发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

History of Philosophy Quarterly最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Imagination, Suffering, and Perfection: A Kierkegaardian Reflection on Meaning in Life 想象、苦难与完美:克尔凯郭尔对生命意义的反思
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.4.03
Jeffrey Hanson
{"title":"Imagination, Suffering, and Perfection: A Kierkegaardian Reflection on Meaning in Life","authors":"Jeffrey Hanson","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.4.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.4.03","url":null,"abstract":"Engaging the thought of the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard, I challenge a tendency within the analytic tradition of philosophy on the subject of meaning in life. Taking as a starting point Kierkegaard's insights about meaning in life, the striving needed to attain an imagined ideal self, and his paradoxical conception of the perfection available to human life, I claim that meaning in life is a function of an individual's striving for an ideal self. This continuous effort to achieve myself is marked by suffering, an indispensable part of Kierkegaard's project of identity formation. The imagined grasp of a possible ideal self is essential to this process but insufficient for it because the imagination can only ever glimpse a kind of static perfection, not the lived perfection that only results from willed actualization of an ideal self. The meaning of a human life, then, consists in the suffering that results from a struggle to actualize the ideal I aspire to become in the process of identity formation. I contrast this view with a tendency shared by many contemporary analytic philosophers of meaning in life, for whom meaning in life is constituted by achievement of valued goods, without much attention to one's relation to the process of achieving them. In that respect, I will focus on the position of Iddo Landau. After clearing a number of his misconceptions about Kierkegaard's philosophy, I claim that, for a life to be meaningful, valued goods in life must be complemented by a conscious enactment of the process of the formation of one's identity that includes striving to attain a kind of perfection. I conclude that Kierkegaard's paradoxical account of perfectionism makes him more of an ally to Landau than an opponent.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43882002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Thomas Reid on the Role of Conception and Belief in Perception and Memory 托马斯·里德论概念与信仰在感知与记忆中的作用
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.4.04
Lucas Thorpe
{"title":"Thomas Reid on the Role of Conception and Belief in Perception and Memory","authors":"Lucas Thorpe","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.4.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.4.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Thomas Reid argues that both perception and memory involve a conception of an object and usually cause a corresponding belief. According to defenders of the constitutive interpretation, such as Rebecca Copenhaver, the belief is constitutive of acts of perception and memory. I instead argue for a causal interpretation: although in normal circumstances perceiving and remembering cause a corresponding belief, the belief is not constitutive of perception or memory. Copenhaver's strongest argument for the constitutive interpretation is that perception essentially represents objects as present, while memory essentially represents objects as past; since such tense markers can only occur within the beliefs, the beliefs must be an essential aspect of perception and memory. I argue, in contrast, that temporal markers are contained in our conceptions of objects, so beliefs do not play an essential role in distinguishing between perception and memory. Such a reading presupposes a “thick” interpretation of what Reid means by a conception, according to which a Reidian conception is a mode of presentation of the object apprehended.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49472164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contents of Volume 38 (2021) 第38卷（2021）目录
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.4.06
{"title":"Contents of Volume 38 (2021)","authors":"","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.4.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.4.06","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43365912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Avicenna's Intuitionist Rationalism 阿维森纳的直觉理性主义
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.4.02
İsmail Kurun
{"title":"Avicenna's Intuitionist Rationalism","authors":"İsmail Kurun","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.4.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.4.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study is the first part of an attempt to settle a vigorous debate among historians of medieval philosophy by harnessing the resources of analytic philosophy. The debate is about whether Avicenna's epistemology is rationalist or empirical. To settle the debate, I first articulate in this article the three core theses of rationalism and one core thesis of empiricism. Then, I probe Avicenna's epistemology in his major works according to the first core thesis of rationalism (the intuition thesis). In the end, I find Avicenna committed to this thesis in at least one substantive way, namely, in his claim to intuit the intelligible forms or essences. This suffices to count Avicenna as rationalist. In a subsequent article, I shall probe Avicenna's epistemology according to the other two core theses of rationalism, presenting further evidence that he was a rationalist, not an empiricist.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41326366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
William James and Swami Vivekananda: Their Relationship and the Conceptual Resemblance of Vedānta and Pragmatism 威廉·詹姆斯与斯瓦米·维韦卡南达:他们的关系及Vedānta与实用主义的概念相似性
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.3.05
Chris Zajner
