{"title":"Troubling Trends in Health Misinformation Related to Gender-Affirming Care","authors":"Stef M. Shuster, Meredithe McNamara","doi":"10.1002/hast.1590","DOIUrl":"10.1002/hast.1590","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p><i>Amidst the misinformation climate about trans people and their health care that dominates policy and social discourse, autonomy-based rationales for gender-affirming care for trans and nonbinary youth are being called into question. In this commentary, which responds to “What Is the Aim of Pediatric ‘Gender-Affirming’ Care?,” by Moti Gorin, we contextualize the virulent ideas circulating in misinformation campaigns that have become weaponized for unprecedented legal interference into standard health care. We conclude that the current legal justifications for upending gender-affirming care gloss over how this health care field meets conventional evidentiary standards and aligns protocols with most other fields of medicine. Refusal to offer gender-affirming care is more harmful than centralizing trans and nonbinary people's health autonomy</i>.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 3","pages":"53-55"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hast.1590","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141263554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Colonial and Neocolonial Barriers to Companion Digital Humans in Africa","authors":"Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues","doi":"10.1002/hast.1594","DOIUrl":"10.1002/hast.1594","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>This letter responds to the essay “Digital Humans to Combat Loneliness and Social Isolation: Ethics Concerns and Policy Recommendation,” by Nancy S. Jecker, Robert Sparrow, Zohar Lederman, and Anita Ho, in the January-February 2024 issue of the</i> Hastings Center Report.</p>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 3","pages":"59"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hast.1594","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141263534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Ruth R. Faden, Michelle M. Mello
{"title":"Beneath the Sword of Damocles: Moral Obligations of Physicians in a Post-Dobbs Landscape","authors":"Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Ruth R. Faden, Michelle M. Mello","doi":"10.1002/hast.1589","DOIUrl":"10.1002/hast.1589","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in</i> Dobbs vs. Jackson Women's Health Organization, <i>a growing web of state laws restricts access to abortion. Here we consider how, ethically, doctors should respond when terminating a pregnancy is clinically indicated but state law imposes restrictions on doing so. We offer a typology of cases in which the dilemma emerges and a brief sketch of the current state of legal prohibitions against providing such care. We examine the issue from the standpoints of conscience, professional ethics, and civil disobedience and conclude that it is almost always morally permissible and praiseworthy to break the law and that, in a subset of cases, it is morally obligatory to do so. We further argue that health care institutions that employ or credential physicians to provide reproductive health care have an ethical duty to provide a basic suite of practical supports for them as they work to ethically resolve the dilemmas before them</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 3","pages":"15-27"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141263491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adam Omelianchuk, Alexander Morgan Capron, Lainie Friedman Ross, Arthur R. Derse, James L. Bernat, David Magnus
{"title":"Neither Ethical nor Prudent: Why Not to Choose Normothermic Regional Perfusion","authors":"Adam Omelianchuk, Alexander Morgan Capron, Lainie Friedman Ross, Arthur R. Derse, James L. Bernat, David Magnus","doi":"10.1002/hast.1584","DOIUrl":"10.1002/hast.1584","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p><i>In transplant medicine, the use of normothermic regional perfusion (NRP) in donation after circulatory determination of death raises ethical difficulties. NRP is objectionable because it restores the donor's circulation, thus invalidating a death declaration based on the permanent cessation of circulation. NRP's defenders respond with arguments that are tortuous and factually inaccurate and depend on introducing extraneous concepts into the law. However, results comparable to NRP's—more and higher-quality organs and more efficient allocation—can be achieved by removing organs from deceased donors and using normothermic machine perfusion (NMP) to support the organs outside the body, without jeopardizing confidence in transplantation's legal and ethical foundations. Given the controversy that NRP generates and the convoluted justifications made for it, we recommend a prudential approach we call “ethical parsimony,” which holds that, in the choice between competing means of achieving a result, the ethically simpler one is to be preferred. This approach makes clear that policy-makers should favor NMP over NRP</i>.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 4","pages":"14-23"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hast.1584","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141071889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Do Prospective Parents Owe to Their Children?","authors":"Abigail Levin","doi":"10.1002/hast.1577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.1577","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>I consider the question of what moral obligations prospective parents owe to their future children. It is taken as an almost axiomatic premise of a wide range of philosophical arguments that prospective parents have a moral obligation to take such steps as ensuring their own financial stability or waiting until they are emotionally mature before conceiving. This is because it is assumed that parents have a moral obligation to lay the groundwork for their children's lives to go well. While at first glance such a premise seems benign, I will argue that when it is applied to arguments in assisted reproductive technology, as it is in Julian Savulescu's procreative beneficence argument or as it is in Daniel Groll's recent argument for open gamete donation, we see problems with this premise. Problems in Groll's argument also become apparent when it is scrutinized in connection with this premise</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 2","pages":"34-43"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140619782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Phifer Nicholson Jr., Monica H. Bodd, Ellery Sarosi, Martha C. Carlough, M. Therese Lysaught, Farr A. Curlin
