Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献

{"title":"Sources of richness and ineffability for phenomenally conscious states","authors":"Xu Ji, Eric Elmoznino, George Deane, Axel Constant, Guillaume Dumas, Guillaume Lajoie, Jonathan Simon, Yoshua Bengio","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae001","url":null,"abstract":"Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience corresponds to the amount of information in a conscious state and ineffability corresponds to the amount of information lost at different stages of processing. We describe how attractor dynamics in working memory would induce impoverished recollections of our original experiences, how the discrete symbolic nature of language is insufficient for describing the rich and high-dimensional structure of experiences, and how similarity in the cognitive function of two individuals relates to improved communicability of their experiences to each other. While our model may not settle all questions relating to the explanatory gap, it makes progress toward a fully physicalist explanation of the richness and ineffability of conscious experience—two important aspects that seem to be part of what makes qualitative character so puzzling.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140069956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A novel model of divergent predictive perception.","authors":"Reshanne R Reeder, Giovanni Sala, Tessa M van Leeuwen","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae006","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae006","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Predictive processing theories state that our subjective experience of reality is shaped by a balance of expectations based on previous knowledge about the world (i.e. priors) and confidence in sensory input from the environment. Divergent experiences (e.g. hallucinations and synaesthesia) are likely to occur when there is an imbalance between one's reliance on priors and sensory input. In a novel theoretical model, inspired by both predictive processing and psychological principles, we propose that predictable divergent experiences are associated with natural or environmentally induced prior/sensory imbalances: inappropriately strong or inflexible (i.e. maladaptive) high-level priors (beliefs) combined with low sensory confidence can result in reality discrimination issues, a characteristic of psychosis; maladaptive low-level priors (sensory expectations) combined with high sensory confidence can result in atypical sensory sensitivities and persistent divergent percepts, a characteristic of synaesthesia. Crucially, we propose that whether different divergent experiences manifest with dominantly sensory (e.g. hallucinations) or nonsensory characteristics (e.g. delusions) depends on mental imagery ability, which is a spectrum from aphantasia (absent or weak imagery) to hyperphantasia (extremely vivid imagery). We theorize that imagery is critically involved in shaping the sensory richness of divergent perceptual experience. In sum, to predict a range of divergent perceptual experiences in both clinical and general populations, three factors must be accounted for: a maladaptive use of priors, individual level of confidence in sensory input, and mental imagery ability. These ideas can be expressed formally using nonparametric regression modeling. We provide evidence for our theory from previous work and deliver predictions for future research.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10860603/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139724955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A novel, semi-automatic procedure for generating slow change blindness stimuli.","authors":"Haley G Frey, Lua Koenig, Biyu J He, Jan W Brascamp","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae004","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae004","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Change blindness is the phenomenon that occurs when an observer fails to notice what would seem to be obvious changes in the features of a visual stimulus. Researchers can induce this experimentally by including visual disruptions (such as brief blanks) that coincide with the changes in question. However, change blindness can also occur in the absence of these disruptions if a change occurs sufficiently slowly. This \"slow\" or \"gradual\" change blindness phenomenon has not been extensively researched. Two plausible practical reasons for this are that there are few slow-change stimuli available, and that it is difficult to collect trial-specific responses without affecting expectations on later trials. Here, we describe a novel, semi-automatic procedure for quickly generating many slow-change stimuli. This procedure creates stimuli that have been specifically designed to allow assessment of change blindness on individual trials without influencing subsequent trials. We include the results of three validation experiments that demonstrate that these stimuli are effective and suitable for use in systematic studies of slow change blindness.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10860497/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139724956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pain suffering and the self. An active allostatic inference explanation.","authors":"Philip Gerrans","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae002","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae002","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Distributed processing that gives rise to pain experience is anchored by a multidimensional self-model. I show how the phenomenon of pain asymbolia and other atypical pain-related conditions (Insensitivity to Pain, Chronic Pain, 'Social' Pain, Insensitivity to Pain, Chronic Pain, 'Social' Pain, empathy for pain and suffering) can be explained by this idea. It also explains the patterns of association and dissociation among neural correlates without importing strong modular assumptions. It treats pain processing as a species of allostatic active inference in which the mind co-ordinates its processing resources to optimize basic bodily functioning at different time scales. The self is inferred to be source and target of regulation in this process. The self-modelling account reconciles conflicting deaffectualization and depersonalization accounts of pain asymbolia by showing how depersonalization and pain asymbolia arise at different levels of hierarchical self modelling.