Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献_第10页

What it is like to be a bit: an integrated information decomposition account of emergent mental phenomena. 它是什么样的：一个完整的信息分解的突发心理现象的描述。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-11-16 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab027

Andrea I Luppi, Pedro A M Mediano, Fernando E Rosas, David J Harrison, Robin L Carhart-Harris, Daniel Bor, Emmanuel A Stamatakis

{"title":"What it is like to be a bit: an integrated information decomposition account of emergent mental phenomena.","authors":"Andrea I Luppi, Pedro A M Mediano, Fernando E Rosas, David J Harrison, Robin L Carhart-Harris, Daniel Bor, Emmanuel A Stamatakis","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab027","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab027","url":null,"abstract":"A central question in neuroscience concerns the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrate. Here, we argue that a richer characterization of consciousness can be obtained by viewing it as constituted of distinct information-theoretic elements. In other words, we propose a shift from quantification of consciousness-viewed as integrated information-to its decomposition. Through this approach, termed Integrated Information Decomposition (ΦID), we lay out a formal argument that whether the consciousness of a given system is an emergent phenomenon depends on its information-theoretic composition-providing a principled answer to the long-standing dispute on the relationship between consciousness and emergence. Furthermore, we show that two organisms may attain the same amount of integrated information, yet differ in their information-theoretic composition. Building on ΦID's revised understanding of integrated information, termed ΦR, we also introduce the notion of ΦR-ing ratio to quantify how efficiently an entity uses information for conscious processing. A combination of ΦR and ΦR-ing ratio may provide an important way to compare the neural basis of different aspects of consciousness. Decomposition of consciousness enables us to identify qualitatively different 'modes of consciousness', establishing a common space for mapping the phenomenology of different conscious states. We outline both theoretical and empirical avenues to carry out such mapping between phenomenology and information-theoretic modes, starting from a central feature of everyday consciousness: selfhood. Overall, ΦID yields rich new ways to explore the relationship between information, consciousness, and its emergence from neural dynamics.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8600547/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39732928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

A robust confidence-accuracy dissociation via criterion attraction. 通过标准吸引力实现稳健的置信度-准确度分离。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-11-15 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab039

Dobromir Rahnev

{"title":"A robust confidence-accuracy dissociation via criterion attraction.","authors":"Dobromir Rahnev","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab039","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab039","url":null,"abstract":"Many studies have shown that confidence and accuracy can be dissociated in a variety of tasks. However, most of these dissociations involve small effect sizes, occur only in a subset of participants, and include a reaction time (RT) confound. Here, I develop a new method for inducing confidence-accuracy dissociations that overcomes these limitations. The method uses an external noise manipulation and relies on the phenomenon of criterion attraction where criteria for different tasks become attracted to each other. Subjects judged the identity of stimuli generated with either low or high external noise. The results showed that the two conditions were matched on accuracy and RT but produced a large difference in confidence (effect appeared for 25 of 26 participants, effect size: Cohen's d = 1.9). Computational modeling confirmed that these results are consistent with a mechanism of criterion attraction. These findings establish a new method for creating conditions with large differences in confidence without differences in accuracy or RT. Unlike many previous studies, however, the current method does not lead to differences in subjective experience and instead produces robust confidence-accuracy dissociations by exploiting limitations in post-perceptual, cognitive processes.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8599199/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39644108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

'Consciousnessoids': clues and insights from human cerebral organoids for the study of consciousness. “意识实体”:人类大脑类器官对意识研究的线索和见解。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-27 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab029

Andrea Lavazza

{"title":"'Consciousnessoids': clues and insights from human cerebral organoids for the study of consciousness.","authors":"Andrea Lavazza","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab029","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab029","url":null,"abstract":"Human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are an in vitro three-dimensional model of early neural development, aimed at modelling and understanding brain development and neurological disorders. In just a few years, there has been a rapid and considerable progress in the attempt to create a brain model capable of showcasing the structure and functions of the human brain. There are still strong limitations to address, including the absence of vascularization that makes it difficult to feed the central layers of organoids. Nevertheless, some important features of the nervous system have recently been observed: HCOs manifest electrical activity, are sensitive to light stimulation and are able to connect to a spinal cord by sending impulses that make a muscle contract. Recent data show that cortical organoid network development at 10 months resembles some preterm babies' electroencephalography (EEG) patterns. In the light of the fast pace of research in this field, one might consider the hypothesis that HCOs might become a living laboratory for studying the emergence of consciousness and investigating its mechanisms and neural correlates. HCOs could be also a benchmark for different neuroscientific theories of consciousness. In this paper, I propose some potential lines of research and offer some clues and insights so as to use HCOs in trying to unveil some puzzles concerning our conscious states. Finally, I consider some relevant ethical issues regarding this specific experimentation on HCOs and conclude that some of them could require strict regulation in this field.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8557395/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39689905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Metacognitive asymmetries in visual perception. 视觉感知中的元认知不对称。

IF 3.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-19 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab025

