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Journal of Theoretical Politics最新文献

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Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war 权力转移、军事不确定性和战争
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-09-16 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820956304
William Spaniel
{"title":"Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war","authors":"William Spaniel","doi":"10.1177/0951629820956304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820956304","url":null,"abstract":"In many contexts, patrons wish to simultaneously increase a protégé’s military power while reducing the probability of war between that protégé and its enemy. Are these goals compatible? I show that the answer is yes when states face uncertainty over a class of military allotments. Arms transfers mitigate the information problem by making both strong and weak types behave more similarly. This encourages uninformed states to make safer demands, which decreases the probability of war. As a result, transfers to the informed actor both increase bargaining power and enhance efficiency under these conditions.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"538 - 556"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820956304","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41797588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Should I stay or should I go? British voter you got to let me know! Prime Ministers, intra-party conflict, and membership referendums in the British Westminster model 我该留下还是走?英国选民，你得让我知道!英国威斯敏斯特模式下的首相、党内冲突和成员公投
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-09-15 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820956273
T. König, Xiao Lu
{"title":"Should I stay or should I go? British voter you got to let me know! Prime Ministers, intra-party conflict, and membership referendums in the British Westminster model","authors":"T. König, Xiao Lu","doi":"10.1177/0951629820956273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820956273","url":null,"abstract":"We explain the referendums on British membership of the European Communities and European Union from a principal–agent perspective between the Prime Minister and the rank-and-file. We show that announcing a referendum on the Prime Minister’s membership proposal helps the incumbent party to win the general election when the rank-and-file is divided on the terms of membership. When the Prime Minister overcomes the rank-and-file’s mistrust of her effectiveness in negotiating new membership terms with other member states, the voters are more likely to follow her proposal. However, when intra-party controversies reveal principal–agent problems, the initially uninformed voters can learn about the dysfunctionality of the terms and are more likely to reject the Prime Minister’s proposal.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"557 - 581"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820956273","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48428350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem 财政联邦制的政治:构建一个更强的分权定理
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-08-27 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820956287
Raúl A. Ponce-Rodríguez, Charles R. Hankla, J. Martínez-Vázquez, Eunice Heredia-Ortiz
{"title":"The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem","authors":"Raúl A. Ponce-Rodríguez, Charles R. Hankla, J. Martínez-Vázquez, Eunice Heredia-Ortiz","doi":"10.1177/0951629820956287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820956287","url":null,"abstract":"We explore how party structures can condition the benefits of decentralization in modern democracies. In particular, we study the interaction of two political institutions: democratic (de)centralization (whether a country has fiscally autonomous and elected local governments) and party (non)integration (whether power over local party leaders flows upwards through party institutions, which we model using control over candidate selection). We incorporate these institutions into our strong decentralization theorem, which expands on Oates (1972) to examine when the decentralized provision of public services will dominate centralized provision even in the presence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Our findings suggest that, when externalities are present, democratic decentralization will be beneficial only when parties are integrated. In countries with non-integrated parties, we find that the participation rules of primaries have implications for the expected gains from democratic decentralization. Under blanket primaries, Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem holds but our strong decentralization theorem does not. By contrast, when primaries are closed, not even Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem holds.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"605 - 639"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820956287","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46822575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Axioms for defeat in democratic elections 民主选举失败的公理
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-08-15 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211043236
W. Holliday, E. Pacuit
{"title":"Axioms for defeat in democratic elections","authors":"W. Holliday, E. Pacuit","doi":"10.1177/09516298211043236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211043236","url":null,"abstract":"We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of Kenneth Arrow’s famous condition of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We call this weakening Coherent IIA. We prove that the five axioms plus Coherent IIA single out a method of determining defeats studied in our recent work: Split Cycle. In particular, Split Cycle provides the most resolute definition of defeat among any satisfying the six axioms for democratic defeat. In addition, we analyze how Split Cycle escapes Arrow’s impossibility theorem and related impossibility results.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"475 - 524"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42704498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Security in the absence of a state: Traditional authority, livestock trading, and maritime piracy in northern Somalia 没有国家的安全：索马里北部的传统权威、牲畜贸易和海盗行为
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-08-05 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820941110
Avidit Acharya, R. Harding, J. Harris
