Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献

{"title":"Knowing that you know that you know? An extreme-confidence heuristic can lead to above-chance discrimination of metacognitive performance.","authors":"Maxine T Sherman, Anil K Seth","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae020","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae020","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In daily life, we can not only estimate confidence in our inferences ('I'm sure I failed that exam'), but can also estimate whether those feelings of confidence are good predictors of decision accuracy ('I feel sure I failed, but my feeling is probably wrong; I probably passed'). In the lab, by using simple perceptual tasks and collecting trial-by-trial confidence ratings visual metacognition research has repeatedly shown that participants can successfully predict the accuracy of their perceptual choices. Can participants also successfully evaluate 'confidence in confidence' in these tasks? This is the question addressed in this study. Participants performed a simple, two-interval forced choice numerosity task framed as an exam. Confidence judgements were collected in the form of a 'predicted exam grade'. Finally, we collected 'meta-metacognitive' reports in a two-interval forced-choice design: trials were presented in pairs, and participants had to select that in which they thought their confidence (predicted grade) best matched their accuracy (actual grade), effectively minimizing their quadratic scoring rule (QSR) score. Participants successfully selected trials on which their metacognition was better when metacognitive performance was quantified using area under the type 2 ROC (AUROC2) but not when using the 'gold-standard' measure m-ratio. However, further analyses suggested that participants selected trials on which AUROC2 is lower in part via an extreme-confidence heuristic, rather than through explicit evaluation of metacognitive inferences: when restricting analyses to trials on which participants gave the same confidence rating AUROC2 no longer differed as a function of selection, and likewise when we excluded trials on which extreme confidence ratings were given. Together, our results show that participants are able to make effective metacognitive discriminations on their visual confidence ratings, but that explicit 'meta-metacognitive' processes may not be required.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2024 1","pages":"niae020"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11110933/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141082858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn't the content NCC.","authors":"Benjamin Kozuch","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae017","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Recent years have seen the rise of several theories saying that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a neural correlate of visual consciousness (NCC). Especially popular here are theories saying that the PFC is the 'content NCC' for vision, i.e. it contains those brain areas that are not only necessary for consciousness, but also determine 'what' it is that we visually experience (e.g. whether we experience green or red). This article points out how this \"upper-deck\" form of PFC theory is at odds with the character of visual experience: on the one hand, visual consciousness appears to contain copious amounts of content, with many properties (such as object, shape, or color) being simultaneously represented in many parts of the visual field. On the other hand, the functions that the PFC carries out (e.g. attention and working memory) are each dedicated to processing only a relatively small subset of available visual stimuli. In short, the PFC probably does not produce enough or the right kind of visual representations for it to supply all of the content found in visual experience, in which case the idea that the PFC is the content NCC for vision is probably false. This article also discusses data thought to undercut the idea that visual experience is informationally rich (inattentional blindness, etc.), along with theories of vision according to which \"ensemble statistics\" are used to represent features in the periphery of the visual field. I'll argue that these lines of evidence fail to close the apparently vast gap between the amount of visual content represented in the visual experience and the amount represented in the PFC.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2024 1","pages":"niae017"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11210398/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141472442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Incongruent active head rotations increase visual motion detection thresholds.","authors":"Kate Pickard, Matthew J Davidson, Sujin Kim, David Alais","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae019","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Attributing a visual motion signal to its correct source-be that external object motion, self-motion, or some combination of both-seems effortless, and yet often involves disentangling a complex web of motion signals. Existing literature focuses on either translational motion (heading) or eye movements, leaving much to be learnt about the influence of a wider range of self-motions, such as active head rotations, on visual motion perception. This study investigated how active head rotations affect visual motion detection thresholds, comparing conditions where visual motion and head-turn direction were either congruent or incongruent. Participants judged the direction of a visual motion stimulus while rotating their head or remaining stationary, using a fixation-locked Virtual Reality display with integrated head-movement recordings. Thresholds to perceive visual motion were higher in both active-head rotation conditions compared to stationary, though no differences were found between congruent or incongruent conditions. Participants also showed a significant bias to report seeing visual motion travelling in the same direction as the head rotation. Together, these results demonstrate active head rotations increase visual motion perceptual thresholds, particularly in cases of