training medical staff. The growing number of humanitarian crises across the globe and the people affected requires increasing organizations involved in providing relief. The emphasis should be on global education, aiming to make the recipients reflect and prepare them to face humanitarian crises.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"90-97"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BioethicsPub Date : 2024-12-25DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13389
Shane Ward
{"title":"A defense of ectogenic abortion.","authors":"Shane Ward","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13389","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A popular argument for a right to ectogenic abortions appeals to a right to avoid the obligations associated with parenthood. A common objection to this argument questions whether there are any sufficiently great harms associated with parenthood to ground such a right. I propose a novel formulation of this argument that avoids these objections. I then defend it against important objections.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142886513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}