Competing signals in the judicial hierarchy

Political principals often face information deficits. This is especially true of the US judicial hierarchy; extant theories of ideological monitoring in this setting have therefore explored informational cues such as lower court ideology or dissent. Canonical models of this setting, however, have omitted litigants, implicity assuming they are not an important source of information. This paper develops a formal model that considers whether litigants can credibly signal information about noncompliance, and how litigants’ signals interact with the cues of ideology and dissent. The model shows that litigant signals can be highly informative about doctrinal compliance, sometimes even crowding out the need for other signals. By contrast, litigants face difficulty communicating information about case importance; dissent, however, can be highly informative on this dimension. Accordingly, some informational cues may only influence limited aspects of the high court’s case selection process.