European Competition Journal最新文献

{"title":"It ain’t over until it’s over – when do infringements of EU competition law end?","authors":"Jussi Koivusalo","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2280324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2280324","url":null,"abstract":"The duration of infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU has significant implications on the enforcement of those rules and those subject to enforcement. This article examines the European Court of Justice’s case law on the assessment of the duration of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU after the conduct constituting the infringement has ended. While earlier case law focused on continuing market conduct corresponding to the original infringing conduct, more recent case law appears to bring forth an approach centred on the restriction of competition resulting from the conduct. The judgment in Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto suggests that a complete assessment of an infringement’s duration should consider the scrutinized conduct’s restrictive effects on the competition that it distorts. That judgment also suggests that any price effects or other damages suffered by the infringers’ customers do not affect the infringement period’s length.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"15 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"FRAND determination under the European SEP Regulation Proposal: discarding the <i>Huawei</i> framework?","authors":"Giuseppe Colangelo","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2280333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2280333","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAs part of the recent proposal for a regulation that would overhaul the entire standard essential patents licensing system (SEP Proposal), the European Commission has envisaged a pre-trial mandatory FRAND determination by a conciliator. The paper investigates the relationship between the FRAND determination process under such a proposal and the test developed by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE, which represents the current guiding framework for SEP licensing negotiations in the EU. The paper aims at demonstrating that even, if the SEP Proposal were not to displace Huawei, it endorses an anti-injunction approach which is inconsistent with the CJEU’s stance and is essentially triggered by the German case law.KEYWORDS: Standard essential patentsFRAND determinationcompetition lawinjunctionswilling licensee testconciliation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Standard Essential Patents and Amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, COM(2023)232.2 ibid Recital 2.3 See Group of Experts on Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patents, ‘Contribution to the Debate on SEPs’ [2021] <https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/45217> (all websites last visited on 4 November 2023); European Commission, ‘Making the most of the EU’s innovative potential. An intellectual property action plan to support the EU’s recovery and resilience’, COM(2020) 760 final; European Commission, ‘Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents’, COM(2017) 712 final; European Commission, ‘ICT Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market’, COM(2016) 176 final.4 European Commission, ‘Intellectual property – new framework for standard-essential patents’ [2022] Call for evidence for an impact assessment, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13109-Intellectual-property-new-framework-for-standard-essential-patents_en>.5 ibid.6 See, e.g. Centre for a Digital Society of the European University Institute, ‘Feedback to EU Commission’s public consultation’ [2023] <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13109-Intellectual-property-new-framework-for-standard-essential-patents/F3432699_en>; Christine A Varney and others, ‘Comments on European Commission’s Draft “Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for Transparent Licensing of Standard Essential Patents”’ [2023] <https://ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Comments-on-European-Commission-Draft-SEP-Regulation-by-Former-US-Officials-1.pdf>; Robin Jacob and Igor Nikolic, ‘ICLE Feedback to EU Commission’s public consultation’ [2023] <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13109-Intellectual-property-new-framework-for-standard-essential-patents/F3433917_en>.7 European Commission, ‘Imp","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"84 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Full compensation and the volume effect: assessing different policy options","authors":"Franziska Weber, Peter van Wijck","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2280331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2280331","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Damages Directive victims of infringements of competition law are entitled to full compensation. To achieve this goal overcharges, passing-on, and volume effects should play a role in the calculation of damages (for any purchaser who is not yet the final consumer). Whereas the Damages Directive promotes the passing-on defence for the defendants, it does not regulate volume effects in depth. The computation of these effects requires information on counterfactual prices and quantities. Since this information cannot be observed, the size of the volume effect tends to be uncertain. This paper discusses policy-options that aspire to bring compensation closer to full compensation, given uncertainty about the size of the volume effect. Based on the maximin-principle, a principle for decision-making under uncertainty, not allowing a passing-on defence appears to be an attractive option since this may lead to the minimization of the maximum gap between actual and full compensation.