Nuria Campora, Juan Pablo Princich, Alejandro Nasimbera, Santiago Cordisco, Manuela Villanueva, Silvia Oddo, Brenda Giagante, Silvia Kochen
{"title":"Stereo-EEG features of temporal and frontal lobe seizures with loss of consciousness","authors":"Nuria Campora, Juan Pablo Princich, Alejandro Nasimbera, Santiago Cordisco, Manuela Villanueva, Silvia Oddo, Brenda Giagante, Silvia Kochen","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae003","url":null,"abstract":"The loss of consciousness (LOC) during seizures is one of the most striking features that significantly impact the quality of life, even though the neuronal network involved is not fully comprehended. We analyzed the intracerebral patterns in patients with focal drug-resistant epilepsy, both with and without LOC. We assessed the localization, lateralization, stereo electroencephalography (SEEG) patterns, seizure duration, and the quantification of contacts exhibiting electrical discharge. The degree of LOC was quantified using the Consciousness Seizure Scale. Thirteen patients (40 seizures) with focal drug-resistant epilepsy underwent SEEG. In cases of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE, 6 patients and 15 seizures), LOC occurred more frequently in seizures with mesial rather than lateral temporal lobe onset. On the other hand, in cases of frontal lobe epilepsy (7 patients; 25 seizures), LOC was associated with pre-frontal onset, a higher number of contacts with epileptic discharge compared to the onset count and longer seizure durations. Our study revealed distinct characteristics during LOC depending on the epileptogenic zone. For temporal lobe seizures, LOC was associated with mesial seizure onset, whereas in frontal lobe epilepsy, seizure with LOC has a significant increase in contact showing epileptiform discharge and a pre-frontal onset. This phenomenon may be correlated with the broad neural network required to maintain consciousness, which can be affected in different ways, resulting in LOC","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140573229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A mechanistic alternative to minimal sufficiency as the guiding principle for NCC research","authors":"Andy Mckilliam","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae014","url":null,"abstract":"A central project for the neuroscience of consciousness is to reveal the neural basis of consciousness. For the past 20-odd years, this project has been conceptualized in terms of minimal sufficiency. Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the project is better conceived in mechanistic terms as the search for difference-makers. In this paper, I (i) motivate this mechanistic alternative to minimal sufficiency, (ii) develop it further by clarifying debates about the prospects of leveraging mutual manipulability to distinguish constitutive difference-makers from those that are merely causal, and (iii) explore the implications this has for recent debates concerning the status of the prefrontal cortex. I argue that adopting a mechanistic approach to the neuroscience of consciousness suggests that the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness even if it is not strictly speaking a necessary part.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140573220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models","authors":"Clara Colombatto, Stephen M Fleming","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae013","url":null,"abstract":"Technological advances raise new puzzles and challenges for cognitive science and the study of how humans think about and interact with artificial intelligence (AI). For example, the advent of large language models and their human-like linguistic abilities has raised substantial debate regarding whether or not AI could be conscious. Here, we consider the question of whether AI could have subjective experiences such as feelings and sensations (‘phenomenal consciousness’). While experts from many fields have weighed in on this issue in academic and public discourse, it remains unknown whether and how the general population attributes phenomenal consciousness to AI. We surveyed a sample of US residents (n = 300) and found that a majority of participants were willing to attribute some possibility of phenomenal consciousness to large language models. These attributions were robust, as they predicted attributions of mental states typically associated with phenomenality—but also flexible, as they were sensitive to individual differences such as usage frequency. Overall, these results show how folk intuitions about AI consciousness can diverge from expert intuitions—with potential implications for the legal and ethical status of AI.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140573323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consciousness isn’t “hard”—it’s human psychology that makes it so!","authors":"Iris Berent","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae016","url":null,"abstract":"Consciousness arguably presents a “hard problem” for scholars. An influential position asserts that the “problem” is rooted in ontology—it arises because consciousness “is” distinct from the physical. “Problem intuitions” are routinely taken as evidence for this view. In so doing, it is assumed that (i) people do not consider consciousness as physical and (ii) their intuitions faithfully reflect what exists (or else, intuitions would not constitute evidence). New experimental results challenge both claims. First, in some scenarios, people demonstrably view consciousness as a physical affair that registers in the body (brain). Second, “problem intuitions” are linked to psychological biases, so they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is. I conclude that the roots of the “hard problem” are partly psychological. Accordingly, its resolution requires careful characterization of the psychological mechanisms that engender “problem intuitions.”","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140573337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mahault Albarracin, Gabriel Bouchard-Joly, Zahra Sheikhbahaee, Mark Miller, Riddhi J Pitliya, Pierre Poirier
