Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association最新文献

A Case Study of Biosafety Considerations and Solutions for Work with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus with Large-Scale Equipment in High Biocontainment. 高致病性禽流感病毒大型设备高生物防护工作的生物安全考虑与对策研究

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0061

Nicholas J Chaplinski, Nancy Mead, David Haley, Erica Spackman

{"title":"A Case Study of Biosafety Considerations and Solutions for Work with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus with Large-Scale Equipment in High Biocontainment.","authors":"Nicholas J Chaplinski, Nancy Mead, David Haley, Erica Spackman","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0061","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0061","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction: Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV), a potential pandemic pathogen (PPP), was discovered in a new species, cattle, in March 2024 in the United States. Soon thereafter it was discovered that infectious virus could be present in milk at very high titers (up to 10 log10 50% egg infectious doses per mL). Therefore, \"emergency\" testing to confirm that current milk processing methods used to reduce bacterial pathogens were sufficient to inactivate HPAIV was needed. Continuous flow pasteurization (CFP) is the industry standard, and the conditions defined in the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration needed to be validated with HPAIV. To accomplish this, biosafety procedures for an experimental design that required a pilot-scale CFP with high volumes of HPAIV-contaminated milk needed to be developed.Methods: Numerous information sources, including subject matter experts, were utilized to acquire information for risk assessments and to develop procedures for a new, large-scale piece of equipment that required 5L of a PPP at a high titer per test.Results: Application-specific equipment such as sample and waste vessels with sealed ports, tubing with valved connection, and high efficiency particulate air-filtered vents were designed with corresponding safety procedures, such as seal integrity testing of the sample vessels.Conclusions: The use of high volumes of infectious material, the scale of the equipment, and time constraints presented unique challenges to balance biosafety and research objectives. Innovative engineering and procedural approaches allowed the research to be completed successfully in a time-sensitive manner while mitigating biosafety risk.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"132-138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179349/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Governing Dual-Use Research of Concern in the Life Sciences: United States and Canada Policy Comparative Analysis and Recommendations. 管理生命科学中值得关注的两用研究：美国和加拿大的政策比较分析和建议。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0046

Riya Manas Sharma, Yasmin Cürük, Kirke Joamets, Kurdo Araz, Conrad Kunadu

{"title":"Governing Dual-Use Research of Concern in the Life Sciences: United States and Canada Policy Comparative Analysis and Recommendations.","authors":"Riya Manas Sharma, Yasmin Cürük, Kirke Joamets, Kurdo Araz, Conrad Kunadu","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0046","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0046","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction: This study examines and compares dual-use research of concern (DURC) policies in the United States and Canada, two countries with advanced biosafety frameworks, to identify strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement in DURC governance.Methods: The study conducts a comprehensive review of current DURC policies, regulatory frameworks, and oversight mechanisms in the United States and Canada, analyzing key policy documents, including the 2024 U.S. Government Policy for Oversight of DURC and Canada's Human Pathogens and Toxins Act.Results: Both U.S. and Canadian DURC policies require principal investigators (PIs) to conduct continuous project reviews throughout the research duration and maintain dedicated advisory agencies for biosecurity. Their approaches are notably multi-layered, integrating policymaking with educational initiatives and surveillance systems. However, important differences exist in their governance strategies. The United States has specific DURC policies primarily for federally funded research, while Canadian regulations apply to all facilities handling human pathogens and toxins. Notably, Canada also employs more detailed pathogen classification and quantity specifications than the United States and requires designated biological safety officers for oversight.Conclusion: While both countries maintain robust DURC oversight frameworks, they differ in their approach to governance, scope, and implementation. Based on this analysis, five key recommendations were developed. This includes establishing an international minimum standard for DURC regulation, extending U.S. DURC legislation to non-federally funded research, developing detailed risk-benefit analysis guidelines, and strengthening policies for responsible scientific communication.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"157-166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179360/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Thrown in the Deep End: The Dual-Use Saga. 陷入困境：军民两用的传奇。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0062

Rebecca L Moritz

{"title":"Thrown in the Deep End: The Dual-Use Saga.","authors":"Rebecca L Moritz","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0062","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0062","url":null,"abstract":"This reflection shares insights from a biosafety professional's experience managing dual-use research challenges. It emphasizes the importance of proactive communication, teamwork, and transparency. In responding to high-profile, ethically complex projects involving potential pandemic pathogens, I discuss the evolving role of biosafety professionals in ensuring safety and ethical oversight while supporting scientific progress. Key lessons include the need for a proactive approach to science communication, a resilient mindset, and strategic team collaboration. Managing public scrutiny and navigating confidentiality issues underscored the necessity for transparency to foster public trust. The experience also revealed the value of biosafety professionals as essential partners in research who contribute to policy discussions and should be consulted to shape effective, responsible research practices. These lessons emphasize the need for continuous improvement in biosafety practices, promoting proactive, integrated support systems within research institutions to effectively manage complex biosafety and biosecurity challenges.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"198-203"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179359/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Landscape of Dual-Use Research Governance in Malaysia. 马来西亚军民两用研究治理的景观。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0054

