Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations最新文献

{"title":"Social Networking Site Use and Depressive Symptoms: Does Facebook Activity Lead to Adverse Psychological Health?","authors":"C. Burwell, George Lăzăroiu, Nicholas Rothchild, Vanessa Shackelford","doi":"10.22381/lpi1720188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1720188","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"17 1","pages":"141"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The qua-problem and meaning scepticism","authors":"S. Douglas","doi":"10.22381/lpi1720184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1720184","url":null,"abstract":"When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"17 1","pages":"71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68372025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Presented Discourse in Popular Science Narratives of Discovery: Communicative Side of Thought Presentation","authors":"Olga A. Pilkington","doi":"10.22381/lpi1720181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1720181","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"17 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Philosophy-Ladenness of Perception: A Philosophical Analysis of Perception in Husserl and Sartre","authors":"Mika Suojanen","doi":"10.22381/lpi1720186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1720186","url":null,"abstract":"The basic entity in phenomenology is the phenomenon. Knowing the phenomenon is another issue. The phenomenon has been described as the real natural object or the appearance directly perceived in phenomenology and analytic philosophy of perception. Within both traditions, philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and Wittgenstein have considered that perceptual experience demonstrates what a phenomenon is on the line between the mind and the external world. Therefore, conceptualizing the phenomenon is based on the perceptual evidence. However, if the belief that perception is “theory-laden” is true, then perception can also be “philosophy-laden.” These philosophers have not noticed whether perceptual knowledge is independent of philosophies. If perceptual knowledge is not independent of philosophies, a philosopher’s background philosophy can influence what he or she claims to know about the phenomenon. For Husserl, experience is direct evidence of what exists. The textual evidence shows that Sartre rejects the distinction between appearance and reality based on the assumption of the phenomenon. By examining Husserl’s Ideas and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness I conclude that these philosophers’ philosophical languages influence their perceptual knowledge. Philosophical traditions affect the thoughts of perception.","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"24 4 1","pages":"110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fear of Missing out, Improper Behavior, and Distressing Patterns of Use. an Empirical Investigation","authors":"Sofia Bratu","doi":"10.22381/lpi1720187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1720187","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"17 1","pages":"130-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Structural Complexity of Popular Science Narratives of Discovery as an Indicator of Reader-Awareness: A Labov-Inspired Approach","authors":"Olga A. Pilkington","doi":"10.22381/lpi1620171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1620171","url":null,"abstract":"1.IntroductionNarrative is a popular form of knowledge dissemination. In fact, some scholars (see, for example, Schank 1990; Gjedde 2000; Boyd 2009; Herman 2009) suggest that it is the preferred method for humans to acquire and process new information. It is no wonder that in recent decades such disciplines as communication of science to the public, philosophy of science, and science as culture have been paying increased attention to narratives and their ability to transfer complex scientific concepts to lay audiences. Narrative analysis of popular science contributes to the exploration of the language of popular science as a discourse category. Just as the languages of individual scientific disciplines can be seen as separate discourse categories (see, for example, Mackinnon 2010 for a discussion of the language of classical physics) or as the unified language of science, the language of popular science can be parsed into several discourses or analyzed as one. This study treats the language of popular science as a subsuming discourse category and suggests that the underlying narrative structure explored here is suitable for popularization of a variety of scientific disciplines.Recent studies (see, for example, Reitsma 2010; Blanchard et al. 2015; Hermwille 2016) demonstrate that the explanatory and contextualizing abilities of popular science narratives appeal not only to the science-minded laymen but also to the decision-making social power structures such as grant-providing agencies or policy-creating institutions. In that, popular science narratives have helped popular science to cross the boundaries of intellectual entertainment and become vital pieces of the technological and socio-economic spheres.While the awareness of the importance of narrative in communication of science is obvious, the linguistic insight into the structure of such narratives remains somewhat underdeveloped. Those who investigate popular science from the point of view of linguistics (see, for example, Moirand 2003; Myers 2003; Turney 2004; De Oliveira and Pagano 2006; Fu and Hyland 2014) tend to address either broad issues such as explanatory properties (see, for example, Turney 2004) or the general structure and effectiveness of a message (see, for example, Moirand 2003; Myers 2003). Others take a very narrow approach that addresses one specific linguistic issue (see, for example, De Oliveira and Pagano 2006 or Urbanova 2012 for analyses of discourse presentation; Fu and Hyland 2014 for exploration of interactional metadiscourse). General narratology usually regards scientific and popular scientific discourses as a side note (see, for example, Herman 2009).It might be tempting, in the circumstances, to propose a structural system that could account for and explicate popular science narratives and in the process introduce specific steps that successful narratives follow. Such a system would be equally useful for writers and for analysts who have to evaluate popular sci","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"16 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do Ignorant Assessors Cases Pose a Challenge to Relativism about Epistemic Modals","authors":"Heidi Furey","doi":"10.22381/lpi1620172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1620172","url":null,"abstract":"1.IntroductionOur ordinary conversations are filled with talk about what could or must be. For instance, in an iconic scene from On the Waterfront, the protagonist Terry bemoans his ruined boxing career. \"I could have been a contender,\" he says, \"instead of a bum, which is what I am.