{"title":"Security in the absence of a state: Traditional authority, livestock trading, and maritime piracy in northern Somalia","authors":"Avidit Acharya, R. Harding, J. Harris","doi":"10.1177/0951629820941110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820941110","url":null,"abstract":"Without a strong state, how do institutions emerge to limit the impact of one group’s predation on another’s economic activities? Motivated by the case of northern Somalia, we develop a model that highlights the monitoring challenges that groups face in making cooperation self-enforcing, and two key factors that influence their likelihood of overcoming this challenge: the ratio of economic interests across productive and predatory sectors, and the existence of informal income-sharing institutions. Our model explains why conflicts between pirates and livestock traders can be resolved in the region of Somaliland, where the ratio of economic interests favors the productive sector and traditional institutions promote income sharing between groups, but not in the region of Puntland, where these conditions do not hold. The model also accounts for several of the empirical patterns in the relationships between piracy, livestock exports, and conflict in both regions.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"497 - 537"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820941110","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45983422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
When strategic uninformed abstention improves democratic accountability 当战略性的不知情弃权改善民主问责制时
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820926699
Gento Kato
{"title":"When strategic uninformed abstention improves democratic accountability","authors":"Gento Kato","doi":"10.1177/0951629820926699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820926699","url":null,"abstract":"The recent development in formal studies of elections produced two sets of findings that question the custom to treat voter information as a prerequisite for competent democratic decision-making. One argues that uninformed abstention is an effective strategy to approximate informed electoral outcome, and another suggests that uninformed voters may motivate strategic political elites to improve accountability. This article bridges and extends these two findings by analyzing strategic incentives in the comprehensive voting model with abstention and its connection with electoral accountability. The proposed model offers a contextual explanation for two contrasting logic in uninformed abstention, delegation and discouragement, and shows that uninformed voting with abstention sometimes improves accountability. Furthermore, uninformed abstention is more effective in generating democratically preferred outcome under delegatory than discouraged context. The results make a significant addition to the existing accountability literature by providing a more general mechanism by which less voter information improves policy outcomes.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"366 - 388"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820926699","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44370581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator’s dilemma 人格崇拜、偏好造假与独裁者的困境
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820927790
C. Crabtree, H. L. Kern, David A. Siegel
{"title":"Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator’s dilemma","authors":"C. Crabtree, H. L. Kern, David A. Siegel","doi":"10.1177/0951629820927790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820927790","url":null,"abstract":"We offer a novel rational explanation for cults of personality. Participation in a cult of personality is psychologically costly whenever it involves preference falsification, with the costs varying across individuals. We highlight two characteristics associated with lower individual costs of preference falsification: (i) loyalty to the regime and (ii) unscrupulousness. Different characteristics might serve the regime better in different roles. Using a simple formal screening model, we demonstrate that one’s participation in a cult of personality improves the dictator’s personnel decisions under a wide variety of circumstances. Decisions are most improved when subordinates’ characteristics that better enable cult participation are correspondingly valued by dictators. Dictators who can manipulate the costs that cult participants pay find it easiest to ensure that correspondence. Our model also highlights the importance to dictators of not believing their own propaganda, and their need to offer increasingly extreme acts of cult participation as old acts become normalized.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"409 - 434"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820927790","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46985546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Editors’ introduction to JTP issue 32(3) 编辑介绍JTP第32期（3）
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820934967
Torun Dewan, John W. Patty
{"title":"Editors’ introduction to JTP issue 32(3)","authors":"Torun Dewan, John W. Patty","doi":"10.1177/0951629820934967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820934967","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"363 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820934967","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48567529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A majoritarian basis for judicial countermajoritarianism 司法反多数主义的多数主义基础
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820927784
J. Rogers, J. Ura
{"title":"A majoritarian basis for judicial countermajoritarianism","authors":"J. Rogers, J. Ura","doi":"10.1177/0951629820927784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820927784","url":null,"abstract":"Judicial protection of disfavored minorities against oppressive legislation in majoritarian separation-of-power systems raises a puzzle: Why don’t legislative majorities enacting discriminatory legislation curb judicial power when judges use their power to protect minorities and stymie the legislation? We answer this question by showing that judicial protection of disfavored minorities can emerge as an unintended by-product of majoritarian politics. We develop a model that includes the two aspects of judicial review Alexander Hamilton discusses in The Federalist No. 78: Judicial protection of disfavored minorities against hostile popular majorities, and judicial protection of majority interests against legislative depredation. It is the institutional linkage between these functions that induces popular majorities, within limits, to side with judges against legislatures even when those judges protect minorities that popular majorities want to oppress.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"435 - 459"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820927784","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45872690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme 威权选举作为一种激励机制
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-05-05 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820910563
Hao Hong, Tsz-Ning Wong
{"title":"Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme","authors":"Hao Hong, Tsz-Ning Wong","doi":"10.1177/0951629820910563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820910563","url":null,"abstract":"Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control hinders the introduction of elections, but mild electoral control facilitates it. Our findings offer a new perspective on understanding authoritarian elections and explain many stylized facts in authoritarian regimes.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"460 - 493"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820910563","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48464674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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