incongruent visual and active vestibular stimulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2024 1","pages":"niae019"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11097904/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140960878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploring effects of anesthesia on complexity, differentiation, and integrated information in rat EEG.","authors":"André Sevenius Nilsen, Alessandro Arena, Johan F Storm","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae021","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>To investigate mechanisms underlying loss of consciousness, it is important to extend methods established in humans to rodents as well. Perturbational complexity index (PCI) is a promising metric of \"capacity for consciousness\" and is based on a perturbational approach that allows inferring a system's capacity for causal integration and differentiation of information. These properties have been proposed as necessary for conscious systems. Measures based on spontaneous electroencephalography recordings, however, may be more practical for certain clinical purposes and may better reflect ongoing dynamics. Here, we compare PCI (using electrical stimulation for perturbing cortical activity) to several spontaneous electroencephalography-based measures of signal diversity and integrated information in rats undergoing propofol, sevoflurane, and ketamine anesthesia. We find that, along with PCI, the spontaneous electroencephalography-based measures, Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZ) and geometric integrated information (Φ^<b>G</b>), were best able to distinguish between awake and propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia. However, PCI was anti-correlated with spontaneous measures of integrated information, which generally increased during propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia, contrary to expectations. Together with an observed divergence in network properties estimated from directed functional connectivity (current results) and effective connectivity (earlier results), the perturbation-based results seem to suggest that anesthesia disrupts global cortico-cortical information transfer, whereas spontaneous activity suggests the opposite. We speculate that these seemingly diverging results may be because of suppressed encoding specificity of information or driving subcortical projections from, e.g., the thalamus. We conclude that certain perturbation-based measures (PCI) and spontaneous measures (LZ and Φ^<b>G</b>) may be complementary and mutually informative when studying altered states of consciousness.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2024 1","pages":"niae021"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11097907/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140960861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What the eyes, confidence, and partner's identity can tell about change of mind.","authors":"Rémi Sanchez, Anne-Catherine Tomei, Pascal Mamassian, Manuel Vidal, Andrea Desantis","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae018","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae018","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p><b>Perceptual confidence reflects the ability to evaluate the evidence that supports perceptual decisions. It is thought to play a critical role in guiding decision-making. However, only a few empirical studies have actually investigated the function of perceptual confidence. To address this issue, we designed a perceptual task in which participants provided a confidence judgment on the accuracy of their perceptual decision. Then, they viewed the response of a machine or human partner, and they were instructed to decide whether to keep or change their initial response. We observed that confidence predicted participants' changes of mind more than task difficulty and perceptual accuracy. Additionally, interacting with a machine, compared to a human, decreased confidence and increased participants tendency to change their initial decision, suggesting that both confidence and changes of mind are influenced by contextual factors, such as the identity of a partner. Finally, variations in confidence judgments but not change of mind were correlated with pre-response pupil dynamics, indicating that arousal changes are linked to confidence computations. This study contributes to our understanding of the factors influencing confidence and changes of mind and also evaluates the possibility of using pupil dynamics as a proxy of confidence</b>.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2024 1","pages":"niae018"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11077902/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140892813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life","authors":"Anna Ciaunica, Adam Safron, Jonathan Delafield-Butt","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab037","url":null,"abstract":"Most theoretical and empirical discussions about the nature of consciousness are typically couched in a way that endorses a tacit adult-centric and vision-based perspective. This paper defends the idea that consciousness science may be put on a fruitful track for its next phase by examining the nature of subjective experiences through a bottom-up developmental lens. We draw attention to the intrinsic link between consciousness, experiences and experiencing subjects, which are first and foremost embodied and situated organisms essentially concerned with self-preservation within a precarious environment. Our paper suggests that in order to understand what consciousness ‘is’, one should first tackle the fundamental question: how do embodied experiences ‘arise’ from square one? We then highlight one key yet overlooked aspect of human consciousness studies, namely that the earliest and closest environment of an embodied experiencing subject is the body of another human experiencing subject. We present evidence speaking in favour of fairly sophisticated forms of early sensorimotor integration of bodily signals and self-generated actions already being established in utero. We conclude that these primitive and fundamentally relational and co-embodied roots of our early experiences may have a crucial impact on the way human beings consciously experience the self, body and the world across their lifespan.