\"1 Terry's regret is tied not only to the way things are but also to the way things might have been. As it was, Terry lost his chance at the title. However, had he not thrown a big fight, things might have turned out quite differently for him. \"Could\" and \"might,\" along with their duals, \"should\" and \"must,\" are modal terms: we use them to talk about what is possible and what is necessary. Terry's statement has to do with what is metaphysically possible. Although certain things are essential to Terry's nature, presumably being a bum is not. T here are other kinds of possibility besides metaphysical possibility. For instance, when a parent tells a child \"You must not lie,\" she is reminding the chi ld of what is morally necessary - that is, what is not possible given the constraints of morality.One particularly interesting type of modality is epistemic modality, which concerns what is possible given a body of knowledge or evidence. For instance, consider Luke and Max's conversation in (1).(1) Luke: What did you catch out on the lake?Max: I'm no expert, but it might be a rainbow trout.Luke: It can't be a rainbow trout. It is missing the pink streak down its side.Max: Oh, then I guess I was wrong.Cases involving epistemic modals, such as (1), present an interesting semantic challenge. In order to give a semantic treatment of epistemic modals, we must explain how informational states figure in the semantic representation of these terms. Recently, there have been several proposals for a semantic theory of epistemic modals.2 One major view - relativism -holds that claims involving epistemic modals are only true or false relative to epistemic agents or informational states. On this view, epistemic modals are quantifiers over epistemic possibilities, and the range of possibilities quantified over changes depending on whose knowledge is relevant. For now, we can think of epistemic possibilities as represented by epistemically possible worlds - worlds compatible with what is known.3 Formally, utterances containing epistemic modals express propositions (which we can think of as either sets of worlds or functions from worlds to truth values) that are evaluated for truth relative to a circumstance of evaluation (or index). The circumstance of evaluation includes a parameter i that represents an informational state that determines the range of the quantifier.Because informational states vary from person to person, an important question for the relativist to answer is \"whose knowledge is relevant?\" According to a basic version of relativism - call it speaker relativism - the truth of an epistemic modal claim depends upon what the speaker knows at the time of utterance. It is true jus","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"10 1","pages":"29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Indeterminacy of Translation and Innate Concepts: A Critical Review","authors":"David King","doi":"10.22381/lpi1620176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1620176","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThroughout their careers, both Chomsky and Quine have dealt with Underdetermination (henceforth UD) in different ways. Whenever Chomsky encounters UD he seeks to overcome it by postulating innate constraints; in contrast, Quine treats UD as a fact of life which simply has to be lived with. In this paper I will discuss the Indeterminacy of Translation (henceforth IDT). Chomsky argues that the IDT amounts to nothing more than UD. He argues that the UD in physics is overcome by our innate science-forming faculty, and that UD in language raises no more difficulties than UD in physics. In the case of language, the IDT is overcome by innate constraints imposed by the rules of our language faculty.Chomsky's interpretation of the IDT has been accepted by the vast majority of contemporary cognitive scientists and they have proceeded to flesh out his proposal that the IDT can be overcome by innate constraints. However, when cognitive scientists are concerned with the IDT, they are typically interested in only one area of it, the inscrutability of reference. They typically argue that the inscrutability of reference is a form of UD in concept acquisition and that this UD can be overcome by postulating innate concepts which we use to learn our first words. In this paper I will consider the attempt by contemporary cognitive scientists to overcome the inscrutability of reference by postulating innate concepts. Furthermore, I will analyze what effect the supposed overcoming of the inscrutability of reference by postulating innate concepts has on the indeterminacy of translation argument.I will review three key experiments which purport to overcome the problems raised by Quine and will show that while these important experiments are not a proof that Quine is wrong about the process of a child learning their first language they are very suggestive that Quine is on the wrong track. However as I will show in the paper even if Quine is wrong about manner in which a child learns his first words and concepts, this fact is of little significance. Quine's indeterminacy of translation is concerned with adults with a fully functioning conceptual scheme, so a child having innate constraints on the interpretations they give to experience is little evidence that adult users whose concepts develop over a life time in a culture will be subject to the same constraints; unless of course it can be shown that human concepts do not develop over time. Given that there is no evidence that human concepts do not change over time, and no evidence that the way such concepts change is determined a priori, then we have no reason to assume that innate constraints will overcome the indeterminacy of translation.Over the last fifty years it has become more and more common for people in the cognitive sciences to discuss the IDT as though it were a problem which has been overcome by discoveries in psychology. However this research typically ignores the fact that even if innate constra","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"16 1","pages":"104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Analysis of Linguistic Normativity and Communication as a Response to Objections to a Biopsychological Foundation for