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"16 16","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Upstream market regulation between competitive tension and technological innovation","authors":"Francesca Niola","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2280323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2280323","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe document examines challenges and innovations in telecommunications law, focusing on the European context. It highlights the importance of asymmetric regulation and ex ante identification of enterprises with substantial market power. The 2018 European Electronic Communications Code introduces pivotal changes, including co-investment agreements (Art. 76), aiming to foster cost and risk sharing among operators, benefiting smaller enterprises. Such agreements respond to the need for sustainable competition. Art. 72 introduces a new obligation: access to civil engineering infrastructures. This obligation can extend beyond the traditional market if necessary and proportionate to achieve competition and unhindered access objectives. The document emphasizes the regulations' efforts to balance the interests of economic operators and consumers, promoting competition and innovation in the telecommunications sector.KEYWORDS: Electronic communicationdigital single marketcompetition lawnet neutralitynew remedies Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 O. Pollicino, Codes of conduct between self-regulation and hard law: is there really a third way for digital regulation? The case of the European strategy against online disinformation in Riv. Trim. dir. pubb., no. 4/2022.2 This procedure was originally provided for in Article 15(1) of Directive No. 2002/21/EC (the so-called Framework Directive), under which the Commission is required to periodically review the list of these markets with a view to updating its Recommendation on the subject. To date, there are three Recommendations: the first, No. 2003/311/EC, identified eighteen markets as susceptible to ex ante regulation divided into two macro-areas (retail services and wholesale services); subsequently, Recommendation 2007/879/EC reduced the number of relevant markets to only seven, maintaining the typological division of the previous identification. Specifically, the retail services included the markets for access services on fixed networks (both local networks and new generation networks); the wholesale services included the markets for interconnection services on fixed networks and mobile networks: call origination, termination and local transit services; termination services on mobile networks and services for the provision of terminating segments of leased lines On 8 January 2013, the Commission concluded a new process of revision of the list, which led to the issue of Recommendation no. 2014/710/EU, the third and final one, which further decreased the number of regulated markets, while redefining some markets to take into account industry and technological developments. In doing so, it identified only four relevant markets: ‘Market 1: Wholesale provision of the call termination service on individual public telephone networks at a fixed location; Market 2: Wholesale provision of the voice call termination service on individual mobile networks;","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"61 3‐4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135390389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When should EU merger assessment address privacy? The conditions for addressing privacy issues under the EU merger control regulation","authors":"Lilian Klein","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2280330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2280330","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe advent of digital companies has brought benefits to society. Nevertheless, the digital era poses significant risks to consumers’ privacy. The combination, through mergers, of enormous datasets could raise further privacy concerns. It has been much discussed whether and how consumer privacy concerns should be introduced within merger assessment. This paper approaches this issue from another perspective and reflects upon the circumstances under which the EU Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) has a role to address privacy issues. Accordingly, this paper clarifies the conditions that must be satisfied in order for privacy issues to fall within the EUMR’s ambit. First, privacy should be a parameter of competition on the market and second, there must be a causal link between the merger and privacy deterioration. Following this, the paper turns to critically analyse the Commission’s treatment of privacy issues in objectively selected mergers involving some of the most powerful digital companies.KEYWORDS: EU merger controlprivacydata protectioncausal linkdigital marketsGAMAM AcknowledgementsI would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Michael Harker and Dr Elias Deutscher for their invaluable and insightful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 [12].2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ 364/3 of 18 December 2000, Articles 7&8.3 Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECHR’ [2013] International Data Privacy Law 222, 223.4 Autorité de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, ‘Competition Law and Data’ [2016]. <http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf> at page 5.5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1 (GDPR).6 Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law (3rd edn, OUP 2016) 5–11 & 51–54.7 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University Press 2010) 19.8 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ Report on the CMA’s call for information CMA38 June 2015. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf> at page 5; Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 55.9 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ (n 8) para 3.56; OECD, ‘Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-being: Interim Synthesis Report’ [2014]. <https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/data-driven-innovation-interim-synt","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"16 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Closing the tech acquisitions enforcement gap: from article 22 to article 102","authors":"Alessia Sophia D’Amico","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2270744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2270744","url":null,"abstract":"Platform power poses a number of challenges for competition authorities. One concern is that big tech companies may harm competition through the acquisition of emerging companies with a high competitive potential. Such acquisitions may escape ex ante merger control if they do not reach the turnover threshold for mandatory notification. The Commission sought to bridge this enforcement gap with its Article 22 guidance and the Digital Markets Act. This paper evaluates the steps taken by the Commission to increase scrutiny of such mergers. Building on this discussion, the paper examines the AG opinion in Towercast and analyses the residual gap-closing function of Article 102 TFEU. The aim of this paper is to bring the new developments surrounding digital merger control together and assess whether they represent an adequate response to the challenges posed by the digital economy.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Antitrust liability, corporate groups and M&amp;A transactions: a tale of undertakings, economic continuity and effectiveness of EU competition law","authors":"Patrick Actis Perinetto, Giacomo Grechi","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2263262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2263262","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWho should be liable for competition law infringements? While the answer should be, in theory, a simple application of the personal liability principle – the infringer pays – the corporate changes that an infringer may undergo in the years necessary to come to an imputation of the infringement make the matter, in practice, significantly more complex. In this article, we first investigate the core of the antitrust liability theories, all to be traced back to the fundamental concept of undertaking, which constitutes their indispensable theoretical background. Then, we will try to provide an answer to the question, by analyzing, on the basis of the case-law, the multifaceted and colourful applications of antitrust liability theories to M&A transactions involving antitrust infringers. Lastly, we lay out practical suggestions which may be useful for companies to minimize the risks of being left with antitrust liability as a result of corporate transactions.KEYWORDS: Antitrust liabilityundertakingSumalSkanskaeconomic continuity Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 P Whelan, ‘Private Enforcement and the Imputation of Antitrust Liability’ in B Rodger, F Marcos and M Sousa Ferro (eds), Research Handbook on Competition Law Private Enforcement in the EU (Elgar Publishing) 159–80, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4080911> 159 and 175. See also C Reichow, ‘The Court of Justice’s Sumal Judgment: Civil Liability of a Subsidiary for its Parent’s Infringement of EU Competition Law’ (2021) 6(3) European Papers 1327.2 Judgment of the Court of First instance of 30 September 2009, case T-161/05, Hoechst v. Commission, EU:T:2009:366, §58.3 Opinion of A.G. Kokott of 29 November 2012, case C-440/11 P, Commission v. Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje, EU:C:2012:76, §32.4 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 October 2021, case C-882/19, Sumal v. Mercedes Benz Trucks España (Sumal), EU:C:2021:800, §43.5 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2017, case C-625/13P, Villeroy & Boch AG v. Commission, EU:C:2017:52, §154.6 Sumal, cit., §39 and judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 March 2019, case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy and others (Skanska), EU:C:2019:204, §32.7 Sumal, cit., §42.8 Opinion of A.G. Wahl of 6 February 2019, Skanska, EU:C:2019:100, §66.9 Sumal, cit., §38.10 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU refer to undertakings as subjects which can infringe competition law, Articles 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 and 2(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU mention the undertaking as the subject on which fines should be imposed and damages should be claimed in connection with a competition law infringement.11 Whelan, cit., 160.12 S Thomas, ‘Guilty of a Fault that one has not Committed. The Limits of the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried out by the Commission and the European Courts in EU-Antitrust Law’ (2012) 3(1) JECLAP 33.13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 April 20","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135424964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Apple’s antitrust paradox","authors":"Manuel Wörsdörfer","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2262870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2262870","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper builds on Khan’s work on Amazon by transferring her normative framework to Apple. It explores the company’s anti-competitive business practices, main antitrust concerns, and the currently proposed reform measures from an innovative business ethics and law (i.e., ordoliberal) perspective. The paper argues that one of the key issues with Apple is the company’s closed ecosystem combined with its role as an internet gatekeeper. The E.U.’s Digital Markets Act, which aims to open Apple’s ecosystem – via data portability, interoperability, and multi-homing requirements – is a necessary step in the right direction. Yet, it is insufficient to prevent the lock-in effects of a ‘walled product garden’ and ensure complete device and platform