定性问题和意义怀疑主义

Q1 Arts and Humanities

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI:10.22381/lpi1720184

S. Douglas

{"title":"定性问题和意义怀疑主义","authors":"S. Douglas","doi":"10.22381/lpi1720184","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.","PeriodicalId":53498,"journal":{"name":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","volume":"17 1","pages":"71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The qua-problem and meaning scepticism\",\"authors\":\"S. Douglas\",\"doi\":\"10.22381/lpi1720184\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":53498,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"71\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1720184\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22381/lpi1720184","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

摘要

在考虑意义怀疑主义的潜在解决方案时，Kripke(1982)没有考虑因果理论方法。Kusch(2006)认为这是由于qua-problem。我考虑了库什对Maddy(1984)和McGinn(1984)的批评，然后提出了一种不同的方法来解决这个问题，一种不容易受到怀疑攻击的方法。如果这个解决方案是成功的，那么使用因果理论来反驳克里普克的怀疑论的障碍至少被消除了一个。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

The qua-problem and meaning scepticism

When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations Arts and Humanities-Philosophy

CiteScore

10.00

自引率

0.00%

发文量