{"title":"Feeling our place in the world: an active inference account of self-esteem.","authors":"Mahault Albarracin, Gabriel Bouchard-Joly, Zahra Sheikhbahaee, Mark Miller, Riddhi J Pitliya, Pierre Poirier","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae007","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae007","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Self-esteem, the evaluation of one's own worth or value, is a critical aspect of psychological well-being and mental health. In this paper, we propose an active inference account of self-esteem, casting it as a sociometer or an inferential capacity to interpret one's standing within a social group. This approach allows us to explore the interaction between an individual's self-perception and the expectations of their social environment.When there is a mismatch between these perceptions and expectations, the individual needs to adjust their actions or update their self-perception to better align with their current experiences. We also consider this hypothesis in relation with recent research on affective inference, suggesting that self-esteem enables the individual to track and respond to this discrepancy through affective states such as anxiety or positive affect. By acting as an inferential sociometer, self-esteem allows individuals to navigate and adapt to their social environment, ultimately impacting their psychological well-being and mental health.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10984624/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140337634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deep CANALs: a deep learning approach to refining the canalization theory of psychopathology.","authors":"Arthur Juliani, Adam Safron, Ryota Kanai","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae005","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae005","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Psychedelic therapy has seen a resurgence of interest in the last decade, with promising clinical outcomes for the treatment of a variety of psychopathologies. In response to this success, several theoretical models have been proposed to account for the positive therapeutic effects of psychedelics. One of the more prominent models is \"RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics,\" which proposes that psychedelics act therapeutically by relaxing the strength of maladaptive high-level beliefs encoded in the brain. The more recent \"CANAL\" model of psychopathology builds on the explanatory framework of RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics by proposing that canalization (the development of overly rigid belief landscapes) may be a primary factor in psychopathology. Here, we make use of learning theory in deep neural networks to develop a series of refinements to the original CANAL model. Our primary theoretical contribution is to disambiguate two separate optimization landscapes underlying belief representation in the brain and describe the unique pathologies which can arise from the canalization of each. Along each dimension, we identify pathologies of either too much or too little canalization, implying that the construct of canalization does not have a simple linear correlation with the presentation of psychopathology. In this expanded paradigm, we demonstrate the ability to make novel predictions regarding what aspects of psychopathology may be amenable to psychedelic therapy, as well as what forms of psychedelic therapy may ultimately be most beneficial for a given individual.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10965250/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140295236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hannah Biddell, Mark Solms, Heleen Slagter, Ruben Laukkonen
{"title":"Arousal coherence, uncertainty, and well-being: an active inference account.","authors":"Hannah Biddell, Mark Solms, Heleen Slagter, Ruben Laukkonen","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae011","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae011","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Here we build on recent findings which show that greater alignment between our subjective experiences (how we feel) and physiological states (measurable changes in our body) plays a pivotal role in the overall psychological well-being. Specifically, we propose that the alignment or 'coherence' between affective arousal (e.g. how excited we 'feel') and autonomic arousal (e.g. heart rate or pupil dilation) may be key for maintaining up-to-date uncertainty representations in dynamic environments. Drawing on recent advances in interoceptive and affective inference, we also propose that arousal coherence reflects interoceptive integration, facilitates adaptive belief updating, and impacts our capacity to adapt to changes in uncertainty, with downstream consequences to well-being. We also highlight the role of meta-awareness of arousal, a third level of inference, which may permit conscious awareness, learning about, and intentional regulation of lower-order sources of arousal. Practices emphasizing meta-awareness of arousal (like meditation) may therefore elicit some of their known benefits via improved arousal coherence. We suggest that arousal coherence is also likely to be associated with markers of adaptive functioning (like emotional awareness and self-regulatory capacities) and discuss mind-body practices that may increase coherence.