Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献_第9页

On the non-uniqueness problem in integrated information theory. 集成信息论中的非唯一性问题。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad014

Jake R Hanson, Sara I Walker

引用次数: 0

Toward the unknown: consciousness and pain. 走向未知:意识和痛苦。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad002

Richard Ambron

{"title":"Toward the unknown: consciousness and pain.","authors":"Richard Ambron","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad002","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of consciousness are hindered by the complexity of the brain, but it is possible to study the consciousness of a sensation, namely pain. Three systems are necessary to experience pain: the somatosensory system conveys information about an injury to the thalamus where an awareness of the injury but not the painfulness emerges. The thalamus distributes the information to the affective system, which modulates the intensity of the pain, and to the cognitive system that imparts attention to the pain. Imaging of patients in pain and those experiencing placebo and hypnosis-induced analgesia shows that two essential cortical circuits for pain and attention are located within the anterior cingulate cortex. The circuits are activated when a high-frequency input results in the development of a long-term potentiation (LTP) at synapses on the apical dendrites of pyramidal neurons. The LTP acts via α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid (AMPA) and N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors, and an anterior cingulate cortex-specific type-1 adenylate cyclase is necessary for both the LTP and the pain. The apical dendrites form an extensive network such that the input from serious injuries results in the emergence of a local field potential. Using mouse models, I propose experiments designed to test the hypothesis that the local field potential is necessary and sufficient for the consciousness of pain.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad002"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/9d/37/niad002.PMC9940454.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10754185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Nonlinear brain correlates of trait self-boundarylessness. 自我边界无特征的非线性脑相关性。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad006

Lena Lindström, Philippe Goldin, Johan Mårtensson, Etzel Cardeña

{"title":"Nonlinear brain correlates of trait self-boundarylessness.","authors":"Lena Lindström, Philippe Goldin, Johan Mårtensson, Etzel Cardeña","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad006","url":null,"abstract":"Alterations of the sense of self induced by meditation include an increased sense of boundarylessness. In this study, we investigated behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging correlates of trait self-boundarylessness during resting state and the performance of two experimental tasks. We found that boundarylessness correlated with greater self-endorsement of words related to fluidity and with longer response times in a math task. Boundarylessness also correlated negatively with brain activity in the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus during mind-wandering compared to a task targeting a minimal sense of self. Interestingly, boundarylessness showed quadratic relations to several measures. Participants reporting low or high boundarylessness, as compared to those in between, showed higher functional connectivity within the default mode network during rest, less brain activity in the medial prefrontal cortex during self-referential word processing, and less self-endorsement of words related to constancy. We relate these results to our previous findings of a quadratic relation between boundarylessness and the sense of perspectival ownership of experience. Additionally, an instruction to direct attention to the centre of experience elicited brain activation similar to that of meditation onset, including increases in anterior precentral gyrus and anterior insula and decreases in default mode network areas, for both non-meditators and experienced meditators.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad006"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/8d/55/niad006.PMC10129386.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9364294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Feeling ready: neural bases of prospective motor readiness judgements. 感觉准备:前瞻性运动准备判断的神经基础。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad003

Elisabeth Parés-Pujolràs, Karla Matić, Patrick Haggard

引用次数: 2

Investigating the shift between externally and internally oriented cognition: a novel task-switching paradigm. 研究外部导向认知和内部导向认知之间的转变:一种新的任务转换范式。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2022-11-19 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac016

