Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献_第5页

The exclusionary approach to consciousness. 排斥意识的方法。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-10-05 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad022

Marlo Paßler

{"title":"The exclusionary approach to consciousness.","authors":"Marlo Paßler","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad022","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad022","url":null,"abstract":"The standard approach in the field of consciousness research involves identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) by comparing neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials. However, this method has been met with criticism due to the lack of consensus on how to operationalize and measure consciousness. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach: the exclusionary approach. Rather than utilizing near-threshold conditions to contrast conscious and unconscious trials, this approach leverages the widely accepted notion that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. I propose that this can be done by assessing whether consciousness remains stable across trials while manipulating other factors such as reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention. We can use the resulting contrast to exclude certain kinds of neural activity as candidate NCCs. This method produces results that are less contentious, allowing for the establishment of hard criteria for theories of consciousness. Additionally, this approach does not require the development of new research paradigms, but can incorporate existing studies, particularly those aimed at identifying confounding factors in the standard approach. It is important to note, however, that the proposed exclusionary approach does not negate the value of the identification approach. Rather, they should be considered as complementary methods.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10553408/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41140521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Lifeworlds in pain: a principled method for investigation and intervention. 痛苦中的生活世界：一种原则性的调查和干预方法。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-09-13 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad021

Abby Tabor, Axel Constant

{"title":"Lifeworlds in pain: a principled method for investigation and intervention.","authors":"Abby Tabor, Axel Constant","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad021","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad021","url":null,"abstract":"The experience of pain spans biological, psychological and sociocultural realms, both basic and complex, it is by turns necessary and devastating. Despite an extensive knowledge of the constituents of pain, the ability to translate this into effective intervention remains limited. It is suggested that current, multiscale, medical approaches, largely informed by the biopsychosocial (BPS) model, attempt to integrate knowledge but are undermined by an epistemological obligation, one that necessitates a prior isolation of the constituent parts. To overcome this impasse, we propose that an anthropological stance needs to be taken, underpinned by a Bayesian apparatus situated in computational psychiatry. Here, pain is presented within the context of lifeworlds, where attention is shifted away from the constituents of experience (e.g. nociception, reward processing and fear-avoidance), towards the dynamic affiliation that occurs between these processes over time. We argue that one can derive a principled method of investigation and intervention for pain from modelling approaches in computational psychiatry. We suggest that these modelling methods provide the necessary apparatus to navigate multiscale ontology and epistemology of pain. Finally, a unified approach to the experience of pain is presented, where the relational, inter-subjective phenomenology of pain is brought into contact with a principled method of translation; in so doing, revealing the conditions and possibilities of lifeworlds in pain.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10499064/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10263038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The evolutionary origins of the Global Neuronal Workspace in vertebrates. 脊椎动物全局神经元工作区的进化起源。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-09-13 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad020

Oryan Zacks, Eva Jablonka

引用次数: 0

Adversarial inference: predictive minds in the attention economy. 对抗性推理：注意力经济中的预测思维。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-08-24 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad019

Jelle Bruineberg

{"title":"Adversarial inference: predictive minds in the attention economy.","authors":"Jelle Bruineberg","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad019","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad019","url":null,"abstract":"What is it about our current digital technologies that seemingly makes it difficult for users to attend to what matters to them? According to the dominant narrative in the literature on the \"attention economy,\" a user's lack of attention is due to the large amounts of information available in their everyday environments. I will argue that information-abundance fails to account for some of the central manifestations of distraction, such as sudden urges to check a particular information-source in the absence of perceptual information. I will use active inference, and in particular models of action selection based on the minimization of expected free energy, to develop an alternative answer to the question about what makes it difficult to attend. Besides obvious adversarial forms of inference, in which algorithms build up models of users in order to keep them scrolling, I will show that active inference provides the tools to identify a number of problematic structural features of current digital technologies: they contain limitless sources of novelty, they can be navigated by very simple and effortless motor movements, and they offer their action possibilities everywhere and anytime independent of place or context. Moreover, recent models of motivated control show an intricate interplay between motivation and control that can explain sudden transitions in motivational state and the consequent alteration of the salience of actions. I conclude, therefore, that the challenges users encounter when engaging with digital technologies are less about information overload or inviting content, but more about the continuous availability of easily available possibilities for action.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/cd/2e/niad019.PMC10457025.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10111090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Modelling perception as a hierarchical competition differentiates imagined, veridical, and hallucinated percepts. 作为一种等级竞争的感知建模区分了想象的、真实的和幻觉的感知。

IF 3.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-08-23 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad018