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10860504/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139724957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Covert cortical processing: a diagnosis in search of a definition.","authors":"Michael J Young, Matteo Fecchio, Yelena G Bodien, Brian L Edlow","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad026","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad026","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Historically, clinical evaluation of unresponsive patients following brain injury has relied principally on serial behavioral examination to search for emerging signs of consciousness and track recovery. Advances in neuroimaging and electrophysiologic techniques now enable clinicians to peer into residual brain functions even in the absence of overt behavioral signs. These advances have expanded clinicians' ability to sub-stratify behaviorally unresponsive and seemingly unaware patients following brain injury by querying and classifying covert brain activity made evident through active or passive neuroimaging or electrophysiologic techniques, including functional MRI, electroencephalography (EEG), transcranial magnetic stimulation-EEG, and positron emission tomography. Clinical research has thus reciprocally influenced clinical practice, giving rise to new diagnostic categories including cognitive-motor dissociation (i.e. 'covert consciousness') and covert cortical processing (CCP). While covert consciousness has received extensive attention and study, CCP is relatively less understood. We describe that CCP is an emerging and clinically relevant state of consciousness marked by the presence of intact association cortex responses to environmental stimuli in the absence of behavioral evidence of stimulus processing. CCP is not a monotonic state but rather encapsulates a spectrum of possible association cortex responses from rudimentary to complex and to a range of possible stimuli. In constructing a roadmap for this evolving field, we emphasize that efforts to inform clinicians, philosophers, and researchers of this condition are crucial. Along with strategies to sensitize diagnostic criteria and disorders of consciousness nosology to these vital discoveries, democratizing access to the resources necessary for clinical identification of CCP is an emerging clinical and ethical imperative.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10849751/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139703998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Audiovisual interactions outside of visual awareness during motion adaptation","authors":"Minsun Park, Randolph Blake, Chai-Youn Kim","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad027","url":null,"abstract":"Motion aftereffects (MAEs), illusory motion experienced in a direction opposed to real motion experienced during prior adaptation, have been used to assess audiovisual interactions. In a previous study from our laboratory, we demonstrated that a congruent direction of auditory motion presented concurrently with visual motion during adaptation strengthened the consequent visual MAE, compared to when auditory motion was incongruent in direction. Those judgments of MAE strength, however, could have been influenced by expectations or response bias from mere knowledge of the state of audiovisual congruity during adaptation. To prevent such knowledge, we now employed continuous flash suppression to render visual motion perceptually invisible during adaptation, ensuring that observers were completely unaware of visual adapting motion and only aware of the motion direction of the sound they were hearing. We found a small but statistically significant congruence effect of sound on adaptation strength produced by invisible adaptation motion. After considering alternative explanations for this finding, we conclude that auditory motion can impact the strength of visual processing produced by translational visual motion even when that motion transpires outside of awareness.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139588698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Where is the ghost in the shell?","authors":"Veith Weilnhammer","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The neurobiology of conscious experience is one of the fundamental mysteries in science. New evidence suggests that transcranial magnetic stimulation of the parietal cortex does not modulate bistable perception. What does this mean for the neural correlates of consciousness, and how should we search for them?","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140518342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Modeling and controlling the body in maladaptive ways: an active inference perspective on non-suicidal self-injury behaviors.","authors":"Barca Laura, Domenico Maisto, Giovani Pezzulo","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad025","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad025","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A significant number of persons engage in paradoxical behaviors, such as extreme food restriction (up to starvation) and