Saarani Vengadesen, Lay Ching Chai, De-Ming Chau

{"title":"Landscape of Dual-Use Research Governance in Malaysia.","authors":"Saarani Vengadesen, Lay Ching Chai, De-Ming Chau","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0054","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0054","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction: Biosafety and biosecurity are critical elements of biorisk management, designed to mitigate the risk associated with intentional or unintentional release or exposure to potentially harmful biological agents. Dual-use research (DUR), research conducted with beneficial intentions but also carries the potential for misuse, has recently emerged as a form of biorisk that requires mitigation.Objectives: While biosafety and biosecurity governance already exist in Malaysia, the governance of DUR remains unexplored. The objective of this study is to assess the current state of DUR governance in Malaysia, with a focus on identifying existing gaps in institutional policies. The goal is to explore strategies and recommendations to enhance DUR governance in Malaysia.Methods: This study used a combination of desktop research and semi-structured interviews. The desktop study involved reviewing policies and guidelines related to biosafety, biosecurity, and DUR. The documents were analyzed to assess whether DUR governance is mentioned or integrated within existing biorisk frameworks. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted to gain insights into the current understanding and governance of DUR in Malaysia. The qualitative data collected through these interviews were analyzed to identify common themes and challenges.Discussion and conclusions: This study identifies significant gaps in DUR governance in Malaysia. None of the institutional guidelines that we reviewed contain DUR elements and this contributes to low researcher awareness of DUR. Experts suggest integrating DUR into existing biosafety frameworks, enhancing institutional support, and fostering a culture of self-regulation to improve governance and strengthen biorisk management.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"189-197"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179350/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The World Needs a PEPP Policy that Addresses Biosafety Loopholes Highlighted by the COVID-19 Pandemic. 世界需要一项解决COVID-19大流行突出的生物安全漏洞的公私合作政策。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0041

Alina Chan

引用次数: 0

Virologist Opinions: An Important Component for the Governance of the Convergence of Artificial Intelligence and Dual-Use Research of Concern. 病毒学家意见：人工智能与军民两用研究融合治理的重要组成部分。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0060

Matthew E Walsh, Gigi Kwik Gronvall

{"title":"Virologist Opinions: An Important Component for the Governance of the Convergence of Artificial Intelligence and Dual-Use Research of Concern.","authors":"Matthew E Walsh, Gigi Kwik Gronvall","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0060","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0060","url":null,"abstract":"Background: The convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and the life sciences has brought in silico research into policy conversations around dual-use research of concern and pathogens with enhanced pandemic potential research. This study considers the expert opinions of virologists on governance of AI and life sciences research.Methods: Semi-structured interviews with virologists were conducted and qualitatively analyzed to explore expert opinions about AI and virology. Interviewees were asked about the risks and benefits of AI, policy development considerations, and about evaluating the capability of AI tools in the field of virology.Results: Interviewed virologists generally expressed similar sentiments in responses to questions, including that benefits and risks of AI use in virology research are still to come, that policy and governance should be a process that includes virologist input, and that it is challenging to predict the capability of AI tools without experimental wet-lab validation.Discussion: Governance should be informed by expert opinions of practitioners, and it is important to consider how such opinions are incorporated. Expert opinions are valuable in understanding the impact of governance measures on beneficial research and development, and ensuring that governance measures are practicable and applicable. Virologists interviewed generally had similar opinions around AI and virology topics and often expressed an expectation that their opinions would develop over time.Conclusion: Given the uncertainty around the capability of AI technologies in the life sciences, it may be better to focus on developing frameworks for how governance measures will be developed, and to monitor developments, than to focus on specific interventions.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"124-131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179355/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Trust, but Verify: A "Just Culture" Model for Oversight of Potentially High-Risk Life Sciences Research. 信任，但要验证：监督潜在高风险生命科学研究的“公正文化”模式。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0053

Ben C Snyder, Joshua M Wentzel, Gerald L Epstein, Robert P Kadlec, Gerald W Parker

{"title":"Trust, but Verify: A \"Just Culture\" Model for Oversight of Potentially High-Risk Life Sciences Research.","authors":"Ben C Snyder, Joshua M Wentzel, Gerald L Epstein, Robert P Kadlec, Gerald W Parker","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0053","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0053","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction: A \"just culture\" balances accountability for misconduct with transparency, collaboration, and proactive engagement to address the root causes of accidents and compliance issues. Fostering a just culture in the oversight of potentially high-risk life sciences research would allow the U.S. government to improve biosafety and biosecurity while promoting beneficial research.Discussion: The authors explore four proposed elements of a just culture approach to oversight: (1) an enforcement continuum with options ranging from cooperative engagement to legal penalties, (2) non-punitive reporting of safety and security incidents, (3) technical assistance for researchers and institutions subject to oversight, and (4) outreach and two-way information sharing across the life sciences research enterprise.Conclusion: Promoting a just culture would support effective risk management by combining bottom-up scientific responsibility with top-down oversight and accountability. Implementing this approach will be challenging and require extensive stakeholder engagement, but adoption in the aviation industry shows it can succeed.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"107-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179362/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Evolution of United States Governance Policies for Research Using Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential. 美国对利用具有增强大流行潜力的病原体进行研究的治理政策的演变。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0049

