Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献_第10页

Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity. 意识和错位的客观性的谬误。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-15 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab032

Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan P Lang, Andrew M Haun, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, Giulio Tononi

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引用次数: 22

A relational approach to consciousness: categories of level and contents of consciousness. 意识的关系方法:意识的层次和内容的范畴。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-15 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab034

Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Hayato Saigo

引用次数: 12

Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model. 意识的贝叶斯理论：寻找最小统一模型的综述。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-13 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab038

Wiktor Rorot

引用次数: 2

Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception? 顶端放大——意识知觉的细胞机制?

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-13 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab036

Tomáš Marvan, Michal Polák, Talis Bachmann, William A Phillips

{"title":"Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?","authors":"Tomáš Marvan, Michal Polák, Talis Bachmann, William A Phillips","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab036","url":null,"abstract":"We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2021 2","pages":"niab036"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8511476/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39519112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness or consciousness as such. 非言语意识或意识的内隐-外显梯度。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-08 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab031

Zoran Josipovic

{"title":"Implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness or consciousness as such.","authors":"Zoran Josipovic","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab031","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab031","url":null,"abstract":"Consciousness is multi-dimensional but is most often portrayed with a two-dimensional (2D) map that has global levels or states on one axis and phenomenal contents on the other. On this map, awareness is conflated either with general alertness or with phenomenal content. This contributes to ongoing difficulties in the scientific understanding of consciousness. Previously, I have proposed that consciousness as such or nondual awareness-a basic non-conceptual, non-propositional awareness in itself free of subject-object fragmentation-is a unique kind that cannot be adequately specified by this 2D map of states and contents. Here, I propose an implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness to be added as the z-axis to the existing 2D map of consciousness. This gradient informs about the degree to which nondual awareness is manifest in any experience, independent of the specifics of global state or local content. Alternatively, within the multi-dimensional state space model of consciousness, nondual awareness can be specified by several vectors, each representing one of its properties. In the first part, I outline nondual awareness or consciousness as such in terms of its phenomenal description, its function and its neural correlates. In the second part, I explore the implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness and how including it as an additional axis clarifies certain features of everyday dualistic experiences and is especially relevant for understanding the unitary and nondual experiences accessed via different contemplative methods, mind-altering substances or spontaneously.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2021 2","pages":"niab031"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8500298/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39515730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Neuroscience of the yogic theory of consciousness. 意识瑜伽理论的神经科学。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-07 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab030

Vaibhav Tripathi, Pallavi Bharadwaj

{"title":"Neuroscience of the yogic theory of consciousness.","authors":"Vaibhav Tripathi, Pallavi Bharadwaj","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab030","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab030","url":null,"abstract":"Yoga as a practice and philosophy of life has been followed for more than 4500 years with known evidence of yogic practices in the Indus Valley Civilization. The last few decades have seen a resurgence in the utility of yoga and meditation as a practice with growing scientific evidence behind it. Significant scientific literature has been published, illustrating the benefits of yogic practices including 'asana', 'pranayama' and 'dhyana' on mental and physical well-being. Electrophysiological and recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have found explicit neural signatures for yogic practices. In this article, we present a review of the philosophy of yoga, based on the dualistic 'Sankhya' school, as applied to consciousness summarized by Patanjali in his yoga sutras followed by a discussion on the five 'vritti' (modulations of mind), the practice of 'pratyahara', 'dharana', 'dhyana', different states of 'samadhi', and 'samapatti'. We formulate the yogic theory of consciousness (YTC), a cohesive theory that can model both external modulations and internal states of the mind. We propose that attention, sleep and mind wandering should be understood as unique modulatory states of the mind. YTC allows us to model the external states, internal states of meditation, 'samadhi' and even the disorders of consciousness. Furthermore, we list some testable neuroscientific hypotheses that could be answered using YTC and analyse the benefits, outcomes and possible limitations.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2021 2","pages":"niab030"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/d8/03/niab030.PMC8675243.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39739491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Of maps and grids. 地图和网格。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-09-21 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab022