Alexander A Sulfaro, Amanda K Robinson, Thomas A Carlson

{"title":"Modelling perception as a hierarchical competition differentiates imagined, veridical, and hallucinated percepts.","authors":"Alexander A Sulfaro, Amanda K Robinson, Thomas A Carlson","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad018","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad018","url":null,"abstract":"Mental imagery is a process by which thoughts become experienced with sensory characteristics. Yet, it is not clear why mental images appear diminished compared to veridical images, nor how mental images are phenomenologically distinct from hallucinations, another type of non-veridical sensory experience. Current evidence suggests that imagination and veridical perception share neural resources. If so, we argue that considering how neural representations of externally generated stimuli (i.e. sensory input) and internally generated stimuli (i.e. thoughts) might interfere with one another can sufficiently differentiate between veridical, imaginary, and hallucinatory perception. We here use a simple computational model of a serially connected, hierarchical network with bidirectional information flow to emulate the primate visual system. We show that modelling even first approximations of neural competition can more coherently explain imagery phenomenology than non-competitive models. Our simulations predict that, without competing sensory input, imagined stimuli should ubiquitously dominate hierarchical representations. However, with competition, imagination should dominate high-level representations but largely fail to outcompete sensory inputs at lower processing levels. To interpret our findings, we assume that low-level stimulus information (e.g. in early visual cortices) contributes most to the sensory aspects of perceptual experience, while high-level stimulus information (e.g. towards temporal regions) contributes most to its abstract aspects. Our findings therefore suggest that ongoing bottom-up inputs during waking life may prevent imagination from overriding veridical sensory experience. In contrast, internally generated stimuli may be hallucinated when sensory input is dampened or eradicated. Our approach can explain individual differences in imagery, along with aspects of daydreaming, hallucinations, and non-visual mental imagery.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10445666/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10069232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Pattern breaking: a complex systems approach to psychedelic medicine. 模式突破：迷幻药的一种复杂系统方法。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-07-06 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad017

Inês Hipólito, Jonas Mago, Fernando E Rosas, Robin Carhart-Harris

引用次数: 3

The Self-Simulational Theory of temporal extension. 时间延伸的自我模拟理论。

IF 3.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-06-19 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad015

Jan Erik Bellingrath

{"title":"The Self-Simulational Theory of temporal extension.","authors":"Jan Erik Bellingrath","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad015","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad015","url":null,"abstract":"Subjective experience is experience in time. Unfolding in a continuous river of moments, our experience, however, consists not only in the changing phenomenological content per se but, further, in additional retrodiction and prospection of the moments that immediately preceded and followed it. It is in this way that William James's 'specious present' presents itself as extending between the past and future. While the phenomenology of temporality always happens, in normal waking states, to someone, and the notions of self-representation and temporal experience have continuously been associated with each other, there has not yet been an explicit account of their relationship. In this paper, the emergence of the subjective experience of temporal extension will be conceived of as arising out of a difference-relation between counterfactual and actual self-representations. After presenting the proposed relationship on both a conceptual level and a formalized and neuronally realistic level of description using information theory, convergent empirical evidence from general findings about temporal experience and inference, altered states of consciousness, and mental illness is examined. The Self-Simulational Theory of temporal extension is able to explain systematic variations in the subjectively experienced length of the temporal Now across numerous domains and holds potentially wide implications for the neuroscience of consciousness, as well as for a deeper understanding of different forms of mental illness.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10279415/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9764042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

About the compatibility between the perturbational complexity index and the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness. 关于微扰复杂性指数与意识的全局神经元工作空间理论之间的兼容性。

IF 3.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-06-19 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad016

Michele Farisco, Jean-Pierre Changeux

{"title":"About the compatibility between the perturbational complexity index and the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness.","authors":"Michele Farisco, Jean-Pierre Changeux","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad016","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad016","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the compatibility between the theoretical framework of the global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) of conscious processing and the perturbational complexity index (PCI). Even if it has been introduced within the framework of a concurrent theory (i.e. Integrated Information Theory), PCI appears, in principle, compatible with the main tenet of GNWT, which is a conscious process that depends on a long-range connection between different cortical regions, more specifically on the amplification, global propagation, and integration of brain signals. Notwithstanding this basic compatibility, a number of limited compatibilities and apparent differences emerge. This paper starts from the description of brain complexity, a notion that is crucial for PCI, to then summary of the main features of PCI and the main tenets of GNWT. Against this background, the text explores the compatibility between PCI and GNWT. It concludes that GNWT and PCI are fundamentally compatible, even though there are some partial disagreements and some points to further examine.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/8e/0d/niad016.PMC10279414.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10066998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Separating weak integrated information theory into inspired and aspirational approaches. 将弱集成信息理论分为启发和激励两种方法。

IF 3.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-05-17 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad012

Angus Leung, Naotsugu Tsuchiya

引用次数: 0

Time-consciousness in computational phenomenology: a temporal analysis of active inference. 计算现象学中的时间意识:主动推理的时间分析。

IF 3.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-03-17 eCollection Date: 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad004

Juan Diego Bogotá, Zakaria Djebbara

引用次数: 0