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"99 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140616836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stereo-EEG features of temporal and frontal lobe seizures with loss of consciousness","authors":"Nuria Campora, Juan Pablo Princich, Alejandro Nasimbera, Santiago Cordisco, Manuela Villanueva, Silvia Oddo, Brenda Giagante, Silvia Kochen","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae003","url":null,"abstract":"The loss of consciousness (LOC) during seizures is one of the most striking features that significantly impact the quality of life, even though the neuronal network involved is not fully comprehended. We analyzed the intracerebral patterns in patients with focal drug-resistant epilepsy, both with and without LOC. We assessed the localization, lateralization, stereo electroencephalography (SEEG) patterns, seizure duration, and the quantification of contacts exhibiting electrical discharge. The degree of LOC was quantified using the Consciousness Seizure Scale. Thirteen patients (40 seizures) with focal drug-resistant epilepsy underwent SEEG. In cases of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE, 6 patients and 15 seizures), LOC occurred more frequently in seizures with mesial rather than lateral temporal lobe onset. On the other hand, in cases of frontal lobe epilepsy (7 patients; 25 seizures), LOC was associated with pre-frontal onset, a higher number of contacts with epileptic discharge compared to the onset count and longer seizure durations. Our study revealed distinct characteristics during LOC depending on the epileptogenic zone. For temporal lobe seizures, LOC was associated with mesial seizure onset, whereas in frontal lobe epilepsy, seizure with LOC has a significant increase in contact showing epileptiform discharge and a pre-frontal onset. This phenomenon may be correlated with the broad neural network required to maintain consciousness, which can be affected in different ways, resulting in LOC","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140573229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A mechanistic alternative to minimal sufficiency as the guiding principle for NCC research","authors":"Andy Mckilliam","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae014","url":null,"abstract":"A central project for the neuroscience of consciousness is to reveal the neural basis of consciousness. For the past 20-odd years, this project has been conceptualized in terms of minimal sufficiency. Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the project is better conceived in mechanistic terms as the search for difference-makers. In this paper, I (i) motivate this mechanistic alternative to minimal sufficiency, (ii) develop it further by clarifying debates about the prospects of leveraging mutual manipulability to distinguish constitutive difference-makers from those that are merely causal, and (iii) explore the implications this has for recent debates concerning the status of the prefrontal cortex. I argue that adopting a mechanistic approach to the neuroscience of consciousness suggests that the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness even if it is not strictly speaking a necessary part.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"145 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140573220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models","authors":"Clara Colombatto, Stephen M Fleming","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae013","url":null,"abstract":"Technological advances raise new puzzles and challenges for cognitive science and the study of how humans think about and interact with artificial intelligence (AI). For example, the advent of large language models and their human-like linguistic abilities has raised substantial debate regarding whether or not AI could be conscious. Here, we consider the question of whether AI could have subjective experiences such as feelings and sensations (‘phenomenal consciousness’). While experts from many fields have weighed in on this issue in academic and public discourse, it remains unknown whether and how the general population attributes phenomenal consciousness to AI. We surveyed a sample of US residents (n = 300) and found that a majority of participants were willing to attribute some possibility of phenomenal consciousness to large language models. These attributions were robust, as they predicted attributions of mental states typically associated with phenomenality—but also flexible, as they were sensitive to individual differences such as usage frequency. Overall, these results show how folk intuitions about AI consciousness can diverge from expert intuitions—with potential implications for the legal and ethical status of AI.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140573323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Consciousness isn’t “hard”—it’s human psychology that makes it so!","authors":"Iris Berent","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae016","url":null,"abstract":"Consciousness arguably presents a “hard problem” for scholars. An influential position asserts that the “problem” is rooted in ontology—it arises because consciousness “is” distinct from the physical. “Problem intuitions” are routinely taken as evidence for this view. In so doing, it is assumed that (i) people do not consider consciousness as physical and (ii) their intuitions faithfully reflect what exists (or else, intuitions would not constitute evidence). New experimental results challenge both claims. First, in some scenarios, people demonstrably view consciousness as a physical affair that registers in the body (brain). Second, “problem intuitions” are linked to psychological biases, so they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is. I conclude that the roots of the “hard problem” are partly psychological. Accordingly, its resolution requires careful characterization of the psychological mechanisms that engender “problem intuitions.”","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140573337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}