Linguistics","authors":"Jonathan J. Life","doi":"10.22381/lpi1620173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1620173","url":null,"abstract":"1.The Objection from Linguistic NormsThe Scientific and Manifest Images of LanguageThis paper considers how a scientific understanding of language fits together with our everyday, commonsense understanding of language, according to which language is used for communication between persons, and follows or fails to follow certain essentially normative constraints.The scientific view of the world poses a theoretical threat to our commonsense understanding of our place in it as persons. As Sellars writes in \"Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man:\"Does the manifest image of man-in-the-world survive the attempt to unite this image in one field of intellectual vision with man as conceived in terms of the postulated objects of scientific theory? The bite to this question lies, we have seen, in the fact that man is that being which conceives of itself in terms of the manifest image. To the extent that the manifest does not survive in the synoptic view, to that extent man himself would not survive (18).Something similar could be said regarding the manifest image of human language. The image of language as normative (as opposed to merely descriptive), personal (as opposed to merely sub-personal), social (as opposed to merely individual), and serving communication (as opposed to merely serving thought) would be lost if not shown consistent, somehow, with its scientific counterpart.Because the use of language is important to the commonsense understanding of human beings as persons, consideration of Sellars' analysis of the scientific and manifest images of human beings is relevant to the apparent conflicts between the scientific and manifest images of language.Humans appear in different ways to different sciences. We have images in social science, psychology, physiology, biochemistry, and all the way down to physics, in which we appear as \"a swirl of physical particles, forces, and fields\" (Sellars, \"Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,\" 20). \"The\" scientific image of humans is an idealization of the bringing together of these various special images. All of them, and thus \"the\" scientific image itself, Sellars writes \"are to be contrasted with man as he appears to himself in sophisticated common sense, the manifest image which even today contains most of what he knows about himself at the properly human level\" (20).Though, historically, the scientific image of human beings and of the world in general grows out of a basis in their manifest image, once generated and developed, the scientific image presents itself as a rival, conflicting with the theory and ontology of the manifest image. Though the scientific image of the world stems from the manifest image as an historical basis, it also views the manifest image itself as an object in the world and, from the lens of the scientific image, this manifest image is at best a pragmatically useful approximation of ultimate scientific reality (Sellars, 20).The conflict of the scientific and manifest images ","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"16 1","pages":"49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unamuno's Mirror-Games: On the Seeming Omnipotence and Meaningfulness of Writing in the Grammatical Void","authors":"Ariso Salgado, J. María","doi":"10.22381/LPI1620175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/LPI1620175","url":null,"abstract":"1.IntroductionImagine as vividly as possible that you suddenly become blind and that, once you have comforted yourself with other sense impressions, you go deaf. Imagine that you subsequently lose not only your senses of touch, smell and taste, but also the very feeling of your members, so that you remain as an inert thing that cannot even opt for suicide. You still might take refuge in your thoughts and memories, but imagine that they gradually fade until you preserve nothing more than the mere awareness of existing. But imagine that you also end up losing such awareness. Then you are not even entirely alone, for you are already nothing, to the extent that you are not even aware of your nothingness. This fear of ceasing to exist beats in every line of the Spanish philosopher, playwright, poet and novelist Miguel de Unamuno (1994), who considered it impossible to live quietly while truly taking for granted that one's own consciousness will disappear: in his opinion, thinking about the extinction of consciousness provokes a vertigo that cannot be cured by reason. Thus, it is not biological or physical death but the dissolution of consciousness which terrifies Unamuno (1954), for he was convinced that the value and meaning of everything depends on consciousness: indeed, consciousness constitutes the guarantee to be and exist both for the universe and for the individual. On the one hand, the world exists inasmuch as it is reflected and known by consciousness, which also gives it a purpose. On the other hand, Unamuno emphasizes, following Senancour, the impossibility of conceiving ourselves as not existing. Although he is not able to imagine how nothingness - understood as the extinction of consciousness - would be like, he was gripped by the idea that his consciousness, and by extension his identity or feeling of being himself, may dissolve forever.This terror of death was motivated to a large extent by the deep mark that the deaths of some relatives, especially that of his six-year-old son in 1902, left on him. Yet terror of the dissolution of consciousness was also largely due to the fact that Unamuno associated the consciousness of being oneself with the effort to survive and go on being, that is, the effort of constantly trying to flee from being nothing. His work was addressed to readers sensitized to the possibility of losing their consciousness, but it was also intended to alert the passive individual who is indifferent to such idea. For Unamuno assumed that, once his reader had fallen prey to terror of extinction, he would aim at being all, as that is the only means to escape from being nothing. However, the objective should not consist in ending up being all, but in aiming or wishing it without ever succeeding: if someone ended up being all, he would no longer be himself because his individuality would have mixed with all and it could not be distinguished as an unique and nontransferable one. Starting from the intuition that this aim of bei","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"16 1","pages":"90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68371222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}