non-suicidal self-injuries, especially during periods of rapid changes, such as adolescence. Here, we contextualize these and related paradoxical behavior within an active inference view of brain functions, which assumes that the brain forms predictive models of bodily variables, emotional experiences, and the embodied self and continuously strives to reduce the uncertainty of such models. We propose that not only in conditions of excessive or prolonged uncertainty, such as in clinical conditions, but also during pivotal periods of developmental transition, paradoxical behaviors might emerge as maladaptive strategies to reduce uncertainty-by \"acting on the body\"- soliciting salient perceptual and interoceptive sensations, such as pain or excessive levels of hunger. Although such strategies are maladaptive and run against our basic homeostatic imperatives, they might be functional not only to provide some short-term reward (e.g. relief from emotional distress)-as previously proposed-but also to reduce uncertainty and possibly to restore a coherent model of one's bodily experience and the self, affording greater confidence in who we are and what course of actions we should pursue.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10681710/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138464298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Special Issue: Experiencing Well-BeingPlayfulness and the meaningful life: an active inference perspective.","authors":"Julian Kiverstein, Mark Miller","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad024","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad024","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Our paper takes as its starting point the recent proposal, at the core of this special issue, to use the active inference framework (AIF) to computationally model what it is for a person to live a meaningful life. In broad brushstrokes, the AIF takes experiences of human flourishing to be the result of predictions and uncertainty estimations along many dimensions at multiple levels of neurobiological organization. Our aim in this paper is to explain how AIF models predict that uncertainty can sometimes, under the right conditions, be conducive to the experiences of flourishing. Our focus is on playfulness, because playful individuals have learned a high-level prior that in certain safe contexts, uncertainty and error should be tolerated and explored. They have expanded the phenotypic bound on the amount of surprise they are prepared to tolerate in their lives. The positive embracing of uncertainty has a number of positive knock-on effects for the kind of lives playful individuals are able to lead. First, a playful individual attends to the world in a way that is open and expansive, a mode of attending that is effortless and therefore conducive to being in the present. This openness to the present moment allows for deep engagement and participation in experience that can furnish a renewed appreciation for life. Second, playful individuals will actively seek out spaces at the edge of their own abilities and will therefore be more likely to grow and develop in their skills and relationships in ways that contribute to their living a good life. Finally, playful agents seek out situations in which they can monitor, observe, and learn from their own affective responses to uncertainty. Thus, uncertainty becomes something familiar to them that they not only learn to tolerate but also enjoy positively exploring, in ways that provide them opportunities to grow. For these three reasons, we will argue that playfulness and openness to experiences of uncertainty and the unknown may be important ingredients in human flourishing.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10656941/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138464299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Common computations for metacognition and meta-metacognition.","authors":"Yunxuan Zheng, Samuel Recht, Dobromir Rahnev","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad023","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad023","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Recent evidence shows that people have the meta-metacognitive ability to evaluate their metacognitive judgments of confidence. However, it is unclear whether meta-metacognitive judgments are made by a different system and rely on a separate set of computations compared to metacognitive judgments. To address this question, we asked participants (<i>N</i> = 36) to perform a perceptual decision-making task and provide (i) an object-level, Type-1 response about the identity of the stimulus; (ii) a metacognitive, Type-2 response (low/high) regarding their confidence in their Type-1 decision; and (iii) a meta-metacognitive, Type-3 response (low/high) regarding the quality of their Type-2 rating. We found strong evidence for the existence of Type-3, meta-metacognitive ability. In a separate condition, participants performed an identical task with only a Type-1 response followed by a Type-2 response given on a 4-point scale. We found that the two conditions produced equivalent results such that the combination of binary Type-2 and binary Type-3 responses acts similar to a 4-point Type-2 response. Critically, while Type-2 evaluations were subject to metacognitive noise, Type-3 judgments were made at no additional cost. These results suggest that it is unlikely that there is a distinction between Type-2 and Type-3 systems (metacognition and meta-metacognition) in perceptual decision-making and, instead, a single system can be flexibly adapted to produce both Type-2 and Type-3 evaluations recursively.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10693288/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138479271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}