{"title":"The Power of Proximity: Toward an Ethic of Accompaniment in Surgical Care","authors":"C. Phifer Nicholson Jr., Monica H. Bodd, Ellery Sarosi, Martha C. Carlough, M. Therese Lysaught, Farr A. Curlin","doi":"10.1002/hast.1575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.1575","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>Although the field of surgical ethics focuses primarily on informed consent, surgical decision-making, and research ethics, some surgeons have started to consider ethical questions regarding justice and solidarity with poor and minoritized populations. To date, those calling for social justice in surgical care have emphasized increased diversity within the ranks of the surgical profession. This article, in contrast, foregrounds the agency of those most affected by injustice by bringing to bear an ethic of accompaniment. The ethic of accompaniment is born from a theological tradition that has motivated work to improve health outcomes in those at the margins through its emphasis on listening, solidarity against systemic drivers of disease, and proximity to individuals and communities. Through a review of surgical ethics and exploration of a central patient case, we argue for applying an ethic of accompaniment to the care of surgical patients and their communities</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 2","pages":"12-21"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140619815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Holding the Guardrails on Involuntary Commitment","authors":"Carl H. Coleman","doi":"10.1002/hast.1574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.1574","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>In response to the increasing number of mentally ill people experiencing homelessness, some policy-makers have called for the expanded use of involuntary commitment, even for individuals who are not engaging in behaviors that are immediately life-threatening. Yet there is no evidence that involuntary commitment offers long-term benefits, and significant reasons to believe that expanding the practice will cause harm. In addition, these proposals ignore research showing that most people with mental illness have the capacity to make medical decisions for themselves. Rather than expanding the use of involuntary commitment, policy-makers should support approaches proven to decrease the prevalence of homelessness, such as supportive housing. In addition, states should reevaluate their commitment standards for persons who pose no risk of harm to others. One promising approach is Northern Ireland's Mental Health Capacity Act of 2016, which establishes a uniform standard for imposing nonconsensual health care interventions, without any distinction between mental illnesses and other conditions in which capacity might be compromised</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 2","pages":"8-11"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140619814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Suicide Attempters Have a Right Not to Be Stabilized in an Emergency?","authors":"Aleksy Tarasenko Struc","doi":"10.1002/hast.1576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.1576","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>The standard of care in the United States favors stabilizing any adult who arrives in an emergency department after a failed suicide attempt, even if he appears decisionally capacitated and refuses life-sustaining treatment. I challenge this ubiquitous practice. Emergency clinicians generally have a moral obligation to err on the side of stabilizing even suicide attempters who refuse such interventions. This obligation reflects the fact that it is typically infeasible to determine these patients’ level of decisional capacitation—among other relevant information—in this unique setting. Nevertheless, I argue, stabilizing suicide attempters over their objection sometimes violates a basic yet insufficiently appreciated right of theirs—the right against bodily invasion. In such cases, it is at least</i> prima facie <i>wrong to stabilize a patient who wants to die even if they lack a contrary advance directive or medical order and suffer from no terminal physical illness</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 2","pages":"22-33"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140619817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leah Z. Rand, Daniel P. Carpenter, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Anushka Bhaskar, Jonathan J. Darrow, William B. Feldman
{"title":"Leah Z. Rand, Daniel P. Carpenter, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Anushka Bhaskar, Jonathan J. Darrow, and William B. Feldman Reply","authors":"Leah Z. Rand, Daniel P. Carpenter, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Anushka Bhaskar, Jonathan J. Darrow, William B. Feldman","doi":"10.1002/hast.1579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.1579","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>The authors respond to a letter by Mitchell Berger in the March-April 2024 issue of the</i> Hastings Center Report <i>concerning their essay “Securing the Trustworthiness of the FDA to Build Public Trust in Vaccines.”</i></p>","PeriodicalId":55073,"journal":{"name":"Hastings Center Report","volume":"54 2","pages":"44-45"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140619818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}