Gerald L Epstein

{"title":"The Evolution of United States Governance Policies for Research Using Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential.","authors":"Gerald L Epstein","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0049","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0049","url":null,"abstract":"Background: Prompted by publications in 2012 involving the enhancement of a highly virulent but poorly transmissible human pathogen to make it more transmissible, the research community and the U.S. government have implemented policies to oversee research involving enhanced pathogens that pose the risk of causing a pandemic.Method: This article reviews the evolution of policies governing high consequence, government-funded research that has been called \"gain-of-function-research-of-concern,\" research with \"enhanced potential pandemic pathogens\" (ePPPs), and research with \"pathogens with enhanced pandemic potential\" (PEPPs). It analyzes features that these policies share and points out some of their shortcomings, challenges, and ambiguities.Results: These policies, culminating in the 2024 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual-Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential, all define a set of consequential research activities that trigger the need for additional high-level review, and they all set out principles that must be satisfied before the research can be funded.Conclusion: The 2024 policy, like its predecessors, only applies to government-funded research. Extending it to cover privately funded research would require either new regulations under existing statutory authority or new legislation. Like its predecessors, the 2024 policy requires that the benefits of PEPP research justify its potential pandemic risk. Unlike its predecessors, however, the 2024 policy is missing an important principle that prevents construction of a pandemic pathogen that-were it not for its creation in the proposed research-would have little likelihood of ever causing an actual pandemic.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"79-96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179363/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Dual-Use Research and Publication Policies: A Comparison of Journals in Life Sciences and Artificial Intelligence. 双重用途研究与出版政策：生命科学与人工智能期刊比较。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0034

Daniel J Hurst, Christopher A Bobier

{"title":"Dual-Use Research and Publication Policies: A Comparison of Journals in Life Sciences and Artificial Intelligence.","authors":"Daniel J Hurst, Christopher A Bobier","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0034","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0034","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction: Dual-use research (DUR) describes research with potential benefits that could be misapplied for harm. Policy on DUR is often limited to life sciences research. However, recently, there have been demonstrations of how research with dual-use concerns may extend beyond the life sciences to artificial intelligence (AI). One method of ensuring that research with dual-use concerns is not misapplied for harm is by censoring scientific journal articles. Journals may have policy on managing article submissions with potential DUR concerns. This study compared the policies of life science and AI journals toward DUR.Methods: Google Scholar Metrics and Scimago Journal and Country Rank were utilized to identify and select the top 20 publications in fields of life sciences and AI by specific metrics. The publicly accessible websites of each journal were searched to ascertain their publication policies regarding DUR. Journals and/or publishers were contacted if no policy was located.Results: From Google Scholar, 12/20 journals within the \"Life Sciences & Earth Sciences\" category had policies on DUR; from Scimago, 9/16 of the \"Biochemistry, Genetics, and Molecular Biology\" category had policies; and 8/19 of the \"Immunology and Microbiology\" category had policies. For AI journals, 2/13 journals from Google Scholar had policies; 4/15 journals from Scimago had policies.Conclusion: More journals in the life sciences have extant policies on how to handle article submissions with DUR concerns. Very few AI journals have policies.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"97-106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179373/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Dual-Use Research of Concern Landscape in Southeast Asia: Prioritization, Gaps, and Challenges. 东南亚关注景观的双重用途研究：优先顺序、差距与挑战。

Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association Pub Date : 2025-06-05 eCollection Date: 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1089/apb.2024.0055

Mely Caballero-Anthony, Jose Ma Luis Montesclaros, Jeselyn, Julius Cesar Trajano

{"title":"Dual-Use Research of Concern Landscape in Southeast Asia: Prioritization, Gaps, and Challenges.","authors":"Mely Caballero-Anthony, Jose Ma Luis Montesclaros, Jeselyn, Julius Cesar Trajano","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0055","DOIUrl":"10.1089/apb.2024.0055","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the governance of dual-use research of concern (DURC) in Southeast Asia, highlighting both progress and persistent gaps in biosafety and biosecurity. While significant developments have been made in biosafety and biosecurity, the region remains underprepared to address the complexities of DURC. This underpreparedness stems from diverse factors, including varying levels of exposure to biosecurity threats across countries, competing priorities within national biosecurity agendas, limited awareness of DURC issues, and weak institutional capacity to implement effective oversight mechanisms. These factors create inconsistencies in the implementation of DURC governance across countries, undermining efforts to establish robust safeguards against potential misuse of scientific research. The article argues that addressing these domestic issues is crucial for building more effective DURC governance frameworks. Strengthening national policies, improving institutional capabilities, and fostering awareness of DURC risks are essential steps toward mitigating biosecurity threats and ensuring the responsible conduct of research within the region.","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"178-188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179371/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144478505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0