Sara Calzolari, Svetla Boneva, Davinia Fernández-Espejo

{"title":"Investigating the shift between externally and internally oriented cognition: a novel task-switching paradigm.","authors":"Sara Calzolari, Svetla Boneva, Davinia Fernández-Espejo","doi":"10.1093/nc/niac016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niac016","url":null,"abstract":"Despite our constant need to flexibly balance internal and external information, research on cognitive flexibility has focused solely on shifts between externally oriented tasks. In contrast, switches across internally oriented processes (and self-referential cognition specifically) and between internal and external domains have never been investigated. Here, we report a novel task-switching paradigm developed to explore the behavioural signatures associated with cognitive flexibility when self-referential processes, as well as more traditional external processes, are involved. Two hundred healthy volunteers completed an online task. In each trial, participants performed one of four possible tasks on written words, as instructed by a pre-stimulus cue. These included two externally and two internally oriented tasks: assessing whether the third letter was a consonant or the penultimate letter was a vowel versus assessing whether the adjective applied to their personality or if it described a bodily sensation they were currently experiencing. In total, 40% of trials involved switches to another task, and these were equally distributed across within-external, within-internal, internal-to-external and external-to-internal switches. We found higher response times for switches compared to repetitions both in the external and internal domains, thus demonstrating the presence of switch costs in self-referential tasks for the first time. We also found higher response times for between-domain switches compared to switches within each domain. We propose that these effects originate from the goal-directed engagement of different domain-specific cognitive systems that flexibly communicate and share domain-general control features.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":" ","pages":"niac016"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9675616/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40506857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Confidence at the limits of human nested cognition. 人类嵌套认知极限下的信心。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2022-10-15 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac014

Samuel Recht, Ljubica Jovanovic, Pascal Mamassian, Tarryn Balsdon

{"title":"Confidence at the limits of human nested cognition.","authors":"Samuel Recht, Ljubica Jovanovic, Pascal Mamassian, Tarryn Balsdon","doi":"10.1093/nc/niac014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niac014","url":null,"abstract":"Metacognition is the ability to weigh the quality of our own cognition, such as the confidence that our perceptual decisions are correct. Here we ask whether metacognitive performance can itself be evaluated or else metacognition is the ultimate reflective human faculty. Building upon a classic visual perception task, we show that human observers are able to produce nested, above-chance judgements on the quality of their decisions at least up to the fourth order (i.e. meta-meta-meta-cognition). A computational model can account for this nested cognitive ability if evidence has a high-resolution representation, and if there are two kinds of noise, including recursive evidence degradation. The existence of fourth-order sensitivity suggests that the neural mechanisms responsible for second-order metacognition can be flexibly generalized to evaluate any cognitive process, including metacognitive evaluations themselves. We define the theoretical and practical limits of nested cognition and discuss how this approach paves the way for a better understanding of human self-regulation.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":" ","pages":"niac014"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/8f/f0/niac014.PMC9574785.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40576898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Does integrated information theory make testable predictions about the role of silent neurons in consciousness? 综合信息理论能否对沉默神经元在意识中的作用做出可检验的预测?

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2022-10-15 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac015

Gary Bartlett

{"title":"Does integrated information theory make testable predictions about the role of silent neurons in consciousness?","authors":"Gary Bartlett","doi":"10.1093/nc/niac015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niac015","url":null,"abstract":"Tononi et al. claim that their integrated information theory of consciousness makes testable predictions. This article discusses two of the more startling predictions, which follow from the theory's claim that conscious experiences are generated by inactive as well as active neurons. The first prediction is that a subject's conscious experience at a time can be affected by the disabling of neurons that were already inactive at that time. The second is that even if a subject's entire brain is \"silent,\" meaning that all of its neurons are inactive (but not disabled), the subject can still have a conscious experience. A few authors have noted the implausibility of these predictions-which I call the disabling prediction and the silent brain prediction-but none have considered whether they are testable. In this article, I argue that they are not. In order to make this case, I first try to clarify the distinction between active, inactive (i.e. silent), and inactivated (i.e. disabled) neurons. With this clarification in place, I show that, even putting aside practical difficulties, it is impossible to set up a valid test of either the disabling prediction or the silent brain prediction. The conditions of the tests themselves are conditions under which a response from the subject could not reasonably be interpreted as evidence of consciousness or change in consciousness.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":" ","pages":"niac015"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/28/d3/niac015.PMC9574698.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40576899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Neurophenomenal structuralism. A philosophical agenda for a structuralist neuroscience of consciousness. Neurophenomenal结构主义。结构主义意识神经科学的哲学议程。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2022-08-23 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac012

