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Journal of Theoretical Politics最新文献

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A global game of diplomacy 全球外交游戏
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-09-18 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875517
Matt Malis, Alastair Smith
{"title":"A global game of diplomacy","authors":"Matt Malis, Alastair Smith","doi":"10.1177/0951629819875517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875517","url":null,"abstract":"Diplomacy always occurs in the shadow of domestic political competition. We develop a model of top-level diplomatic exchange between an incumbent and a foreign leader, embedded within a global game of regime change, and examine four mechanisms that induce a relationship between diplomatic visits and regime survival. First, the foreign leader chooses to visit incumbents who are ex ante more secure in office (a selection effect). Second, because the foreign leader’s decision is based partly on private information, the citizens update on the revelation of that information (a learning effect) and are discouraged from mounting a challenge. Third, the foreign leader can bolster the incumbent’s strength in office with a transfer of material support (a strengthening effect). The latter two effects are then amplified by the complementarities in the citizens’ strategies (a multiplier effect). Contrary to standard global games results, we show that increased precision in the public information transmitted strategically by the foreign power induces a unique equilibrium, as citizens coordinate on the foreign leader’s action. Our findings explain why leaders are so eager to receive state visits from major world powers.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819875517","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46555254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Separation of powers with ideological parties 意识形态政党分权
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-08-01 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211017236
A. Forteza, J. Pereyra
{"title":"Separation of powers with ideological parties","authors":"A. Forteza, J. Pereyra","doi":"10.1177/09516298211017236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211017236","url":null,"abstract":"Separation of powers with checks and balances (SP) is usually regarded as a key institution complementing elections in the control of elected officials. However, some analysts and many politicians also warn that excessive checks on the executive in the presence of polarization may lead to political inaction. We analyze the interaction between elections and SP, and study under what circumstances they complement each other. We first introduce a political agency model with ideological parties where citizens and politicians care about rents (a valence issue) and policy (a positional issue). Then, we analyze the impact of SP on the effectiveness of elections to discipline and select politicians. We demonstrate that SP unambiguously raises a majority of voters’ welfare in highly polarized non-competitive political environments, because it strengthens both discipline and selection without causing political gridlock. SP also raises voters’ welfare if elections are very effective at disciplining first period incumbents. Nevertheless, SP may reduce voters’ welfare if most rents go undetected and reform is not a first-order issue.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/09516298211017236","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48018247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lobbying dynamics 游说动态
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819850630
D. Baron
{"title":"Lobbying dynamics","authors":"D. Baron","doi":"10.1177/0951629819850630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819850630","url":null,"abstract":"Many if not most government policies, regulations, and laws continue in effect unless changed by the legislature, providing a natural dynamic to the political process. Lobbying is a ubiquitous component of that process and can affect both proposal making and voting. This paper characterizes Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic legislative bargaining model with stable policies and durable coalitions despite lobbying. Interest groups aligned with challenges to the incumbent coalition have a greater willingness to pay than have the defending interest groups, but the defenders have a legislative incumbency advantage in needing to counter-lobby fewer legislators than the challengers lobby. If legislators are sufficiently patient, equilibria exist such that the defenders of the incumbent coalition are successful. More than a minimal majority may be lobbied by the challengers, and coalitions can be surplus. Lobbying can increase proposal power, resulting in a more unequal distribution within a coalition.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819850630","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46875017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Terrorism prevention with reelection concerns and valence competition 考虑连任和价格竞争的恐怖主义预防
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819858666
Haritz Garro
{"title":"Terrorism prevention with reelection concerns and valence competition","authors":"Haritz Garro","doi":"10.1177/0951629819858666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819858666","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, fear of terrorism has increased among voters in liberal democracies. In response, governments have adopted counterterrorist measures that curtail civil liberties, at times prompting allegations that political expediency underlies such measures. I study politicians’ strategic design of counterterrorist policies in a model of valence competition under threat of terrorism. The incumbent chooses a counterterrorist strategy that combines observable (state of emergency) and unobservable (effort) actions. In equilibrium, emergencies and terrorist attacks become endogenously informative about valence. The low-valence incumbent underprovides effort relative to the high-valence incumbent, and at times declares a state of emergency in the absence of a terrorist threat. Increasing voters’ information about the incumbent’s valence improves politician selection, but at the expense of a higher incidence of unwarranted emergencies and, under some conditions, terrorist attacks.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819858666","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41688937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 31.3 JTP第31.3期编辑简介
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819863171
Torun Dewan, John W. Patty
{"title":"Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 31.3","authors":"Torun Dewan, John W. Patty","doi":"10.1177/0951629819863171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819863171","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819863171","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43061804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What are the effects of entry of new extremist parties on the policy platforms of mainstream parties? 新的极端主义政党进入主流政党的政策纲领会产生什么影响？