neutrality. That is, additional steps must be taken to overcome Apple’s dual role as a platform operator and service provider and inhibit the company from engaging in anti-competitive business conduct.KEYWORDS: Apple Incantitrustcompetition law and policyDigital Markets Actordoliberalism Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See L. Khan, ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’ (2017) 126 Yale Law Journal 710.2 See L. Khan (n 1): “In addition to being a retailer, Amazon is a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of [TV] and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading provider of cloud server space and computing power” (p. 754).3 See for more information on Apple’s App Store as an essential facility: B. Kotapati, S. Mutungi, M. Newham, J. Schroeder, S. Shao, & M. Wang, ‘The Antitrust Case Against Apple’ (2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606073 (accessed: July 11, 2023).4 See B. Baer, J. Baker, M. Kades, F. Scott Morton, N. Rose, C. Shapiro, & T. Wu, ‘Restoring Competition in the United States’ (2020) https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/ (accessed: July 11, 2023), J. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm (Harvard University Press 2019), R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (Free Press 1978/1993), R. Bork & W. Bowman, ‘The Crisis in Antitrust’ (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 363, H. Hovenkamp, ‘Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?’ (2019) 94 Notre Dame Law Review 583, H. Hovenkamp, ‘The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics’ (2021) 101 Boston University Law Review 489, H. Hovenkamp, ‘Antitrust and Platform Monopoly’ (2021) 130 Yale Law Journal 1901, H. Hovenkamp & F. Scott Morton, ‘Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ (2020) 168 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1843, A. Klobuchar, Antitrust (Knopf 2021), C. Shapiro, ‘Antitrust. What Went Wrong and How to Fix It’ (2021) http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/fixingantitrust.pdf (accessed: July 11, 2023), M. Wörsdörfer, ‘Big Tech and Antitrust: An Ordoliberal Analysis’ (2022) 35 Philosophy & Technology Ar","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135425789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The <i>Intel</i> saga: what went wrong with the Commission’s AEC test (in the General Court’s view)?","authors":"Robert Lauer","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2242698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2242698","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe General Court’s annulment of the European Commission’s finding that Intel’s conditional rebate scheme was abusive underscores the Court’s readiness to scrutinize in detail the economic analysis, including the as-efficient competitor (AEC) test. This paper critically reviews some of the key errors that the Commission, according to the Court, made in relation to the implementation of that test, focusing on some of its main ingredients, namely the contestable share of the market, the conditional portion of the rebates, and the relevant cost benchmark. We conclude that the Court’s assessment provides useful lessons for how to perform thorough and robust economic analysis not only within the context of an AEC test but in competition cases more generally. At the same time, considering the test’s intrinsic limitations, we find that, aside from the test’s implementation, its informative value should also be explored, based on economic theory and the facts of the case.KEYWORDS: Abuse of dominant positionas-efficient competitor testexclusivity rebatesforeclosure strategymicroprocessors marketJEL: D43K21L12L42 AcknowledgmentsFor helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Nicola Tosini, David Matthew, C.-Philipp Heller, and an anonymous referee. The opinions and views stated in this text do not necessarily reflect those of my employer. All remaining errors are my own.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See Decision of the European Commission of 13 May 2009 – Intel (COMP/37.990).2 See Judgment of the General Court of 26 January 2022 – Intel v Commission (T-286/09 RENV, EU:T:2022:19).3 See Judgment, Article 1.4 See GC 2014: Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2014 – Intel v Commission (T-286/09, EU:T:2014:547).5 See CJEU 2017: Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 September 2017 – Intel v Commission (C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632).6 Judgment, para. 482.7 Judgment, para. 524.8 Judgment, para. 526.9 See James Killick, Assimakis Komninos, and Peter Citron, ‘EU General Court demands a vigorous effects-based analysis for rebates cases and annuls the European Commission’s Intel decision and the €1.06 billion fine’ (2022) White & Case <https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/eu-general-court-demands-vigorous-effects-based-analysis-rebates-cases-and-annuls>.10 See Judgment, para. 529 and Article 1.11 See Official Journal of the European Union from 7 June 2022, Appeal brought on 5 April 2022 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 26 January 2022 in Case T-286/09 RENV, Intel Corporation v Commission (case C-240/22 P).12 See Judgment, section III. B. (pp. 25–76), out of a total of 88 pages. By contrast, the GC’s assessment of the criteria set out by the CJEU receives considerably less attention; see Judgment, section III. C. (pp. 76–82).13 See Decision, para. 5.14 See Decision, Article 1 a) – d).15 See Decision, Ar","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136020867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cartel formation and the business cycle","authors":"Jesper Fredborg Huric-Larsen","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2234233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2234233","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42537054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}