Holger Lyre

{"title":"Neurophenomenal structuralism. A philosophical agenda for a structuralist neuroscience of consciousness.","authors":"Holger Lyre","doi":"10.1093/nc/niac012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niac012","url":null,"abstract":"The program of \"neurophenomenal structuralism\" is presented as an agenda for a genuine structuralist neuroscience of consciousness that seeks to understand specific phenomenal experiences as strictly relational affairs. The paper covers a broad range of topics. It starts from considerations about neural change detection and relational coding that motivate a solution of the Newman problem of the brain in terms of spatiotemporal relations. Next, phenomenal quality spaces and their Q-structures are discussed. Neurophenomenal structuralism proclaims a homomorphic mapping of the structures of self-organized neural maps in the brain onto Q-structures, and it will be demonstrated how this leads to a new and special version of structural representationalism about phenomenal content. A methodological implication of neurophenomenal structuralism is that it proposes measurement procedures that focus on the relationships between different stimuli (as, for instance, similarity ratings or representational geometry methods). Finally, it will be shown that neurophenomenal structuralism also has strong philosophical implications, as it leads to holism about phenomenal experiences and serves to reject inverted qualia scenarios.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":" ","pages":"niac012"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/ed/8d/niac012.PMC9396309.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40637241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

The positive evidence bias in perceptual confidence is unlikely post-decisional. 知觉信心中的正证据偏差不太可能在决策后发生。

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2022-07-26 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac010

Jason Samaha, Rachel Denison

{"title":"The positive evidence bias in perceptual confidence is unlikely post-decisional.","authors":"Jason Samaha, Rachel Denison","doi":"10.1093/nc/niac010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niac010","url":null,"abstract":"Confidence in a perceptual decision is a subjective estimate of the accuracy of one's choice. As such, confidence is thought to be an important computation for a variety of cognitive and perceptual processes, and it features heavily in theorizing about conscious access to perceptual states. Recent experiments have revealed a \"positive evidence bias\" (PEB) in the computations underlying confidence reports. A PEB occurs when confidence, unlike objective choice, overweights the evidence for the correct (or chosen) option, relative to evidence against the correct (or chosen) option. Accordingly, in a perceptual task, appropriate stimulus conditions can be arranged that produce selective changes in confidence reports but no changes in accuracy. Although the PEB is generally assumed to reflect the observer's perceptual and/or decision processes, post-decisional accounts have not been ruled out. We therefore asked whether the PEB persisted under novel conditions that addressed two possible post-decisional accounts: (i) post-decision evidence accumulation that contributes to a confidence report solicited after the perceptual choice and (ii) a memory bias that emerges in the delay between the stimulus offset and the confidence report. We found that even when the stimulus remained on the screen until observers responded, and when observers reported their choice and confidence simultaneously, the PEB still emerged. Signal detection-based modeling showed that the PEB was not associated with changes to metacognitive efficiency, but rather to confidence criteria. The data show that memory biases cannot explain the PEB and provide evidence against a post-decision evidence accumulation account, bolstering the idea that the PEB is perceptual or decisional in nature.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":" ","pages":"niac010"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/75/06/niac010.PMC9316228.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40557686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Consciousness explained or described? 解释意识还是描述意识?

IF 4.1

Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2022-01-21 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac001

Aaron Schurger, Michael Graziano

{"title":"Consciousness explained or described?","authors":"Aaron Schurger, Michael Graziano","doi":"10.1093/nc/niac001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niac001","url":null,"abstract":"Consciousness is an unusual phenomenon to study scientifically. It is defined as a subjective, first-person phenomenon, and science is an objective, third-person endeavor. This misalignment between the means-science-and the end-explaining consciousness-gave rise to what has become a productive workaround: the search for 'neural correlates of consciousness' (NCCs). Science can sidestep trying to explain consciousness and instead focus on characterizing the kind(s) of neural activity that are reliably correlated with consciousness. However, while we have learned a lot about consciousness in the bargain, the NCC approach was not originally intended as the foundation for a true explanation of consciousness. Indeed, it was proposed precisely to sidestep the, arguably futile, attempt to find one. So how can an account, couched in terms of neural correlates, do the work that a theory is supposed to do: explain consciousness? The answer is that it cannot, and in fact most modern accounts of consciousness do not pretend to. Thus, here, we challenge whether or not any modern accounts of consciousness are in fact theories at all. Instead we argue that they are (competing) laws of consciousness. They describe what they cannot explain, just as Newton described gravity long before a true explanation was ever offered. We lay out our argument using a variety of modern accounts as examples and go on to argue that at least one modern account of consciousness, attention schema theory, goes beyond describing consciousness-related brain activity and qualifies as an explanatory theory.","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2022 2","pages":"niac001"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/dc/02/niac001.PMC8824704.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39613425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6