Matteo Grasso, Andrew M Haun, Giulio Tononi

{"title":"Of maps and grids.","authors":"Matteo Grasso, Andrew M Haun, Giulio Tononi","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab022","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab022","url":null,"abstract":"Neuroscience has made remarkable advances in accounting for how the brain performs its various functions. Consciousness, too, is usually approached in functional terms: the goal is to understand how the brain represents information, accesses that information, and acts on it. While useful for prediction, this functional, information-processing approach leaves out the subjective structure of experience: it does not account for how experience feels. Here, we consider a simple model of how a \"grid-like\" network meant to resemble posterior cortical areas can represent spatial information and act on it to perform a simple \"fixation\" function. Using standard neuroscience tools, we show how the model represents topographically the retinal position of a stimulus and triggers eye muscles to fixate or follow it. Encoding, decoding, and tuning functions of model units illustrate the working of the model in a way that fully explains what the model does. However, these functional properties have nothing to say about the fact that a human fixating a stimulus would also \"see\" it-experience it at a location in space. Using the tools of Integrated Information Theory, we then show how the subjective properties of experienced space-its extendedness-can be accounted for in objective, neuroscientific terms by the \"cause-effect structure\" specified by the grid-like cortical area. By contrast, a \"map-like\" network without lateral connections, meant to resemble a pretectal circuit, is functionally equivalent to the grid-like system with respect to representation, action, and fixation but cannot account for the phenomenal properties of space.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2021 2","pages":"niab022"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8452603/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39444071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Publisher’s note to: towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference 出版商的注释:对心理行为的计算现象学:建模元意识和注意控制与深度参数主动推理

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-09-16 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab035

L. Sandved-Smith, C. Hesp, J. Mattout, K. Friston, A. Lutz, M. Ramstead

{"title":"Publisher’s note to: towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference","authors":"L. Sandved-Smith, C. Hesp, J. Mattout, K. Friston, A. Lutz, M. Ramstead","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab035","url":null,"abstract":"Meta-awareness refers to the capacity to explicitly notice the current content of consciousness and has been identified as a key component for the successful control of cognitive states, such as the deliberate direction of attention. This paper proposes a formal model of meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference. To do so, we cast mental action as policy selection over higher-level cognitive states and add a further hierarchical level to model meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence (precision) in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. We simulate the example of mind-wandering and its regulation during a task involving sustained selective attention on a perceptual object. This provides a computational case study for an inferential architecture that is apt to enable the emergence of these central components of human phenomenology, namely, the ability to access and control cognitive states. We propose that this approach can be generalized to other cognitive states, and hence, this paper provides the first steps towards the development of a computational phenomenology of mental action and more broadly of our ability to monitor and control our own cognitive states. Future steps of this work will focus on fitting the model with qualitative, behavioural, and neural data.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41824652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

V1 as an egocentric cognitive map. 作为以自我为中心的认知地图的 V1

IF 3.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-09-14 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab017

Paul Linton

引用次数: 0

Local neuronal relational structures underlying the contents of human conscious experience. 人类意识体验内容背后的局部神经元关系结构。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-09-03 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab028

Rafael Malach

{"title":"Local neuronal relational structures underlying the contents of human conscious experience.","authors":"Rafael Malach","doi":"10.1093/nc/niab028","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niab028","url":null,"abstract":"While most theories of consciousness posit some kind of dependence on global network activities, I consider here an alternative, localist perspective-in which localized cortical regions each underlie the emergence of a unique category of conscious experience. Under this perspective, the large-scale activation often found in the cortex is a consequence of the complexity of typical conscious experiences rather than an obligatory condition for the emergence of conscious awareness-which can flexibly shift, depending on the richness of its contents, from local to more global activation patterns. This perspective fits a massive body of human imaging, recordings, lesions and stimulation data but opens a fundamental problem: how can the information, defining each content, be derived locally in each cortical region. Here, I will discuss a solution echoing pioneering structuralist ideas in which the content of a conscious experience is defined by its relationship to all other contents within an experiential category. In neuronal terms, this relationship structure between contents is embodied by the local geometry of similarity distances between cortical activation patterns generated during each conscious experience, likely mediated via networks of local neuronal connections. Thus, in order for any conscious experience to appear in an individual's mind, two central conditions must be met. First, a specific configural pattern (\"bar-code\") of neuronal activity must appear within a local relational geometry, i.e. a cortical area. Second, the individual neurons underlying the activated pattern must be bound into a unified functional ensemble through a burst of recurrent neuronal firing: local \"ignitions\".","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2021 2","pages":"niab028"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/a6/71/niab028.PMC8415036.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39409268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0