{"title":"William James and Swami Vivekananda: Their Relationship and the Conceptual Resemblance of Vedānta and Pragmatism","authors":"Chris Zajner","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.3.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.3.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 William James considered Swami Vivekananda the paragon of monists. Yet he comes to reject Vivekananda's philosophy as a result of monism's ineluctable philosophical conundrums and because it ultimately did not suit his active temperament. James's simplified assessment of Vivekananda's philosophy, however, reveals he had only a limited understanding of Vedānta. It can be speculated that James's understanding of Vedānta was mainly the aspect of rāja yoga (the science of psychic control)—which is evinced by the fact that he disagrees with what he perceives as a lack of ability to justify meliorism and a zestful life. But this conception of James's leaves out of consideration karma yoga—or the active principle of Vedānta—which advocates work as the means to realize the divine. Contra James's conception, it is more illustrative to understand Vedānta not as a doctrine of extreme “monism” but rather an attitude that cultivates every particular temperament and disposition. With this rectification, it becomes much clearer that there are significant parallels in viewpoints between James and Vivekananda that have been underappreciated.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44488673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Priori Justification in Nietzsche 尼采的先验论证
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.3.04
Justin Remhof
{"title":"A Priori Justification in Nietzsche","authors":"Justin Remhof","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.3.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.3.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues there are crucial points in Nietzsche's texts where he offers a priori epistemic justification for views he believes are correct, contrasting with the dominant view that Nietzsche's philosophical naturalism is incompatible with a priori justification. My aim is to develop Nietzsche's brand of a priori justification, show that he employs this account of justification in the texts, and suggest how it might be compatible with naturalism.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49574074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Brentano's Fallacy: Moore's Arguments Against Brentano's Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value 布伦塔诺的谬误:摩尔对布伦塔诺价值拟合态度分析的反驳
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.3.03
Krister Bykvist
{"title":"Brentano's Fallacy: Moore's Arguments Against Brentano's Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value","authors":"Krister Bykvist","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.3.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to the popular fitting attitude analysis of value, to be good is to be the object of a proattitude that it is fitting, in some sense, to have. One version of this analysis can be traced back to Franz Brentano, according to which “good” means “worthy of love.” In a review in Ethics of Brentano's The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, G. E. Moore accuses Brentano of committing a fallacious inference, which I will call “Brentano's fallacy.” I shall show that Moore's accusation, properly formulated, hits the target and that his argument can be generalized so that it undermines other Brentano-like versions of the fitting attitude analysis.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45250697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Du Châtelet's Libertarianism
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.3.02
Aaron Wells
{"title":"Du Châtelet's Libertarianism","authors":"Aaron Wells","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.3.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.3.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is a growing consensus that Emilie Du Châtelet's challenging essay “On Freedom” defends compatibilism. I offer an alternative, libertarian reading of the essay I lay out the prima facie textual evidence for such a reading. I also explain how apparently compatibilist remarks in “On Freedom” can be read as aspects of a sophisticated type of libertarianism that rejects blind or arbitrary choice. To this end, I consider the historical context of Du Châtelet's essay, and especially the dialectic between various strands of eighteenth-century libertarianism and compatibilism.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41824798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Oh, the Humanity: Deflating a Humean Concept 《人性:休谟概念的泄气
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.3.01
A. Szymkowiak
{"title":"Oh, the Humanity: Deflating a Humean Concept","authors":"A. Szymkowiak","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.3.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.3.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The concept of “humanity” is integral to David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, but barely appears in his earlier Treatise. Many consider the later “humanity” theory superior, permitting a more “extensive” sympathy not limited by proximate associations. This paper argues for Hume's consistency on humanity by surveying The History of England. Hume's History discussions lend support to the associative, and thus limited, Treatise conception. Humanity is opposed to religious enthusiasm; its positive effects are local and particular. Moreover, Hume's historiography involves a hesitation on the content of “humane” judgments, which cannot fulfill the cosmopolitan function envisioned by many present-day interpreters.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45203937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Confucius on Balancing Generalism and Particularism in Ethics and Aesthetics 孔子论伦理学与美学中一般主义与特殊主义的平衡
History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.2.01
Jonathan Kwan
{"title":"Confucius on Balancing Generalism and Particularism in Ethics and Aesthetics","authors":"Jonathan Kwan","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.2.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.2.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Confucius endorses a balance between generalism and particularism in ethics and aesthetics. Rather than standards, his rules are defeasible guides for perception, thought, and action balanced by particularizing capacities of judgment. These rules have opaque and open-ended hedges that strengthen a generalization by restricting its application. A similar architecture for ethical and aesthetic rules reflects a broad view of ethics and aesthetics as intertwined and continuous. Hence, whether one chooses a generalist or particularist ethics depends on one's corresponding choices in aesthetics, and vice versa. This fundamental finding about value theory invites philosophers everywhere to investigate the teachings of Confucius.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43329668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信