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10949961/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140177664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hierarchical consciousness: the Nested Observer Windows model.","authors":"Justin Riddle, Jonathan W Schooler","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae010","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae010","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Foremost in our experience is the intuition that we possess a unified conscious experience. However, many observations run counter to this intuition: we experience paralyzing indecision when faced with two appealing behavioral choices, we simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs, and the content of our thought is often characterized by an internal debate. Here, we propose the Nested Observer Windows (NOW) Model, a framework for hierarchical consciousness wherein information processed across many spatiotemporal scales of the brain feeds into subjective experience. The model likens the mind to a hierarchy of nested mosaic tiles-where an image is composed of mosaic tiles, and each of these tiles is itself an image composed of mosaic tiles. Unitary consciousness exists at the apex of this nested hierarchy where perceptual constructs become fully integrated and complex behaviors are initiated via abstract commands. We define an observer window as a spatially and temporally constrained system within which information is integrated, e.g. in functional brain regions and neurons. Three principles from the signal analysis of electrical activity describe the nested hierarchy and generate testable predictions. First, nested observer windows disseminate information across spatiotemporal scales with cross-frequency coupling. Second, observer windows are characterized by a high degree of internal synchrony (with zero phase lag). Third, observer windows at the same spatiotemporal level share information with each other through coherence (with non-zero phase lag). The theoretical framework of the NOW Model accounts for a wide range of subjective experiences and a novel approach for integrating prominent theories of consciousness.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10949963/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140177666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digital Being: social media and the predictive mind.","authors":"Ben White, Andy Clark, Mark Miller","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae008","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae008","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Social media is implicated today in an array of mental health concerns. While concerns around social media have become mainstream, little is known about the specific cognitive mechanisms underlying the correlations seen in these studies or why we find it so hard to stop engaging with these platforms when things obviously begin to deteriorate for us. New advances in computational neuroscience, however, are now poised to shed light on this matter. In this paper, we approach the phenomenon of social media addiction through the lens of the active inference framework. According to this framework, predictive agents like us use a 'generative model' of the world to predict our own incoming sense data and act to minimize any discrepancy between the prediction and incoming signal (prediction error). In order to live well and be able to act effectively to minimize prediction error, it is vital that agents like us have a generative model, which not only accurately reflects the regularities of our complex environment but is also flexible and dynamic and able to stay accurate in volatile and turbulent circumstances. In this paper, we propose that some social media platforms are a spectacularly effective way of warping an agent's generative model and of arresting the model's ability to flexibly track and adapt to changes in the environment. We go on to investigate cases of digital tech, which do not have these adverse effects and suggest-based on the active inference framework-some ways to understand why some forms of digital technology pose these risks, while others do not.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10949958/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140177665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Georg Schauer, Pablo Rodrigo Grassi, Alireza Gharabaghi, Andreas Bartels
{"title":"Parietal theta burst TMS does not modulate bistable perception.","authors":"Georg Schauer, Pablo Rodrigo Grassi, Alireza Gharabaghi, Andreas Bartels","doi":"10.1093/nc/niae009","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niae009","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The role of the parietal cortex in perceptual awareness and in resolving perceptual ambiguity is unsettled. Early influential transcranial magnetic stimulation studies have revealed differences in conscious perception following parietal stimulation, fuelling the notion that parietal cortex causally contributes to resolving perceptual ambiguity. However, central to this conclusion is the reliability of the method employed. Several prior studies have revealed opposing effects, such as shortening, lengthening, or no effect on multistable perceptual transitions following parietal stimulation. Here we addressed the reliability of continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) on parietal cortex on the perception of bistable stimuli. We conducted three cTBS experiments that were matched to prior experiments in terms of stimuli, stimulation protocol, and target site, and used a higher number of participants. None of our cTBS experiments replicated prior cTBS results. The only experiment using individual functional localizers led to weak effects, while the two others led to null results. Individual variability of motor cortex cTBS did not predict parietal cTBS effects. In view of recent reports of highly variable cTBS effects over motor cortex, our results suggest that cTBS is particularly unreliable in modulating bistable perception when applied over parietal cortex.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10972555/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140307800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}