Matan Mazor, Rani Moran, Stephen M Fleming

{"title":"Metacognitive asymmetries in visual perception.","authors":"Matan Mazor, Rani Moran, Stephen M Fleming","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab025","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab025","url":null,"abstract":"Representing the absence of objects is psychologically demanding. People are slower, less confident and show lower metacognitive sensitivity (the alignment between subjective confidence and objective accuracy) when reporting the absence compared with presence of visual stimuli. However, what counts as a stimulus absence remains only loosely defined. In this Registered Report, we ask whether such processing asymmetries extend beyond the absence of whole objects to absences defined by stimulus features or expectation violations. Our pre-registered prediction was that differences in the processing of presence and absence reflect a default mode of reasoning: we assume an absence unless evidence is available to the contrary. We predicted asymmetries in response time, confidence, and metacognitive sensitivity in discriminating between stimulus categories that vary in the presence or absence of a distinguishing feature, or in their compliance with an expected default state. Using six pairs of stimuli in six experiments, we find evidence that the absence of local and global stimulus features gives rise to slower, less confident responses, similar to absences of entire stimuli. Contrary to our hypothesis, however, the presence or absence of a local feature has no effect on metacognitive sensitivity. Our results weigh against a proposal of a link between the detection metacognitive asymmetry and default reasoning, and are instead consistent with a low-level visual origin of metacognitive asymmetries for presence and absence.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8524176/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39541545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach. 从无意识的处理到有意识的事件：一种极简主义的方法。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-19 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab026

Asael Y Sklar, Rasha Kardosh, Ran R Hassin

{"title":"From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach.","authors":"Asael Y Sklar, Rasha Kardosh, Ran R Hassin","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab026","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab026","url":null,"abstract":"The minimalist approach that we develop here is a framework that allows to appreciate how non-conscious processing and conscious contents shape human cognition, broadly defined. It is composed of three simple principles. First, cognitive processes are inherently non-conscious, while their inputs and (interim) outputs may be consciously experienced. Second, non-conscious processes and elements of the cognitive architecture prioritize information for conscious experiences. Third, conscious events are composed of series of conscious contents and non-conscious processes, with increased duration leading to more opportunity for processing. The narrowness of conscious experiences is conceptualized here as a solution to the problem of channeling the plethora of non-conscious processes into action and communication processes that are largely serial. The framework highlights the importance of prioritization for consciousness, and we provide an illustrative review of three main factors that shape prioritization-stimulus strength, motivational relevance and mental accessibility. We further discuss when and how this framework (i) is compatible with previous theories, (ii) enables new understandings of established findings and models, and (iii) generates new predictions and understandings.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/3d/78/niab026.PMC8524171.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39541549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Comparing stimulus-evoked and spontaneous response of the face-selective multi-units in the human posterior fusiform gyrus. 比较人后梭状回面部选择多单元的刺激诱发和自发反应。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-16 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab033

Rina Schwartz, Camille Rozier, Tal Seidel Malkinson, Katia Lehongre, Claude Adam, Virginie Lambrecq, Vincent Navarro, Lionel Naccache, Vadim Axelrod

{"title":"Comparing stimulus-evoked and spontaneous response of the face-selective multi-units in the human posterior fusiform gyrus.","authors":"Rina Schwartz, Camille Rozier, Tal Seidel Malkinson, Katia Lehongre, Claude Adam, Virginie Lambrecq, Vincent Navarro, Lionel Naccache, Vadim Axelrod","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab033","url":null,"abstract":"The stimulus-evoked neural response is a widely explored phenomenon. Conscious awareness is associated in many cases with the corresponding selective stimulus-evoked response. For example, conscious awareness of a face stimulus is associated with or accompanied by stimulus-evoked activity in the fusiform face area (FFA). In addition to the stimulus-evoked response, spontaneous (i.e. task-unrelated) activity in the brain is also abundant. Notably, spontaneous activity is considered unconscious. For example, spontaneous activity in the FFA is not associated with conscious awareness of a face. The question is: what is the difference at the neural level between stimulus-evoked activity in a case that this activity is associated with conscious awareness of some content (e.g. activity in the FFA in response to fully visible face stimuli) and spontaneous activity in that same region of the brain? To answer this question, in the present study, we had a rare opportunity to record two face-selective multi-units in the vicinity of the FFA in a human patient. We compared multi-unit face-selective task-evoked activity with spontaneous prestimulus and a resting-state activity. We found that when activity was examined over relatively long temporal windows (e.g. 100-200 ms), face-selective stimulus-evoked firing in the recorded multi-units was much higher than the spontaneous activity. In contrast, when activity was examined over relatively short windows, we found many cases of high firing rates within the spontaneous activity that were comparable to stimulus-evoked activity. Our results thus indicate that the sustained activity is what might differentiate between stimulus-evoked activity that is associated with conscious awareness and spontaneous activity.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8520048/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39532551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity. 意识和错位的客观性的谬误。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-15 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab032

Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan P Lang, Andrew M Haun, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, Giulio Tononi

{"title":"Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity.","authors":"Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan P Lang, Andrew M Haun, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, Giulio Tononi","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab032","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab032","url":null,"abstract":"Objective correlates-behavioral, functional, and neural-provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the 'fallacy of misplaced objectivity': the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically-its subjective properties-not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8519344/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39532550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 22

A relational approach to consciousness: categories of level and contents of consciousness. 意识的关系方法:意识的层次和内容的范畴。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-15 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab034

Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Hayato Saigo

引用次数: 12

Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model. 意识的贝叶斯理论：寻找最小统一模型的综述。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-13 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab038

Wiktor Rorot

引用次数: 2

Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception? 顶端放大——意识知觉的细胞机制?

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-13 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab036

Tomáš Marvan, Michal Polák, Talis Bachmann, William A Phillips

{"title":"Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?","authors":"Tomáš Marvan, Michal Polák, Talis Bachmann, William A Phillips","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab036","url":null,"abstract":"We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8511476/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39519112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9