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-06-27 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819854138
S. Merrill, B. Grofman
{"title":"What are the effects of entry of new extremist parties on the policy platforms of mainstream parties?","authors":"S. Merrill, B. Grofman","doi":"10.1177/0951629819854138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819854138","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the consequences to policy-seeking, center-left and center-right parties under proportional representation following entry by extremist parties either at one or both ends of a unidimensional political spectrum. Assuming a symmetric, unimodal voter distribution, we show that the entry of a single extremist party on either the left or right drives both mainstream parties in the direction opposite to the extremist party. We argue that this three-party scenario is the most empirically relevant case in contemporary European politics. We also extend results of Casamatta and De Donder that project moderation of mainstream parties at equilibrium for PR elections with two extremist parties – one on each end – to a symmetric, unimodal voter distribution. In a setting not considered by these authors, we show that this moderating effect on the mainstream parties for a symmetric voter distribution is reversed if the voter distribution is sufficiently bimodal.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819854138","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46774576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems 廉价谈话在集体行动问题中的功效
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-06-12 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819850625
Brenton Kenkel
{"title":"The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems","authors":"Brenton Kenkel","doi":"10.1177/0951629819850625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819850625","url":null,"abstract":"Incomplete information exacerbates the problems inherent in collective action. Participants cannot efficiently coordinate their actions if they do not know each other’s preferences. I investigate when ordinary communication, or cheap talk, may resolve mutual uncertainty in collective action problems. I find that the efficacy of communication depends critically on the relationship between contributions and the value of the joint project. The incentive barriers to honesty are highest when every contribution increases the project’s value. Participants then have a strict incentive to say whatever would induce others to contribute the most, so cheap talk lacks credibility. By contrast, when contributions may be marginally worthless, such as when the project has no value unless contributions hit a certain threshold, communication may help participants avoid wasted effort. Using these findings, I identify which collective action problems in politics might benefit from communication and which require more expensive solutions to overcome uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819850625","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44675445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A theory of policy sabotage 政策破坏论
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-06-10 DOI: 10.1177/09516298221085974
Alexander V. Hirsch, Jonathan P. Kastellec
{"title":"A theory of policy sabotage","authors":"Alexander V. Hirsch, Jonathan P. Kastellec","doi":"10.1177/09516298221085974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221085974","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a theory of policymaking that examines when policy sabotage—the deliberate choice by an opposition party to interfere with the implementation of a policy—can be an effective electoral strategy, even if rational voters can observe that it is happening. In our model, a potential saboteur chooses whether to sabotage an incumbent’s policy by blocking its successful implementation. A voter then decides whether to retain the incumbent, who is of unknown ability, or to select a challenger. We find that the incentives for sabotage are broadly shaped by the underlying popularity of the incumbent—it is most attractive when an incumbent is somewhat unpopular. If so, sabotage may decrease the probability the incumbent is reelected, even though sabotage is observable to the voter. This is because while the saboteur knows that sabotage will improve the incumbent’s reputation, he fears that absent sabotage a policy success will improve that reputation even more.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42369984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Competing signals in the judicial hierarchy 司法等级制度中的竞争信号
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-06-06 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819850626
Joshua A Strayhorn
{"title":"Competing signals in the judicial hierarchy","authors":"Joshua A Strayhorn","doi":"10.1177/0951629819850626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819850626","url":null,"abstract":"Political principals often face information deficits. This is especially true of the US judicial hierarchy; extant theories of ideological monitoring in this setting have therefore explored informational cues such as lower court ideology or dissent. Canonical models of this setting, however, have omitted litigants, implicity assuming they are not an important source of information. This paper develops a formal model that considers whether litigants can credibly signal information about noncompliance, and how litigants’ signals interact with the cues of ideology and dissent. The model shows that litigant signals can be highly informative about doctrinal compliance, sometimes even crowding out the need for other signals. By contrast, litigants face difficulty communicating information about case importance; dissent, however, can be highly informative on this dimension. Accordingly, some informational cues may only influence limited aspects of the high court’s case selection process.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819850626","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45838072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The stability of multi-level governments 多层次政府的稳定性
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-05-24 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984852
Enriqueta Aragonès, C. Ponsati
{"title":"The stability of multi-level governments","authors":"Enriqueta Aragonès, C. Ponsati","doi":"10.1177/0951629820984852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984852","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such government structures stable. We also show that if leaders care about electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820984852","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44104418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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